As the Chinese historian Lyu Simian observed in 1935, the utopian project proposed by Confucius (551–479 BCE) will be captivating for anyone interested in utopianism. Unlike those ideas that place hope in supernatural powers or great material abundance, the Confucian project emphasises the potential of an in-depth reshaping of people’s thoughts and behaviours to construct a harmonious, morally homogeneous culture. This, perhaps, makes a Confucian utopia appear more ‘practicable’, especially in the contemporary context of similar promises made on behalf of AI governance, surveillance technology and big data.
According to Confucius, humans had already achieved a utopia in the ancient Chinese world, and he called for a revival of the angelic human nature to go back to the ‘Golden Age’ of humankind. In a series of narratives similar to Hesiod’s Five Ages in the ‘Ceremonial Usages’ chapter of the Classic of Rites, Confucius first described a utopian society of co-governance and harmonious order based on the public election of virtues and merits, where everyone lived in fraternity and mutual assistance — he named it ‘Grand Union (or ‘Great Unity’, Datong)’. Then, Confucius claimed that the fall of humanity caused social divisions and hierarchy, and praised ancient sage kings who established a range of downgraded but well-governed societal forms by disciplining the people — the category he named ‘Small Tranquillity (or ‘Moderately Prosperous Society’, Xiaokang)’. In this context, Confucius implied that the only way to respond to social and political disorder was to lead humans to return to the well-disciplined societies of Small Tranquillity first, and then gradually reach the ideal form of Grand Union.
This interpretive article aims to introduce this two-step utopian project as outlined in the Confucian Classics, which conceives of society progressing from hierarchy to harmony. It will also reflect on the paradoxical ‘bad emperor’ problem, according to which utopian success hinges on the perfection of the ruler. Furthermore, it will discuss the contemporary implications of the Confucian vision of a hierarchical utopian society.
From Hierarchy to Harmony
For the first step to achieving Small Tranquillity, ‘Ceremonial Usages’ briefly outlines a series of historical models that later rulers could emulate, including ‘Yu, Tang, Wen and Wu, King Cheng, and the Duke of Zhou’, and the details of each model are scattered across different chapters and classics. According to Confucian narratives, there are two representative teachings for developing the intermediate form of society — the ‘Royal Regulations’ and ‘Great Plan’.
‘Royal Regulations’ (Wangzhi) is commonly interpreted as an outline of the ruling model developed by Wen, Wu and the Duke of Zhou and practised during the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BCE). It establishes a strict, hereditary hierarchy from the sovereign to the feudal aristocracy and then to the lowest subjects. This is achieved by institutionalising most political processes, actions, and agenda settings and by comprehensively regulating various aspects of life — including natural rights, political duties, social status, family ethics, regular rituals, and daily behaviours. The king was to be the only defender and practitioner of virtues and ritual laws, supervising his subjects and restraining everyone’s desires. Confucius believed that the socio-political form described in ‘Royal Regulations’ would be the most systematic, practicable one — in The Analects, he commented, ‘How complete and elegant are its regulations! I follow Zhou.’
The ‘Great Plan’ (Hongfan) is a set of political principles recorded in the Classic of History, which is traditionally interpreted as a description of Yu the Great’s legendary ruling model at the beginning of the Shang dynasty (c. 1600–1046 BCE). Compared with the ‘Royal Regulations’, the hierarchy described in the ‘Great Plan’ is much more extreme and idealistic. The chapter involves nine divisions, and the core thesis is in its fifth, ‘The Establishment and Use of Royal Perfection’. This division proposes a ‘perfect’ model of rulership in which the most virtuous and mighty ruler governs all public affairs solely according to immutable principles and eliminates all personal characteristics and prejudicial tendencies. Finally, the division concludes with a double-ranking hierarchy wherein the supreme ‘paternalistic’ one rules over all the others.
The rationale for establishing hierarchy is implicit in the dialogue between Confucius and Yan Yan (c. 506–? BCE), where Confucius explains how one achieves the utopia of Grand Union. In the dialogue, Confucius demonstrated his basic, ‘Kantian-like’ belief in the universal principles and fundamental rules of morality and ethics grounded on the concept of Heaven, and he ambitiously shows how social progress can be effectively promoted by a sage ruler with absolute authority at the dominant position of the socio-political hierarchy. For Confucius, a ‘paternalistic’ hierarchy would enable the sage to deliver the lessons of virtue, establish the laws of morality, and regulate the rituals of social life to shape the thoughts and behaviours of his subjects. When such teachings, laws, and regulations become culturally and socially dominant, every member of society will be highly self-disciplined and able to act in accordance with the highest moral laws. Such a society will be in complete harmony, without conflict or crime, and political candidates elected by the public will be reliable and worthy of their office.
