Dr. Brian Wong, Co-founder of the Oxford Political Review, speaks with former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Dr. Marty Natalegawa. Dr. Natalegawa had previously served as Indonesia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Ambassador to the United Kingdom. The fireside chat was conducted mid-June 2023, and the following record of the conversation between Brian and Dr. Natalegawa has been lightly edited and editorialised for clarity and concision.
Dr. Brian Wong (OPR): Pak Marty, thank you for joining us. The times we live in are rather uncertain and intriguing. Some would call this an era of bipolarity, gesturing towards the increasingly fractious relations between Beijing and Washington, whilst others would point to the rise of the Global South and increasing strategic autonomy exercised by the likes of the EU and Gulf States as signs of a multipolar world. Yet many more orthodox International Relations (IR) theorists would say, “No, the age of American unipolarity is far from over.” How should we make sense of the times that we’re in right now? And how would you describe them?
Dr. Marty Naralegawa (MN): Well, first of all, thank you very much for the invitation. It’s wonderful to see you all, and I hope that our conversation this morning will be of use to you. I think what you asked me here is a major pursuit in the study of IR, and it’s not an easy task. If one is to think deeper about things, you know, there are certain trends that are more fundamental in nature. For instance, we are seeing increasingly, in my view, the destabilisation of the delineation between internal and external affairs to countries.
In studying IR, we often begin by the assumption that there is such a delineation distinction between internal and external domain; when in fact, in practice, I would contend that local, national, regional and global issues are increasingly converging. Not only in terms of convergence across levels, but also in terms of issues. We are used to describing political security, socioeconomic issues as being distinct, but they are becoming ever more converging. So that is the broader context. At risk of oversimplification, to your specific question in a more traditional sense, about the kind of order that we are going through at the moment… in my view, it’s practically all of the above descriptions, because you can’t really take just a snapshot, freeze-frame a particular situation, and attach a label to it… whether it be “bipolar”, “multipolar”, or whatever color it is… because change is permanent. You can have the traits of all of the above, at different times. On some occasions and uncertain issues, you see more evidence of unipolarity or even bipolarity. But on other issues, or where you see that other actors are more prominent… it could be multipolar. To me, the answer really is increasingly issue-dependent. Whether we attach to a situation the label “unipolar”, “bipolar”, or “multipolar”, is really dependent on particular issues.
Now let’s talk about the other subset of your question, concerning the Global South. I think it’s an increasingly pertinent question. I personally feel that the term “Global South” is not really academically rigorous. It’s a bit of a lazy term, because whether you use the term “Global South”, “emerging powers”, or “middle powers”… or “countries pursuing foreign policy that constitutes hedging”, whatever the term is, I see this as merely a way of attaching a label to countries that are not major rival geopolitical powers, and assume that they all share some kind of a uniform outlook. There’s far more variation within the so-called “Global South” than there is uniformity. My main point is therefore that the current situation defies simplification. We have to simply acknowledge that things are in constant flux, constant change, and change is permanent. That’s why in previous settings, I prefer to use the term “dynamics of power” instead of “balance of power”, because our constellation is constantly changing and we just have to acknowledge that, rather than be fixated with talk of protecting or preserving certain orders.
OPR: Thank you. If I may extrapolate from what you said, may I suggest that we live in an era of military unipolarity with American dominance, economic bipolarity with China rising to potentially challenge the Pax Americana on commercial and trade terms – now, I’m not saying that’s definitely going to happen; I’m just positing a possibility – and, finally, an era of discursive multipolarity, where different countries and blocs have their own normative discourses and frameworks to account for their own legitimacy?
We are also witnessing a critical interplay between domestic and international factors and forces shaping the underlying dynamics of the current world order. What I find really interesting here, Pak Marty, is that during your tenure as Foreign Minister, you’ve been a huge proponent of the ‘Dynamic Equilibrium’ formula in relation to the South China Sea. How do you see this equilibrium playing out today in 2023, given the interaction between domestic factors and politics in all the relevant parties of interest, including China, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, etc.? Do you see domestic politics as playing a role in shaping this dynamic equilibrium?
