As apprehension surrounding a second Trump administration and its implications for the world are on the rise, OPR’s Senior Global Politics Editor Michael Wakin had an opportunity to sit down with the president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Richard Haass, who has had an intimate vantage point into U.S. foreign policy discourse and formulation since the beginning of the post-Cold War order. Dr Haass has worked in Democratic and Republican administrations dating back to President Jimmy Carter—holding positions including special assistant to President George H.W. Bush from 1989 to 1993, Director of Policy Planning for the Department of State under President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2003, U.S. coordinator for policy towards the future of Afghanistan, and U.S. envoy to the Northern Ireland peace process. After leaving government, Dr Haass served as President of the CFR, one of the most influential American think tanks on U.S. foreign policy, from 2003 to 2023.
The wide-ranging conversation touched on the current moment—including U.S. policy vis-à-vis Syria following the ouster of former President Bashar al-Assad, President Trump’s national security and foreign policy nominations, and the utility of tariffs as a U.S. policy instrument. The discussion then shifted to a more reflective tenor as Dr Haass detailed several of the most dramatic changes in consensus of U.S. foreign policy that he witnessed during his twenty-year run leading the CFR.
Notable among Dr Haass’s comments, he described as “preposterous” the claim by Trump’s pick for Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, that wokeness is one the greatest challenges facing the U.S. military. On the centrality of international law to U.S. decision making, he said, ‘I’ve never been in an administration where international law played a significant role in determining policy.’ In assessing the consistency and prudence of U.S. decision making over the past two decades, he declared that ‘this has not been a golden age of American foreign policy’, a failing that he linked to a broader erosion of order and stability in the world.
The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Michael Wakin (OPR): The developments in Syria and removal of Assad from power are on the front of many peoples’ minds at the moment. What seems most shocking was the speed with which the rebels took Damascus, particularly when it felt like just yesterday countries were preparing to normalize relations with Assad. What is your immediate reaction to the events and what could U.S. policy towards a post-Assad Syria look like?
Richard Haass (RH): I was surprised along with everybody else. I think we underestimated one thing and missed another. What we underestimated was just how dependent or reliant the Syrian regime was on external help—above all, Hezbollah and also Russia. We should not have been as surprised as we were because Russia, for example, was so central—its aircraft a decade ago—in helping the regime defeat the opposition. But anyhow, we missed—I would say most people missed—the degree of dependence.
Second of all, there is something about what I describe as these highly personalistic regimes. They are essentially not institutionalized. They are built around a person or family. You have a narrow base of security forces that keep them in power, guarding against coups or what have you. These systems are brittle or vulnerable and then momentum can switch very quickly. That is what happened here.
On U.S. policy post-Assad, I think we do have interests. We do not want to see Syria emerge as a safe haven for terrorism. We do not want to see ISIS regain a base… We have got 800 to 900 troops there, presumably to help prevent that. I would like to think we have some allegiance to the Kurdish forces. But my sense is we will have a limited role militarily at this point.
We could have an interesting role diplomatically through economics because we could condition our support to this or that group, particularly if one were to emerge triumphant or ascendant…I think we have larger interests elsewhere in the region, particularly with Iran. But that does not mean we ought to have a hands-off policy [towards Syria]. We obviously have interests and we obviously have preferences.
OPR: I would like to ask about Trump’s foreign policy and national security nominees. A general consensus seems to be emerging that many of his nominees are more motivated by personal loyalty than experience and expertise, perhaps with the exceptions of Senator Rubio as Secretary of State and Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor. First, do you agree with this consensus and if so, given your experience holding positions in government, do you think these loyalists will actually help or hurt Trump’s ability to advance his international agenda?
RH: I would say both Rubio and Waltz are…more traditional. They are more internationalists. They have certain views about Iran or China that are pretty mainstream and so forth. They are both experienced in Congress. Waltz has had experience in the Executive Branch. [John] Radcliffe has already had a turn in the intelligence community in Trump 1.0.
Some of the others, such as the [Pete] Hegseth nominee for Defense or Tulsi Gabbard are obviously very different. I think there are real questions about their qualifications. They clearly lack requisite experience. I am uneasy when someone like Hegseth seems to think or say that the biggest challenge facing the US military is wokeness. I find that preposterous. I have got about 100 challenges before I would mention that, if I mentioned it at all. Gabbard has shown, shall we say, questionable judgment along the way. But I do not know if they are going to get confirmed. And then once they are confirmed, we will see how the administration plays out.
