In the intricate landscape of emerging multipolarity, the United States grapples with unprecedented challenges in its traditional role of enforcing nuclear non-proliferation. The term ‘multipolarity’ defines a world where power is dispersed across diverse influential actors, ushering in a paradigm shift from the era of centralized dominance by a few superpowers. This nuanced transition introduces complexities that challenge the conventional methods employed by the United States to champion non-proliferation. In this multipolar reality, diverse nations assert distinct priorities, weaving a complex tapestry of interests that reduces great power competition and demands a reevaluation of traditional non-proliferation enforcement strategies.
Unintended Consequences of Security Guarantees
American prevention of nuclear proliferation has often relied on extended deterrence, wherein a nuclear power provides security assurances to a non-nuclear state in exchange for its commitment to avoid pursuing nuclear weapons development. By allying with a nuclear-armed patron, a state (now a client) gains deterrent benefits against an adversary without the costs of developing its own nuclear arsenal. Moreover, political scientists, like Phillip Bleek and Eric Lorber, argue that increased security guarantees reduce the likelihood of client states seeking nuclear capabilities by minimizing the potential of their patrons abandoning them. However, Bleek and Lorber’s analysis fixates on a simplistic bipolar scenario, disregarding the intricacies of today’s multipolar world. In this contemporary landscape, great power patrons contend with more than one adversary, significantly complicating the influence of security guarantees on their relationships with clients.
Delving into this complexity, non-proliferation scholar Lauren Sukin’s exploration of the American-led Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment in South Korea, vividly highlights the potential unintended consequences of security guarantees in fueling client nuclear proliferation. While THAAD aimed to reassure South Korea against North Korean threats, China perceived it as a direct challenge, heightening the perceived utility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal in East Asia. Building on this point, Sukin’s incorporation of a public opinion survey conducted during this period, exposes a growing inclination among South Korean citizens towards nuclear proliferation. This shift in sentiment is rooted in the desire to minimize the risk of being drawn into an American conflict with China and to assert greater independence in forging nuclear policies.
In the context of a multipolar world, this scenario carries significance for two crucial reasons. Firstly, within the framework of numerous powers, encompassing both rising and established states, great powers are inclined to bolster security assurances. This is motivated by the dual goals of signaling military strength and solidifying alliance commitments, ultimately working to strengthen or expand their spheres of influence. Building off this point, multipolarity also introduces overlapping spheres of influence, as illustrated by instances such as South Korea’s efforts to cultivate positive relations with China amid U.S.-China rivalry and India’s ongoing ties with Russia despite Russia-U.S. tensions. In a multipolar world, the likelihood of a client state becoming entangled in conflicts between its patron and another state increases, prompting considerations of independent nuclear policies and proliferation as strategic measures to avoid such entanglements.
Rethinking Alliance Coercion
Another identified method of American non-proliferation enforcement within the patron-client framework is through the utilization of alliance coercion. This strategy involves a patron employing conditional threats of military abandonment to secure a client’s compliance with its demands. Examining the impact of American abandonment threats over the West German nuclear program, non-proliferation scholar Gene Gerzhoy attributes the effectiveness of alliance coercion to the client’s dependence on a superpower patron and the unique military capabilities of the superpower in extending deterrence. While proven effective during the Cold-war bipolar era when this strategy was conceptualized, its viability must undergo critical scrutiny in the context of multipolarity.
The ongoing transition towards multipolarity has significantly narrowed the conventional and non-conventional capability gap between established superpowers like the U.S. and rising powers such as China. This reduction in the historical gap signifies a transformative shift, acknowledged by analysts who recognize the diminishing ability of the United States to dictate the tempo and intensity of military conflicts. As a result, emerging powers now possess the military capacity to address issues of military dependence, providing client states with the advantage of having multiple potential military patrons. Within this multipolar dynamic, the flexibility for client states to explore alternatives challenges the conventional wisdom that clients are solely reliant on a single superpower patron. This newfound autonomy enables client states to seek patrons more aligned with their proliferation goals and distanced from their rival states and associated military patrons.