MN: There are two facets to your question. The first, is the interaction between the domestic and the international. That is a fact of life, of reality that we are all working on, or within, especially those who have interests in diplomacy and foreign policymaking. We have to be increasingly cognizant of the fact that foreign policies are becoming increasingly domesticated. It is not often just about the external dynamics, but often [more than that]. Leaders and governments nowadays have domestic audiences to be catering to, especially in the age of social media, when negotiations [and other key diplomatic engagements] are increasingly conducted under the public attention and limelight there therefore inevitably are cases when agreements and consensus are far more difficult to reach, because governments and leaders tend to first and foremost attend to their domestic audience rather than actually speak to one another, as interlocutors or partners.
Now let’s talk about the Dynamic Equilibrium. Earlier, I spoke not of a balance of power, but of a Dynamic Equilibrium, because I do honestly feel that the nature of power in our world has changed. It’s no longer about the capacity to effect direct change. It’s no longer only about the military sense of power, but you have other means, other modalities at play here. As a result, it’s no longer simply governments and states in the traditional sense, it’s also non-state entities and businesses that have come to shape and produce a Dynamic Equilibrium. It’s “dynamic”, in the sense that power is in constant change; change is permanent, and therefore, is impossible to be captured by a freeze-frame of a particular moment. So, we need to actually celebrate and accept the constant fluxes. Yet at the same time, this state of affairs should not be equated with a state of anarchy. There has to be still some kind of order… some kind of predictability of behavior. This is why I speak of having an “equilibrium”, meaning that there are some norms and principles about how one conduct oneself, that it is not an anarchic state where anything goes. Disequilibria can also be solved, especially by countries that are not the principal protagonists; such states can allow convergences to take place… by bridge-building, or other means. This is how I view things.
OPR: You pointed to the role played by norms in shaping and constraining this dynamic equilibrium. What are these norms? Are they guardrails that prevent undue and unbridled escalation induced by deviation? Or are they more convergence-perpetrating, nudging countries towards cultivating shared interests? I want to apply this framework to the context of the South China Sea. In a recent speech you delivered last June in Asia Society, you said there was a discernible distance between action and rhetoric from China on the front of the South China Sea.
And obviously, you know, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi met with Foreign Secretary Qin Gang in Jakarta earlier this year, expressing the intention to cultivate a code of conduct for negotiations over the South China Sea. I suppose this was a textbook case of norm-setting and norm-building, albeit within a bilateral and non-multilateral context (Sino-Indonesian talks). What role do you see norms as playing in a situation as fraught and as fractious as South China Sea, where you’ve got legal rulings disputed and challenged by multiple parties, energy resources, and trade routes at stake… There’s a lot that countries are fighting over and about, so what role can norms play here, if at all?
MN: Norm-setting is a process is not an event that you can simply codify. You can promulgate norms by the adoption of declarations, of treaties and agreements. These instruments are obviously important manifestation or tests of a state’s willingness to engage some kind of consensus and agreement. But the effectiveness of these instruments is to be built over time as a process rather than simply a one-off event.
This can be illustrated by the South China Sea, because back in the late 1990s to early 2000s, when Indonesia began the push for countries of the region to develop a common approach on the South China Sea. The first question was, what would be its relevance? Because at the time, the South China Sea wasn’t an issue yet. But then our focus was not on today, but on the decades to come. And we thus began the process the habit of consultation between ASEAN and China. We need to ensure that all parties arrive at a comfort level for further discussions, but this level needs to be built by common practices.
The development of what is now a code of conduct, has been going on for 20 years in the making. Thinking about international relations requires us to go beyond the lifetime of a single administration and government. Government politicians often have a five-year-or-so time window between elections. Politicians want to do things quickly so that they can lay claim to what they’ve done by noting, “This is my achievement… our achievement.” Yet if you look at the broader picture, diplomatic projects and efforts clearly take time. Norm-setting is ideally codified by some kind of an instrument or commitment, but it doesn’t always have to be that way. Norm-setting can also come through customary practice that we develop over time – and this requires leadership ordered by the country’s concern, and a sense of purpose.
OPR: Let’s talk about ASEAN, an organisation that has been heavily involved in norm-setting and -creating within Asia, both amongst its members and beyond. Recent years have seen ASEAN accused of fundamental inaction… inadequacy when it comes to Myanmar, where the Tatmadaw overthrew a democratically elected government two years ago. As the chair of the Asia Pacific Leadership Network, I’d like to know what you make of President Jokowi’s advocacy of quiet diplomacy as a response to the unfolding crisis. Has quiet diplomacy worked? Is there something that’s missing in the status quo?