OPR: I wanted to touch on your views on the credibility of President Trump’s threat to use tariffs, which of course have been dramatic and far-reaching. Some defenders, like Scott Bessent—Trump’s pick for Treasury Secretary—argue that these are simply an aggressive negotiating tactic. Others note that if implemented, they could radically reshape how the U.S. generates revenue. How real are these threats to you?
RH: [Tariffs] can’t revolutionize how the United States generates revenue. Tariffs don’t have that ability. I think the real question is whether they are tools of leverage to be reduced or removed depending on policies from the target country. For example, Mexico. I would think Mr. Trump will want to reinstate what’s called ‘Remain in Mexico’. When someone applies for asylum, they have to stay [in Mexico] until their case is heard. So tariffs or the threat of tariffs against Mexico could be a mechanism or an instrument. That’s one way to think about these projected tariffs. It could be used against other countries to tighten controls on fentanyl or precursors, any number of things.
Tariffs could also be used as ends in themselves to essentially compensate for a one-sided trade imbalance. The United States has put many tariffs in place already under the Biden administration or kept them in part to compensate for what’s seen as unfair Chinese subsidies of certain exports. So, tariffs can be narrowly economic. They could be used also for import substitution. The idea is to create a barrier so American firms suddenly find themselves in a more competitive position. If Mr. Trump wants to try to resurrect American manufacturing, then tariffs can be a tool for that. There’s a lot of evidence suggesting it’s an awfully expensive way to go about it. The cost per job tends to be enormous
So again, my guess is it might be a mix of all these things. They could be used as a tool of leverage to bring about non-economic policy changes on the part of a target country, could be used for classic protectionist reasons, or could be used as a fair response to subsidies or dumping. The idea, though, that they’re going to fundamentally generate significant revenues seems to me preposterous. I think there’s risks about rekindling inflation. And people seem to also forget that other countries have tools as well, that if we slap on tariffs, they can slap on tariffs.
OPR: Moving on to the two conflicts that have dominated global events. This is more of a question about international law. The U.S. has remained steadfast in its support of Israel amid its assault of Gaza, which has led to humanitarian catastrophe and has been called a genocide most recently by Amnesty International. ICJ recently issued arrest warrants Netanyahu and Defence Minister Gallant. The U.S., who is of course not a party to the ICJ, has fundamentally rejected these arrest warrants. On the other hand, Biden expressed support for the ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin on the grounds of war crimes. How should we make sense of this distinction? And what if anything can we learn about how U.S. policymakers think about international law?
RH: Those who are lawyers are not going to like what I say. I did, by the way for the record, study international law at Oxford. And I’m not a lawyer. I’ve worked for four different administrations, Democrat and Republican and I’ve never been in an administration where international law played a significant role in determining policy. At most, it’s a minor consideration. Geopolitics, economics matters, if you will. Other considerations triumph. Second of all, international law is a complicated area. It is inevitably questions of jurisdiction, of consistency, and so forth.
So these institutions like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC), there are real questions about their fairness, consistency, and selectivity. My own view as foreign policy person is I don’t put them at the centre of much of anything. That is not to say I ignore legal considerations. I wrote a book called War of Necessity, War of Choice. I think a lot about ‘just war theory’. [International law] can be helpful in thinking through these issues as a policymaker. They become very important as ways of making the case for what you’re doing or not doing with broader public. I think they should be considerations.
I’m critical, for example, of what Israel, for the most part, has done in Gaza— not based on international legal precepts, but simply based on policy considerations. I don’t think it is in Israel’s self-interest. I don’t think it is in the United States’ self-interest. I’m critical of how Israel has gone about using military force and I’m critical about how Israel hasn’t introduced a political dimension to its policy to try to marginalize Hamas.
By and large, these organs like the ICC and ICJ and so forth, they’re seen as so controversial. I don’t find them particularly useful venues because you end up arguing about the consistency and fairness of the venue rather than the issues. So, my view is rather than making moral judgments about the issues or legal judgments, let’s just make really smart policy judgments about what is being done and how it’s being done and whether we believe it is a smart, fair, right, what have you.
OPR: As someone who has overseen the Council on Foreign Relations which maintains this privileged position of shaping ideas and knowledge creation, I’m very curious to hear some of the most dramatic shifts in consensus around U.S. foreign policy that you’ve witnessed?