Thus, according to Xunzi (c. 300–c. 230 BCE), the essence of the socio-political transformation envisioned by Confucius is a long-term process of disciplining humanity through moral education and self-cultivation. And in ‘straightening the crooked wood of bad human nature’, the establishment of hierarchy is at the core of the project. Hierarchy not only institutionalises the privileges of the most ‘morally outstanding’ group in society, but also empowers the sage ruler to establish unchallengeable authority and influence.
However, here we can detect a problem in the transition from hierarchy to harmony — the process has as its necessary condition that the absolute ruler of the transitional societal form must be ideally excellent and wise. But how can we ensure the perfect excellence of the ruler and prevent the disaster that may result from the so-called ‘bad emperor’?
The ‘Bad Emperor’ Problem
As two successors of Confucius, both Mencius (c. 371–c. 289 BCE) and Xunzi noticed the ‘bad emperor’ problem. Mencius proposed a theory of legitimacy which empowered the people to resist an improper ruler. In the chapters ‘King Hui of Liang II’, ‘Li Lou II’ and ‘Exhausting Mental Constitution II’, Mencius repeatedly argued for the just resistance, exile, and even execution of a ‘bad emperor’. Furthermore, Mencius provided a solution to ensure the excellence of the rulership in ‘Wan Zhang I’: ‘When Heaven gave the kingdom to the worthiest, it was given to the worthiest. When Heaven gave it to the son of the preceding sovereign, it was given to him.’ In other words, as Sungmoon Kim underlined, Mencius suggested that sage rulership was not strictly based on blood inheritance but took the capability of potential successors into account, implying a virtue-based succession of outstanding candidates.
Xunzi similarly believed that the government should be formed by well-trained, ritual-regulated, and merit-selected officials to ensure the effectiveness of governance and care for the lower classes and vulnerable groups of society (as in ‘The Rule of a True King’). However, Xunzi denied Mencius’s defense of just uprisings and stressed instead the ‘political continuity’ of rulership based on blood inheritance. In ‘Correct Judgements’, Xunzi argued that a bad heir could exert influence for merely a short period, but a change of the royal bloodline would trigger political chaos and disrupt long-term moral and social progress. Thus, Xunzi emphasised the importance of maintaining a durable and stable system of government and downplayed the negative impact of a single ‘bad emperor’.
Neither Mencius nor Xunzi developed a comprehensive solution to the ‘bad emperor’ problem. Indeed, Xunzi’s emphasis on political continuity and social stability may lead to a dystopia with extreme forms of domination. In the view of his student Han Feizi (c. 280–233 BCE), a society based on blind obedience to political rule is in fact the most effective way of achieving his teacher’s dream of disciplining humanity.
A Contemporary Reflection
From a contemporary perspective, we may now have alternative ways to realise the Confucian utopia. Instead of a human sage ruler at the head of the political hierarchy, we can imagine a ‘Great Plan’ society in which a super-AI governs the whole community and manages every affair through massive surveillance, big data collection, and following pre-set rules and programs. Could such technologies work to shape our thoughts and behaviours and establish absolute moral harmony? If indeed they could, the situation would raise difficult questions, even if it were only a transitional stage. Can we claim that a harmonious order based on tyrannically restricting individuals’ actions and deliberately reshaping their mind to eliminate individual differences in a highly disciplined way is in fact a type of utopian society?
Still, despite its problematic aspects, the Confucian vision of utopia remains valuable for prompting us to reflect on forms of power concentration and political hierarchy. Given that a strong government can effectively introduce public policies and launch megaprojects to better its citizens, should we embrace at least some hierarchical elements in Confucianism as a means of dealing with highly divisive domestic issues and problems of democratic governance? As Gary Wickham once argued, if we take Foucault’s view that learning from history is to produce knowledge of the present, pragmatically reinterpreting past ideas can serve to inspire new sociological and political theories with progressive potentialities.
This article was originally published in OPR’s Issue 12: Utopia.
Max Junbo Tao is a PhD candidate in Political Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, previously a graduate student in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics, and a CIOL-certified English-Chinese translator graduated from Durham University.