In his recently published book, Waste Land, entitled after T. S. Eliot’s seminal modernist poem depicting cultural decay and spiritual desolation, Robert D. Kaplan presents a bleak vision of the disintegrating global order as we know it. In an ever-interconnected world marked by rapid geopolitical transformations and mounting existential threats, citizens in contemporary societies often find themselves disoriented, suffocating and in need of coherent responses to prevalent crises. Accelerating technological innovation has shrunk geographical distance, intensifying global interdependence to an unprecedented degree. While this shrinkage of geographical boundaries offers unparalleled opportunities for learning and new forms of global collaborations, it simultaneously fosters a paradoxical sense of oppressive proximity, leading to alienation, claustrophobia and loneliness. This in turn, might fuel the rise of radicalization, emerging precisely from the friction between hyper-connectivity and the erosion of meaningful distance in the shrinking world.
Kaplan’s historical analysis comments on the adverse effects of technological developments, demographic changes, accelerated urbanization, resource scarcity, climate change, and mass migration. Resulting economic challenges and political instability, even when occurring in seemingly peripheral regions, metastasize into global disturbances, reshaping political, social, and cultural landscapes worldwide. At the core of Kaplan’s thesis lies a compelling historical analogy of the inter-war Weimar Republic, whose fragmented political system and structural vulnerabilities led to localised crises capable of threatening the integrity of the entire state. Kaplan transposes this historical lesson onto the contemporary global arena, where the erosion of sovereignty and the shrinking of geographical boundaries mean that instability in one region—whether economic collapse, armed conflict or state failure—undermines the stability of other regions in the inter-connected world.
‘Geography is not disappearing. It is only shrinking. Indeed, the smaller the world becomes because of technology, the more that every place in it becomes important.’
—Robert D. Kaplan
As can be observed in the modern Western liberal world, even well-established democracies, based on a defined set of virtues and independent institutional design representing a separation of power between the legislative, judicial and executive branches, can be very fragile and thus undermined.
The resurgence of authoritarian populism as well as the erosion of institutions and hierarchies—most prominently displayed during the first weeks of the “Trump 2.0 presidency”—exposes the vulnerability of these democratic structures. Kaplan’s critique extends beyond the United States, implicating a broader spectrum of Western democracies whose institutions and political order is similarly threatened. This political instability has resulting economic consequences, leading to further negative spillovers to other parts of the world.
Kaplan also highlights the ideological confrontation between Western liberalism—based on universalist commitment to human rights, rule of law, and environmental stewardship—and the political and ideological ambitions of rapidly modernising authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China. The global ramifications of this ideological cleavage further exacerbate international security threats. At the same time, the global ramifications of existing cleavages are further worsened by existing threats. The impact of climate change, pandemics or supply chain blockages in the most distant geographies, can have large implications on the global economy. As exemplified by Covid-19 pandemic, supply chains, economic stability and global health infrastructure can be radically impacted by an emerging health emergency rapidly spilling across the globe.
Much like in Anne Applebaum’s recent book Autocracy Inc., Kaplan reminds us that while the liberal democratic “West” alliances might be eroding, new partnerships and alliances are emerging based on a different set of normative and instrumental values. In an increasingly interconnected world, the absence of effective global governance mechanism able to manage the inter-linked economies and social systems had led to systemic vulnerabilities of the world order. The lack of a legitimate global order, as Kaplan argues, could create an opening for conflict and the end of the global order as we know it.
According to Kaplan, the inter-connected world, where only parts are ‘moderately and democratically governed’, is a geo-political Weimar due to ‘close interactions, including shattering of powers from within, great and small’. Kaplan argues that the three global imperial powers, China, the United States and Russia, are all currently in decline for different reasons. The world is at a dangerous juncture where conflict and chaos seem imminent due to advancing military technology, economic warfare and intensifying geopolitical clashes.
Kaplan’s descriptions of the inter-connected world order can remind one of the Thucydides Trap, a concept in international relations coined by political scientist Graham Allison that describes the increased risk of conflict when a rising power threatens to displace an established hegemon. Although Kaplan doesn’t directly cite Allison, the thematic overlap is evident. He invokes Thucydides’ observations to contextualize tensions between the United States and revisionist powers like China, whose rapid ascent disrupts existing power hierarchies. Nevertheless, Kaplan’s reliance on a deterministic perspective invites a familiar criticism often levied against Allison. While prevalent and realistic, potential dangers inherent to power transitions are not a determined outcome. Instead, they underscore the importance of proactive diplomacy, institutional resilience and strategic planning to maintain peace. At the same time, global problems, such as climate change or pandemics, require global solutions and even autocratic regimes will need to rely on collaboration when their safety is under threat. Kaplan’s analysis could benefit from a study of counterfactuals, hypothesizing how conflicts could be averted, which mechanisms of crisis management should be deployed and how we can strengthen confidence in a multilateral world order. Moreover, Kaplan should engage with scholarly thought which reflects on the stabilising power of globalisation and technological progress.
In the context of geopolitical inter-connectedness, Kaplan does not forget the role of individuals. He aptly presents a juxtaposition of mass psychology and elite behaviour. He paints a dismal picture of social-media-obsessed and lonely people who engage in group-think tailored to their ideological fraction. Such individuals form masses living in an increasingly urbanized and globalized world. Their leaders, in turn, reflect this dynamic—what Kaplan names a ‘Shakespearean decline,’ in which political figures become driven by their own inner daemons, paranoia, and political appetites. The result is an increasingly demagogic elite with dangerous and unpredictable tendencies. At the same time, in the world with many global challenges on the horizon, fast responses, as well as strong, decisive and level-headed leadership in fundamental.
Yet, Kaplan adopts a fatalist tone. He warns that Putin’s eventual exit from the political scene will leave Russia in a state of anarchy and confusion. He also predicts less stability for ‘rapidly arming, more nationalist and tumultuous China under Leninist rule’, and that many Middle Eastern regimes will struggle to adopt functioning democratic institutions, instead falling into tyranny or anarchy. Kaplan contrasts states aiming to preserve the status quo, such as the Gulf States or the Eurasian Heartland, against the revolutionaries, for instance Iran and China. In a broader context of geopolitical relations, one might want to remain cautious when placing countries into camps directly positioned against each other, possibly creating a self-serving deterministic narrative, which inevitably leads to a clash. Nevertheless, what is evident is that many of Kaplan’s predictions will be tested by the trial of time in the upcoming decades.
Kaplan’s closing argument rests on a bleak premise: the liberal West is losing structural ground so rapidly that policy prescriptions are a fool’s errand. If this is indeed his settled conviction, the absence of remedies is internally consistent, even principled, because offering hopeful solutions would only mislead readers. Yet consistency alone does not absolve the analysis of responsibility; a diagnosis without any therapeutic horizon leaves both scholars and practitioners with little guidance for action.
From a normative standpoint, such fatalism is unsatisfying for at least three reasons. First, liberal orders have historically rejuvenated themselves through institutional adaptation and coalition-building, suggesting agency still matters. Second, technological progress—especially in clean energy and digital governance—creates strategic opportunities that Kaplan scarcely acknowledges. Third, articulating even provisional paths forward sharpens public debate and tests underlying assumptions. By ending on a resigned note, Kaplan forfeits the chance to turn his impressive historiography into a constructive agenda, and the reader is left informed yet purposeless—a conclusion that undercuts the book’s otherwise formidable contribution.