MN: Whatever institutions we speak of here, whether it be ASEAN or others, when we deal with a situation as complex as Myanmar, we would want to use all the various tools and modalities before us – public and private. The approach needs to be comprehensive. What’s particularly important is that we must have a sense of what the ultimate objectives and purposes of these measures are. Certainly, the Myanmar issue is a litmus, existential even, test for ASEAN.
The idea of an ASEAN community is that it is a community that believes in and fully supports democratic principles, good governance, and human rights. The situation in Myanmar clearly violates all those principles. But again, Myanmar is very much like the South China Sea when it comes to applications [of the principle of norm-setting]. It is a process. During my time I engaged Myanmar, nurturing, pushing, prodding Myanmar to progress in its democratization path, and what we can see is that up till 2015, whilst Myanmar had been democratising, ASEAN was really engaged. Indonesia certainly was really engaged in pushing… hand holding… encouraging… pressurizing in public and in private, driving Myanmar to do the right thing. But from 2015 onwards, after the election of Aung San Suu Kyi’s political parties, I feel personally that ASEAN has taken its eyes off the ball.
After 2015, the nurturing of the democratic transition was no longer seen, certainly not for Indonesia at least, as a policy that brought benefits… immediate material benefits. Our foreign policy became more transactional and materially driven in nature. The issues that surfaced seem to be a bit abstract, and a tad detached. And we thus saw reversal in Myanmar’s democratic process – we are where we are now. The situation hasn’t just reverted to square one – it’s actually even worse than the previous regime.
I’ve been told that efforts have been made informally [in relation to mediating the situation in Myanmar]. I am a great supporter and proponent of such an approach. But there is a fine line between quiet diplomacy and deafening silence. We have a situation that demands visible action on the part of us and what I find especially difficult to fully comprehend, is why ASEAN has yet to engage the representatives of the Opposition government in exile. For as things currently stand, the isolation of the junta is in fact their comfort zone. The junta actually revels in being isolated because they don’t have to be held accountable for all their actions. But you know, if we want to openly engage with the democratic process, then it must be that the junta can be held to account, and realises that their actions are not without costs or consequences. So, to your question, there must be a combination of public and quiet diplomacy. It cannot be that we pursue one at the expense of the other.
OPR: I wholeheartedly see where you’re coming from with your empathy and sympathy for those living under Tatmadaw rule today. Yet if I may raise a few quick comments. The first comment is that the problematic nature of the situation in Myanmar may not necessarily be captured purely by the democratisation frame, and by the charge that democratisation has not taken place thoroughly enough. For, one of the main reasons some would argue here, is that the reason why the Tatmadaw was so paranoid and eventually mounted the coup, was that they felt they felt that the pace of democratisation under Daw Aung Sung was going to knock the army out of power, and deprive them of their constitutionally (skewed) and guaranteed privileges – their engineered control over seats in the parliament. I guess the question here is, democratisation is important – yes, but institution-building and also creating some sort of power-sharing arrangements, such that the Tatmadaw could be divided more strategically, should also have been present in order to install the guardrails to buttress the democracy in Myanmar.
MN: Absolutely, I mean, democratisation is a very complex process. There is no One Size Fits All. Every country situation is unique. Indonesia went through a similar process that was not unlike Myanmar. We also had, at one time, very prominent role of our armed forces. In fact, we are still facing a highly prominent armed force. With a country so diverse, just as Myanmar, Indonesia needed to show that national unity could be achieved within a democratic setting, whilst taking into consideration the role of the armed forces. Thankfully, in our case, concurrent with the reform process in the country as a whole, the armed forces democratised too. There was a reformist mindset within it. Hence came changes in the constitutional provision about the role of the armed forces in Indonesia’s politics. Now ultimately, it is the people of Myanmar themselves who can ascertain and who can decide on their future. As the region, ASEAN’s task is to be sure that they are allowed to do so, that the wishes and the will of the people are respected, and that ASEAN provides conditions are conducive for such changes to take shape.