Building upon this perspective, another challenge posed by a multipolar world to Gerzhoy’s framework becomes evident: Why wouldn’t clients foresee alliance coercion and strategically leverage their nuclear programs as bargaining tools? This strategic approach aligns with the concept of ‘outbidding,’ as articulated by political scientists Jeff Colgan and Nicholas Miller. In this framework, dominant states like Russia and China vie for influence by offering subordinate states military technology, economic aid, and nuclear assistance, often with fewer nonproliferation conditions. This introduces potential for a nuanced power dynamic, allowing weaker powers to strategically navigate between different poles, securing benefits without necessarily making substantial concessions on the nonproliferation front. These instances underscore vulnerabilities in the enforcement of the existing non-proliferation regime through the lens of alliance coercion.
Divergent Interests and Complexities within the NPT
The inclination of certain major powers to propose alternatives to the existing non-proliferation regime underscores the divergent interests among nations which introduces potential complications in enforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Political scientists Andrew Coe and Jane Vyanman’s analysis of the NPT sheds light on the superpowers’ roles in spearheading nonproliferation enforcement within the NPT. Driven by the aim of maintaining allies under their patronage and hindering their rivals’ alliances from obtaining nuclear weapons, these superpowers join forces to thwart the nuclear ambitions of ‘spoiler states.’ This collaborative effort, however, is clearly limited to the Cold-War bipolar era and challenged by the divergent interests of today’s multiple poles, including both incumbent and emerging powers.
In a multipolar global order, what may disadvantage Cold War superpowers like the United States and Russia might not necessarily affect rising nations similarly. This divergence in interests raises the likelihood of diminished cooperation among these global players. Geopolitical situations may emerge where powers prioritize their individual interests over the collective goal of preventing nuclear proliferation, reducing collaboration on nonproliferation enforcement. This evolving landscape introduces complexities that could impact the effectiveness of nonproliferation enforcement within the NPT.
For instance, North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 serves as a compelling example. Following the withdrawal, U.S. leaders proposed strengthening the withdrawal clause (Article X) to prevent states from amassing technology for peaceful nuclear energy (allowed under Article IV), and subsequently employing it for weapon development post-withdrawal. However, this proposal faced resistance, notably from nations like China and Russia, closely tied to Pyongyang. Their reluctance to support the initiative suggested prioritizing bilateral relationships with North Korea over enhancing the adaptability of the nonproliferation regime. This scenario highlights the major powers’ divergent interests within the NPT, further complicating efforts to control “rogue states” and enforce nonproliferation in a multipolar environment.
Forging Pathways: Concluding Recommendations for Nuclear Non-Proliferation
The challenge facing non-proliferation enforcement is evident: When major powers view enforcement as a threat to their geopolitical interests or manipulate it for their gains, existing methods fail. For American policymakers, the central query is: How can we foster cooperation among major powers in enforcing nuclear non-proliferation? At the core of resolving this challenge lies the enduring clout of the United States in championing non-proliferation norms, even amidst a shifting global landscape. Leveraging this influence sees the U.S. taking steps towards nuclear security to galvanize other nations into following suit, fortifying collective endeavors towards global security.
For the U.S., this involves reframing nuclear proliferation as a long-term issue, aligning with game theoretical models that suggest tackling enduring issues fosters more sustainable cooperation than on transient concerns. By highlighting nuclear proliferation as a long-term concern, it garners attention from all states, surpassing individual policies. Here, shifting focus from isolated cases of “rogue” nuclear proliferation to a broader understanding of nuclear security is critical. This approach strategically presents nuclear proliferation as a global threat, prioritizing the dangers of nuclear weapons over specific actors. This broader perspective is crucial because emphasizing individual actors often hampers non-proliferation efforts due to the varied geopolitical interests of different countries in regards to those actors.Advocating a comprehensive, long-term nuclear disarmament framework bolsters the strategic approach. Recent developments, like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in January 2021, signal a global push for disarmament. Supporting this shift moves the non-proliferation regime away from maintaining the status-quo of a few nuclear-armed nations towards actively pursuing a world without nuclear weapons. This shift carries weight, especially if the U.S., with one of the largest nuclear arsenals, demonstrates willingness to forego its nuclear status in the long-run, signaling a serious recognition of and commitment to address this enduring issue. Additionally, many TPNW signatory states are within the spheres of influence of major powers. U.S. support for disarmament could prompt these nations to pressure their superpower patrons toward the same decision. Collectively, this approach reframes nuclear armament as a long-term existential risk, detaching it from everyday geopolitical conflicts, potentially fostering greater cooperation among major powers in enforcing non-proliferation.