RH: I was fortunate enough to help lead the Council on Foreign Relations for 20 years, from 2003 to 2023, which is a long run. Let me just mention a few things that occur to me. One is we saw a major change in attitudes towards China. At the beginning of that time, the whole idea was to integrate China into the global economy in the hopes that China would become more politically open at home, more market-oriented, and more moderate in its foreign policy. We brought China into the WTO and other mechanisms. We began to trade and invest extensively with it. And none of those [reforms] happened. China became more repressive at home, more statist economically, and more aggressive in its foreign policy. What we saw, particularly beginning with the first Trump administration and then continued by the Biden administration, was a real rethinking of U.S.-China relations. It was much more critical.
Second of all, when I began, the hope was still that we could establish a good relationship with Russia. There was still some optimism about U.S. relations with Russia. And here we are 20 years later, and there’s no optimism. Instead, Russia has carried out serial aggression, most prominently against Ukraine, also against Georgia, and so forth. So, there was a real massive deterioration in US relations with Russia.
Thirdly, two decades ago, the bias in the political conversation was in favor of free trade and global trade agreements. You could get them passed with a majority of Republicans and a minority of Democrats. Now, that’s gone. People say we need more bipartisanship. I’d say be careful what you wish for. We have bipartisanship on trade, and basically, both parties now are against it. I think that’s unfortunate for economic as well as political reasons.
There’s been almost no movement on global arrangements to deal with climate. Anyone hoping that there would be important breakthroughs—whether carbon markets, some global consensus, or willingness to act to limit emissions and so forth—would be sorely disappointed.
I would actually argue that, all things being equal, the world is in considerably worse shape today than it was then. My time at the Council was also one of real inconsistency and confusion in American foreign policy. I started at the Council a few months after the Iraq War began, which I opposed. That was a classic example of what I called a war of choice and overreach. We then, along the way, decided to overreach in Afghanistan also. Then we had at other times what I would call underreach, where we didn’t do as much as we could and should have done. I think there’s been a real confusion and inconsistency. This has not been a golden age of American foreign policy.
I think the two things that I’ve just said are related. Order in the world has declined and one of the many reasons order in the world has declined is American foreign policy has been less consistent and wise. This has not been a golden age of either foreign policy or international relations.
OPR: Another more abstract question for you. In your mind, what should be the relationship between domestic priorities and foreign policy for U.S. decisionmakers? In other words, to what extent should the achievements of U.S. foreign policy be evaluated by the benefits they confer to the domestic population?
RH: I think foreign policy and national security policy—what we do, what we spend—often gets held accountable or responsible for our domestic shortcomings. And I think that’s untrue and unfair. We make plenty of mistakes in foreign policy. We also get some things right in foreign policy. But what goes right and wrong at home almost has nothing to do with foreign policy in the sense that the resource demand of foreign policy is not an explanation for the fact that we have a failed immigration policy or our public schools are terrible for the most part or that there’s high inequality or that there’s too much crime or that the lifespan of American men in recent years has been declining.
There are explanations for all those things that have nothing to do with foreign policy. The reason we are having these domestic ills is not for a lack of resources being dedicated to foreign policy. What we are spending as a percentage of our GDP on national security is probably what? Half our Cold War average, if that. I’m prepared to argue we should spend more on foreign policy or certainly spend it more intelligently.
I think when things go poorly in the world, there’s an effect here. COVID is a good example. The failure of China to meet its international obligations in global health and its slow response showed that you know what happens internationally affects things here. 9/11 is a perfect example of terrorists operating out of Afghanistan and the implications of that. There are direct effects. Climate change, for instance. The oceans we have are not moats.
It gets more abstract when the Biden administration for some reason constantly talks about the rules-based order or whatever when there is aggression used. Are you worried about it for the precedent it sets? Are you worried about it for the direct results? When Saddam Hussein and Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, we were concerned about it—I was the Middle East advisor to President [H. W.] Bush at the time—both for reasons of precedent about international order and the opening of the post-Cold War world, as well as we didn’t want Saddam Hussein to coerce compliance when it came to the region’s energy supplies.
In terms of Vladimir Putin in Ukraine, again, we do not want to see a threat to European security and stability. There’s an immediate threat, but there’s also a more general effect. It is harder to make the case for the general effect. It is a little bit harder to sell. People do not quite see the connections. ‘We do not like Vladimir Putin, but if he sits on an extra 10 square miles in the Donbas, does it really affect my life?’ It is harder to make certain connections in terms of what goes on in the world.
I’m not saying the violations of norms and precedents do not matter. Obviously, they matter. We are going to have a version of this debate about Taiwan and its[semiconductor] chips. Are the chips what matter or is our concern China’s potential challenge to the rule of law, the Asia-Pacific order, and the alliance system? So, you can almost debate these effects on multiple levels.