OPR: My second comment is this. When it comes to Myanmar, what’s happened over the past few years seems to reflect a structural issue undergirding ASEAN. There’s a clear range of positions and divergence in stances across countries. Cambodia and Laos have one view. Thailand a slightly different position. Singapore and Brunei, alongside Vietnam and Philippines have taken a substantively distinct range of viewpoints from the aforementioned countries. Malaysia and Indonesia have been trying to straddle the camps. There are clear internal divisions. When you couple this fact of heterogeneity with the lowest common denominator compromise of non-interference, we seem to end up with this impasse – a sort of indifference that is almost pernicious. Yet if we were to adopt a more vocal stance in opposing Myanmar, some are concerned that this would drive the Tatmadaw further into the hands of Russia, amongst other actors. So how can we overcome these issues of internal divisions and structural disagreements?
MN: Whether you use the term ‘divisions’, ‘variations’, or ‘diversity’, it is clear that the disagreements within ASEAN exist, and are a fact of life. Southeast Asia is the very definition of diversity, whether it be in economic systems and developmental models, political systems, ethnic compositions, and beyond. The region is first and foremost a diverse one. So, the ASEAN community project is founded upon the recognition of that fact. We’re not trying to pretend that we are some sort of a uniform union.
The question is – and this has been tricky as a consequence – is how we can, despite such diversity, build on this notion of a community. We’ve been successful in the past, but not necessarily on foreign policy. Now, whilst there are some countries that are closer to the United States, some closer to China, some are independent, we have been able to develop a common external outlook on the region’s affairs. Yet here, I don’t want to use the term ‘Lowest Common Denominator’, because it sounds so minimalist and so negative; instead, we strive to find certain aspirational objectives and principles that we want to define ourselves by – and we’ve been able to do so in the past. Likewise, on our economies and internal systems, that is why we’ve developed the notion of ASEAN political security community, because we’re a community that shares three core tenets…
When they first came up with the idea of ASEAN, Singapore suggested ‘ASEAN Economic Community’. This was in 2002. Indonesia was the one that said, “Look, based on our experience, when in 1998, the financial crisis led to the implosion of the country across the other [non-economic] domains. It is insufficient to have a community forged across the economic dimension alone. That’s why we propose political, security, and economic pillars for the community. We recognise that we have different systems, and that within these systems there are commonalities, and that’s why we came up with things like the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights etc.
All of these institutions are premised and based on the diversity of our systems, as well as the fact that we can find commonalities – even on Myanmar. These differences and variations have worked to our strength in the past; it means that we were able to, for instance, pursue a multi-directional approach in foreign policy, befriending and being close to different capitals – not just Washington, but also Beijing and Moscow. We leverage these heterogeneities as assets, rather than sources of weaknesses. Whether it be North Korea or Myanmar, or Assad [in Syria], there would always be someone with the modalities and channels to communicate with whomever we would like to engage. For instance, Thailand may indeed have its own views on Myanmar, but this shouldn’t always be a source of problems, as ASEAN talents can thus be the main interlocutors to communicate here. We are handed a situation, as diplomats and leaders, and the question is – how can we actually make these qualities of diversity our strengths, rather than something that impedes our capacity to take action?
OPR: In the context of the Sino-American relationship we’re seeing right now, given the protracted tensions between Beijing and Washington, how should ASEAN position itself? Consider, for one, that China is an incredibly important – if not the most important – trading partner to ASEAN, whilst the US remains the primary security partners of many a country in ASEAN. To what extent will the diversity of stances and viewpoints – which has historically served the union of states well per your analysis – become a liability in the event of a Sino-American showdown, especially over flashpoints that are very much adjacent to the area?
MN: Yes, I mean, clearly, when we speak of the Indo-Pacific, one of the key dynamics is the US China dynamic. At least the only silver lining to this reality is that it is the known unknown. We know for sure that the US-China relationship is one that is going to predominate the world, and that it is entering a very difficult phase. We know what to expect and manage. But having said that, I wish to also put on record that it’s not only the US and China. You have for instance, extremely challenging relations between China and India, or even [historically] China and Russia, though at the moment they are partners. In Northeast Asia, we have all kinds of bilateral tensions… consider, for instance, the Korean Peninsula dynamics, between Japan and Russia, the Taiwan Straits, and of course, the South China Sea etc. In other words, managing geopolitical dynamics is going to be a key task for ASEAN, not only in relation to Sino-American tensions.
