Kurdistan is currently the largest stateless nation in the world, with an estimated 30 to 45 million Kurds globally. Whilst this ethnic group is currently scattered across Türkiye, Syria, Iran and Iraq, the highly-varied ethnic group shares one thing in common amongst their dispersed population, namely the Kurdish language. For a group with nomadic origins, a lack of shared land and religion meant that the already varied and multi-dialectic Kurdish language was the only thing that Kurdish people shared amongst one another. If this language is the final remaining marker of this prominent ethnic group, what then happens to the Kurds when their language faces erasure efforts within the nation-states that contain them? While ethnic groups like the Kurds are often defined by their nationality, language can serve as an even more specific marker of an ethnic group, expressing its identity through specialised terminology relevant to the group’s experience. Hence, language and ethnic identity preservation often go hand in hand, and any discussion of the resilience of the Kurdish ethnic group necessitates an understanding of how to keep the Kurdish language alive. Kurdish language erasure is present in the modern day, and tackling it requires an analysis of the conditions of the Kurdish language in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq.
The majority of Kurds speak either the Kurmanji or Sorani dialect; the former is spoken mostly in Turkey, Syria, and Iran, as well as in Armenia and Azerbaijan, while the latter is spoken predominantly in eastern Iran and Iraq. The differences between Kurmanji and Sorani are substantial, with Kurmanji being based on the Latin alphabet whilst Sorani is written in Arabic script. The variation in the dialects has widened an existing gap between Kurdish people in eastern Kurdistan (Turkey and Syria) and western Kurdistan (Iran and Iraq), further dissolving the notion of a shared Kurdish identity across the four main nation-states. These linguistic differences between Kurmanji and Sorani make what is already a challenging project of language preservation even harder, as no single international language project is feasible. Any solution to language erasure must come with a recognition of both Kurmanji and Sorani. Still, although the mission may be the same, the status of the linguistic rights project looks different within each country’s context and for each dialect.
The history of Kurdish erasure in Turkey can be traced back to the formation of the nation-state itself. Although the country’s initial state formation efforts included the Kurds, the formation of the republic in 1923 provided no recognition of the group’s autonomy or statehood. The following year saw the elimination of all schools, organisations and publications in Kurmanji. This state formation effort was paired with a draconian enforcement of a Turkish language-centric policy, solidified in 1980 after a national coup, which was followed by legislation decreeing that Kurdish was not to be spoken in the public or private domain in Turkey. Whilst the twenty-first century has seen more lenient rules around Kurdish language usage and two attempted negotiations between Turkish government officials and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)—an armed group established in 1979 with the initial objective of seeking Kurdish statehood and cultural and linguistic autonomy—the usage of the Kurdish language remains taboo. Indeed, Kurdish schools are still banned in Turkey. Although the current President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has allowed Kurdish to be taught as an elective in certain schools and for occasional broadcasting, analysts argue that this policy shift occurred only to appease Western observers in an attempt to allow Turkey to receive admittance into the European Union. Some schools, particularly in the Kurdish-dominant Turkish southeast, have resisted and implemented their education in the Kurdish language. However, even with this progress, the use of the Kurdish language has diminished within the Turkish republic.
Whilst the landscape for the Kurdish people in Syria looks quite different to that in Turkey—with Syria housing the only autonomous Kurdish-led region in the world, known as Rojava—the Kurdish language was also banned in Syria approximately 80 years ago, alongside a mass effort by the Syrian administration to strip Kurdish people of Syrian citizenship, a discriminatory effort disguised as a scheme to remove ‘alien Turks’ from the nation. Linguistic erasure manifested in the forms of a refusal to register citizens with Kurdish names, the renaming of towns or cities with Kurdish origins, and, like Turkey, the prohibition of Kurdish schools, books and publications. It was not until the establishment of Rojava in 2011 that Kurdish language classes were finally offered in Syria, legitimising the practice of speaking Kurdish. However, Kurdish linguistic and cultural oppression still persist in Syria, with reports of physical and verbal violence being expressed by Syrian teachers towards Kurdish students within classrooms and the continued exclusion of Kurdish language instruction at all education levels.
The Iraqi Kurds have also faced their fair share of language oppression, which was slightly relieved in 2005 when Sorani was legally recognised as an official language within the region. Even with this step forwards in Kurdish linguistic legitimacy, a history of oppression against Kurds in Iraq persists to this day. Kurdish teacher and activist Zara Muhammadi was imprisoned in Iraq in 2022 for speaking and spreading Kurdish language and culture, and was only released the following year when granted general international amnesty. Across Iraq, the use of Kurdish in schools is nearly non-existent, forcing Kurdish families in Iraq to send their children to Arabic-speaking schools from a young age to assimilate into standard Iraqi education.
Iran sets itself apart from the first three nation-states through its celebration of the Kurdish language’s minority status and the proliferation of Kurdish language in Iranian press and media. The intentions behind this small step forward in Kurdish linguistic freedom has been identified as the government’s effort to mobilise Kurdish people as a voting bloc, particularly as the government has little control over the Kurdish area of Rojhelat. Policy documents have been translated into Sorani, but Kurdish speakers are monitored. When possible, Kurdish areas are also heavily controlled by the Iranian government through police. Existing media representation of the Kurdish language has not been accompanied by any efforts to integrate the Kurdish language into education systems, leaving Iran, like the other three countries, with no legacy of language learning formally instituted for the future generations of Kurds.
Given varied progress on Kurdish language rights, what is the general outlook for Kurdish linguistic liberation? The erosion of Kurdish dialects in occupied Kurdish lands makes it increasingly difficult to support Kurdish language preservation. Its longevity has been compromised, with young people’s ability to engage with the Kurdish language restricted to online learning and informal education programs. However, this has not stopped the Kurdish youth from mobilising. With an increased ability to dissent due to the lack of anti-democratic backlash, Kurdish youth abroad have been recognised for their efforts in publicly criticising the international disregard of the Kurdish language and culture. While this dissent by Kurdish youth abroad has been successful in countries such as Sweden, vocal youth movements across Germany and France have been recently silenced due to the criminalisation of anti-regime Kurdish groups. The fight has become more challenging even in the Western nations, and its implications on the resilience of the language paint a desperate picture.
The situation may be bleak, but it also presents an opportunity. The Kurdish identity is nothing without its language. Hence, the continued fight for language preservation is the first necessary step not only to preserve the Kurdish identity, but also to keep alive the dream of Kurdish national liberation.