Türkiye’s local elections on 31 March heralded a momentous victory for the opposition’s secular Republican People’s Party (CHP), marking a pivotal change in the country’s political dynamics. CHP took the lead nationally for the first time in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era, recording strongest support since the 1977 elections with around 38% of the votes. Remarkably, President Erdogan’s AKP saw a dip in its vote share to 36%, nearing its inaugural electoral endeavour in 2002, marking the most significant electoral setback for Erdogan’s party.
Overall, including Türkiye’s five major cities—Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, and Adana— CHP will now govern 35 cities, surpassing the AKP’s 24, representing around 80% of Türkiye’s GDP and over 60% of its population. The election outcomes revealed that the ruling party lost ground also in traditionally conservative regions, illustrating the CHP’s expansion from its coastal strongholds into the heartland of Anatolia.
What are the likely reasons behind this CHP’s red wave?
The first reason is the deepening cost of living crisis. Election outcomes validated the saying, ‘empty pots topple governments’. Even though there have been slight improvements in the investment environment, as reflected by credit default swap (CDS) metrics, the economy remains burdened by sky-high inflation at 68.5% year-over-year, underscoring a broad deterioration in price trends. This economic strain has had a direct impact on public sentiment and electoral outcomes. It persists despite nine months of orthodox economic policies spearheaded by the Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek, leading to widespread dissatisfaction, particularly among low and middle-income groups, white-collar employees, and pensioners. The discontent is also evidenced by a significant drop in the consumer confidence index to 79.4, well below the levels seen in previous May elections. Moreover, the outcomes further suggested that despite substantial post-COVID economic growth rates, wealth distribution has remained unequal. This reaction also reflects such disparity.
Second, President Erdogan’s inability to fulfill the economic promises made prior to the 2023 elections resulted in a loss of support among voters, who had reluctantly chosen him over former CHP leader and opposition’s presidential candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. The disillusionment with the economy prompted a notable shift among AKP voters towards the New Welfare Party (YRP), propelling it to become the third largest party in the country with 6% of the total vote and capturing two cities from AKP. Drawing on Necmettin Erbakan, former Prime Minister of Türkiye, legacy and the famed 1994 victory, Islamist YRP established itself as a trustworthy alternative to AKP. Additionally, the voter turnout was reduced to 78%, which is below the norm for Türkiye, highlighting the growing disenchantment among conservative AKP voters.
Third, while AKP’s low-profile candidates, particularly in major cities, were overshadowed by President Erdogan’s dominant presence, leading to remarkably ineffective campaign communications, they obtained increased support due to adequate planning. CHP’s selection of candidates was strategic, and the party’s social policies, including its social aid programs, yielded highly positive results amidst the deepening economic crisis. As evidenced in Istanbul’s former AKP strongholds like Uskudar, Eyup, and Sancaktepe, CHP clinched victories in the vast majority of these fiercely contested areas, reaping significant benefits from this strategy. Thus, the reaction to AKP extends beyond the economic crisis, emphasizing the effectiveness of the CHP strategies and its notably popular candidates.
Fourth, the resignation of former CHP leader Kilicdaroglu was positively received by opposition voters, emphasizing the missed opportunity in the May elections caused by adhering to an unpopular leader unable to connect with AKP strongholds and the right-wing electorate. It also appears that Kilicdaroglu’s candidacy and Erdogan’s aggressive electoral campaign have substantially galvanized AKP supporters to vote in the May elections.
Fifth, the strategic voting behaviour of Kurdish constituents played a pivotal role. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) held its ground in its eastern strongholds. Notably, CHP-DEM collaboration across 21 districts in Istanbul positively impacted CHP’s performance. Through this approach, DEM Party fortified its position against both the opposition and the government.
Sixth, demographic shifts and the addition of new voters in the latest elections appear to have predominantly benefited the opposition. Moreover, the negative outcomes of the AKP’s handling of migrant flows and integration were evident.
What is next for Türkiye?
With the CHP emerging as the leading party in Türkiye for the first time under AKP rule, several key considerations come to the forefront:
Who will Erdogan think is responsible for these election results? Despite the fact that the orthodox economic policies implemented by Finance Minister Şimşek have yet to produce tangible outcomes that directly benefit citizens, President Erdogan is expected to maintain his reliance on Şimşek and the new economic strategy, steering clear of populist stimulus measures unsuited to the current economic conditions marked by inflationary pressures and vulnerabilities in macroeconomic indicators. Erdogan’s foremost objective will now be to curb inflation, which can only be achieved through the successful implementation of the new economic program and the influx of foreign capital. Additionally, Şimşek’s experience and reputation lend credibility to economic policies in the eyes of foreign investors.
Potential Cabinet Reshuffle: A change in the cabinet appears likely, as the administration may seek to refresh its strategy in response to the electoral outcomes.
Constitutional Reform Uncertainties: Despite Erdogan’s interest in pursuing constitutional reforms to reintroduce a polarized political climate, the emergence of a stronger-than-ever opposition could sideline conservative modifications to the constitution and electoral framework changes. Instead, President Erdogan may lean towards reformist ideas reminiscent of the AKP’s initial years. With the declining influence of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a potential soft shift towards a parliamentary system might also be on the table. This defeat is also likely to complicate President Erdogan’s efforts to secure the support of the opposition lawmakers he needs—around 38, assuming no defections from the 322-member ruling alliance—to achieve the 360-vote threshold necessary for advancing a constitutional amendment to a referendum.
Potential End of Electoral Alliance System: This election has prompted a reevaluation of alliance politics in Türkiye. In light of these results, the AKP-MHP alliance is likely to undergo significant introspection by both parties.
Imamoglu’s Rising Significance: In spite of the government’s vigorous efforts to reclaim control over Türkiye’s economic powerhouse and despite a fragmented opposition unlike 2019, Imamoglu’s decisive win by a margin of over 10% established a strong base for his possible run in the 2028 presidential elections. With this victory, Imamoglu defeated President Erdogan for the third time. The elections highlighted Imamoglu’s gifted campaigning skills, securing votes from both Kurdish voters and Good Party (IYI) nationalists while effectively neutralizing attacks from AKP-leaning media outlets. Another setback for AKP was not just his victory in the mayoral race, but also the significant achievement of gaining a majority in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Council and capturing 11 districts from AKP.
No Shift Expected in Foreign Policy: Efforts towards reconciliation and normalization with both the West and the Middle East are expected to persist, especially considering the critical need for increased financial inflows.
Overall, the major winners of these elections are the main opposition CHP and Istanbul Mayor Imamoglu, Islamist New Welfare Party and pro-Kurdish DEM, which consolidated its votes in the Eastern provinces and its considerable impact in the West.
Temmuz Yiğit Bezmez is a consultant at Istanbul Economics, specializing in foreign policy, political and macroeconomic analysis and public affairs. Prior to joining Istanbul Economics, Temmuz held positions as Project Manager at the French Chamber of Commerce and as Coordinator of Asia-Pacific Business Councils at the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Türkiye (DEİK). He holds a BA from Galatasaray University in Political Science and MSc in International Economics at Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne. His op-eds have previously appeared at The Diplomat, Bloomberg, Lowy Institute, South China Morning Post and his book chapter titled Türkiye-France Economic Relations in the Shadow of Diplomatic Tensions has been published by Springer.