Now, how can we use whatever assets that we have to make sure that we actually emerge out of this stronger rather than weaker as a result? This is the point that the point that I was trying to raise in my talk yesterday at the Centre [Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies]. I think it’s insufficient for countries in ASEAN to simply profess neutrality, to say to these major powers, “Don’t force [me] to choose”, and to make appeals for them [major powers] to restrain their rivalry. Different powers, including those in ASEAN, should be seeking a certain manifestation of their centrality. What is it that they are bringing to the table? What are the contributions that they can make? — such that we are not simply passive and just waiting to be picked out and pressured on a bilateral basis.
There are at least two features in the current environment – which require serious management, across the US, China, and India. The first is trust deficit. We have a situation where countries that need to, do not necessarily get along. There is thus a fundamental deficit of trust between these countries, which needs to be addressed. ASEAN has a role to play, in providing a space for these countries to try to overcome such forms of disagreement. I spoke in the past of the need for countries in the ASEAN region to commit themselves to peaceful settlement of disputes nowadays. We have many problems, many disputes, and many amongst them are long-standing – not ‘present-day’[-born] problems. They are historical in nature.
But why is it that suddenly today, in 2023, all of these issues have come to the forefront? Well in the past, there was some kind of management, some kind of wisdom to say, “Look, these are issues that cannot be resolved today, but let’s at least ensure that things don’t get out of hand.” This norm is now being disrupted. And countries are taking certain risks. ASEAN must be forefront in saying, “Look, differences are prevalent, but let’s agree that we should resolve these problems, through diplomacy and dialogue etc.” I think that this kind of role is something that ASEAN can try to identify – because if they simply sit and wait, like it’s a treadmill that is moving… if you stand still, you will fall off.
And I’m sorry to say this, but we seem to be running out of ideas, whether it be in Myanmar, Sino-US geopolitical competition. There are folks going back to the notion that “We are neutral, don’t force us to choose” — this fixation upon standing still in a world of change is just not good enough. In standing still, you will quickly find yourselves either left behind or pulled apart, and you must therefore be ahead of the curve, identify the problems, and make yourselves relevant in solving these problems.
OPR: I want to apply this suggestion of proactive diplomacy of yours to two case studies. The first constitutes the Sino-Indian relationship given what we’ve just discussed. The second would concern the war in Ukraine right now, which is – in many ways – deeply abominable. On Sino-Indian tensions, you’ve got a contested Line of Actual Control (LAC), long-standing tensions in relation to Pakistan, but also Kashmir and Balochistan, as well as the recent Galway Valley clashes. There’s a lot of animosity between Beijing and Delhi, and just recently I believe both countries have kicked out the last passport-carrying journalists from the other. So if we are to apply the framework of proactive diplomacy, what are the concrete steps that ASEAN can take, whether it be as a collective, or by individual members?
MN: Well, I mean, if one is to look at the geography – let’s start with India here. In the past, when we spoke of difficulties in Sino-Indian relations, it’s predominantly been about land issues… territorial issues. Yet nowadays, the competition permeates beyond land borders, to also encompass maritime borders, in the Indian Ocean; as well as other domains. With India as obviously affiliated themselves to the US, it’s clear that [diplomacy in the region] is becoming more multifaceted. ASEAN is perfectly located geographically, at least, and lies in the middle of that conversation.
Now there is something that I think could be seen as a super silver lining. The wherewithal for ASEAN to contribute to ameliorating the tensions is actually already there – when the East Asian Summit was initiated back in the early 2000s. Indonesia was the country that suggested right from the get go, that the summit should comprise not only ASEAN + 3 (Japan, Korea, and China), but also India, Australia, and New Zealand. India in particular, because we felt that we needed to have a common home, a big event where all these parties are actually seated around the table, so that when we have problems, it is in these settings that such issues are discussed thoroughly.
Hence came the East Asia Summit, which extends the ASEAN Regional beyond East Asia and also to the Southern Indian Ocean. In 2011, with Indonesia chairmanship of ASEAN at the time, through the East Asia Summit, we adopted what we call the Bali Principles of the East Asia Summit. Basically, extrapolating from the 1976 pact, we agreed upon the non-use of force in settling disputes. To extrapolate from the ASEAN experience, trying to positively impact the wider region, we are convinced that disputes should be resolved peacefully. But unfortunately, again, modalities such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum, etc, have been under-utilised. We have the modalities, and we have annual meetings of this forum. But whenever issues developed between, say, India and China, this type of forums, in my view, have not been sufficiently equipped to discuss the matter. In other words, it is not the lack of institutions, but simply [an un-]willingness to utilise them. There were some incidents in the past: India and China, and then there were also some border clashes between India and Pakistan. These clashes in fact occurred concurrently or near to the ministerial meetings of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and yet the issue was managed in Moscow or somewhere else in Russia. There was an informal meeting elsewhere and I find that a little bit unfortunate, because all the principals are there in the same room, and yet, the platform have not been fully utilised. And this is simply a leadership issue.
OPR: You pointed to the underutilisation of institutions, but I suppose a skeptic would say, maybe the problem is to do with the fact that these institutions themselves, in some cases, lack the bite or the binding power in the first place. One way of grounding this view is the war in Ukraine right now, where President Jokowi has made it a point to take a very nuanced stance on Ukraine, one that affirms on one hand the interests of Ukrainian citizens yet nevertheless positions Indonesia as being capable of mediating between Kyiv and Moscow; on the other hand, at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue (in early June), General Prabowo proposed a peace plan that seemed to have been met by pretty sharp backlash from many Western commentators and politicians. He advocated a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops by both parties, a demilitarised zone, and UN-backed referenda. If you could give a piece of advice to the Indonesian cabinet today on what’s going on in relation to the war in Ukraine, what would you say, to Pak Jokowi and Pak Prabowo?
MN: Taking a wider perspective, when it comes to the space of conflict resolution, peacemaking, diplomacy, and dialogue, when conflict occurs, it is occurring in a very fragile space. Whether this be the space for Myanmar or Ukraine, when conflict is so prevalent, and tensions and animosity so deeply felt, whomever comes forward to come forward to offer some kind of peaceful resolution – with the contending parties not quite ready to enter into this phase – will inevitably be struck down. Peacemakers will be criticised for pursuing a policy of appeasement, of justifying the aggression of recognising the actions of one side over another. This is the fate of peacemakers, who will, by nature of trying to find compromises and strike a balance, end up with both parties [to the conflict] not being fully happy with the situation. But the process must be initiated.
It’s not only been Indonesian on Ukraine. We have also had China come forward with some points to do with conflict resolution. Brazil has also made some suggestions. Almost all of these suggestions have been met by knee-jerk reactions by the contending parties that say, “This is rubbish.” To be clear, this is not my view. I’m not saying that it’s rubbish. I’m just saying that the parties involved are so deeply into it, they can’t see anything beyond getting “things right” first, because [they feel that they are] a country that has been attacked, and their territorial integrity has been unduly violated in this way. These states want to have a right to self-defense, to restore their sovereignty.
Yet having said all that, if you think about it, all conflict situations in the world ultimately have to have some kind of a political solution. Whether it be political solution in it in a perfect sense; or simply, the issues simply simmer away, not quite fully resolved, but managed. The question is whether such a resolution will come at the front end of a conflict or at the back end, because any delay in entering a political framework or setting means more casualties, more distractions, and more misery for the ordinary people, so to speak.
Look at what’s happening in Syria, for instance. I’ve been involved, right from the beginning, in all kinds of contact group meetings and diplomatic efforts in many countries. And the debate at the time was whether President (Bashar al-)Assad should leave at the beginning, or stay all the way through the end. There was much back-and-forth in the diplomatic engagements. But after so many years of conflict, now we are almost back to square one. The first President is still about, and 1000s of people have died and great misery has resulted. I think this third space occupied by those who are not the protagonists should be allowed to think out loud to test ideas without prejudice to each other’s position. We are not being disrespectful to one side or the other side, but ultimately a third space, a third party must begin to explore ideas. And I hope, this is actually the role of United Nations, but it’s so geopolitically divided it practically is impossible for the UN to [bring about conflict resolution].
Organisations such as the UN are essentially failing to deal with the ramifications issue. They deal with the humanitarian dimension and the food crises… refugee outflows and grain exports etc. But the core issue is, because it’s so sensitive, reaching consensus is thus impossible. This [focus] is fully understandable and especially in front of the public, for there needs to be some kind of a position of principality. Having said all that, I think third parties should be given some room and space to test ideas, to float ideas. If an idea is not acceptable at this stage, fine – we grant that nothing inimical is being intended, and opt to pursue some other paths. This is I think, diplomacy. Peacemaking has to be waged. We have to wage peace as aggressively as others wage war.
At the moment communication is being done through deployment. of military assets, instead of through words. I mean, people like you and your colleagues, who are into international relations and diplomacy, I think […] we have a responsibility to think of ways other than what is immediately for us, but it’s very difficult because it’s such a vulnerable space.
OPR: So take this as your third space, Pak Marty. If you could propose a peace plan and proposal for the war in Ukraine, what would that proposal look like?
MN: I certainly am not privy. I’m not privy to the most intricate details that are not fully, not publicly known. But clearly, first and foremost, whatever peace efforts are being made, they can’t really be [seen as taking place in] a level playing field. This is not a level playing field. There is clearly one side which has taken an action against another side. And that has to be reflected in the efforts to pursue the peace, so we don’t end up with a bigger tripwire.
However, if you let the perfect be the enemy of the good; if you’re already beginning from the requirement that both sides must be equal, [that cannot work]. When there is no parity here, with one side that has committed this act, then it has to be that for the entry point we begin to look at the notion of silencing the violence and the gun fires. This must be an important first step. Because at the moment, we are seeing the modality being the pursuit of military action, and I think this has to be stopped first. But it is, again, it’s a very sad issue that defies immediate solution. I think the first thing must be a move away from military solutions because it’s relatively easy for leaders to opt for military action, but the consequences are being felt by the people on the ordinary citizens. I wish the space can be can be protected, to try to find peaceful solutions.
OPR: Surely, the real challenge here is, both Russia and Ukraine have made ceasefire contingent upon the satisfaction of two sets of incompatible demands, right. Russia says, “Let me keep these oblasts, say, of the Donbas region and Crimean Peninsula, but also parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.” And Ukraine insists, “Not an inch further”, as evidenced by their rhetoric driving their current counter-offensive.
In any case, the Presidential Election race is scheduled for February 2024. I know, as a diplomat, you may wish to maintain broad neutrality on questions of domestic politics. Yet as it stands, we see Pak Ganjar, Pak Prabowo, and Pak Anies. Three men. Which of them would you back, could you say?
MN: As a preface to your question, I think I’d like to look at a broader picture. In a sense, we are in Indonesia now well into the second decade of our reform and organization process. Elections are an important hallmark of our democratic society. What I hoped for is that the quality of our elections would become more enhanced, that we know who we are voting for what we are voting for. This is because at the moment, electoral politics in Indonesia is very idiosyncratic; it is very much personal personality-driven rather than propelled by ideas, visions, programs, and plans. And to be honest, I feel awkward. Whatever candidates we may have this now, I struggle to be able to identify what candidate A B or C represent in terms of policies other than their supposed electability based on polling, etc. I think our public deserves more informed choices to begin with; with programmes that are properly accounted for in terms of financing, etc. But we are not there yet. Politics seems to be about politicking about the search for power.
But, you know, I mean, I don’t look at personalities. I look at the policies after the election, rather than the promises being made. [The upcoming 2024 race is] certainly a very important election for Indonesia because we are well into the second decade of our reform process, and it is important for people to feel that democracy delivers in terms of betterment to how citizens live, such that there is no sense of despondency and doubt.
This is why I suppose personality driven politics is quite ubiquitous throughout Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, we’ve also seen a similar dynamic with really a ruling party splintering and splintering again – e.g. PH (Pakatan Harapan) in Malaysia. But also, the Philippines has the same thing in political families and dynasties, Soo, too, does Vietnam, for the matter.
So I therefore think there is a huge role in civil society and concerned citizens, to identify what issues matter to them and then try to inform ourselves, you know, of how the different candidates – wherever it is Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines or elsewhere – have expressed their policies on such issues, and try to pass and brought and, and, and discover what they what their elections would mean. Because otherwise, you know, we don’t need empty promises and ProQuest prayed at the moment of the case, complex issues. These are complex issues, needing informed discussions, but everything is been reduced to like a Twitter thread, messages. Indeed, I think young people can especially be engaged to discuss serious issues in a serious manner, rather than superficially.