‘Japa’ Syndrome: Legitimacy Crisis, Emigration and Public Discontent in Nigeria

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In the immediate aftermath of Nigeria’s 2023 Presidential elections, the term ‘Japa’ was trending on Twitter. ‘Japa’, a colloquial term in Yoruba which means “to run, flee or escape”, has seemingly taken hold of the Nigerian consciousness. According to the Pew Research Center, 45% of Nigerians want to leave the country. Indeed, the number of skilled-work and study visas issued by the UK to Nigerians rose from 19,000 in 2019 to 59,000 in 2021. Nigerians, especially the youth, are desperate to see change, and many pinned their hopes on Peter Obi, the ‘outsider’ presidential candidate who energised young Nigerians with his message of hope, renewal and disruption. His ‘loss’, which is currently being challenged in the courts, is seemingly what fuelled discourse surrounding ‘Japa’ in the aftermath of the election. Given the nationalisation of ‘Japa’ syndrome in Nigeria, this article aims to understand public discontent in Nigeria as a symptom of the legitimacy crisis facing the Nigerian state. As such, I will highlight the ways in which ‘Japa’ syndrome is emblematic of the formation of a new consciousness amongst Nigerians, especially the youth, which is equally characterised by an awareness and disdain for the ‘prebendal’ and ‘civic public’ character of Nigerian politics. 

‘For the nation to live, the tribe must die’ – Samora Machel 

Nigerian politics is prebendal and lies within the civic public realm. This means that the country’s politicians have traditionally assumed public office with the view that they are entitled to a share of the state’s resource wealth. These embezzled funds are then used for private gain, as well as for the benefit of their ‘primordial’ (ethnic) group. As a result, Nigeria has suffered. A ‘culture of corruption’ is endemic in the country and warps the efficiency of public and parastatal institutions. 

This situation has arisen from the fact that Nigerian politics operates within the civic public realm and, as such, is subordinated to the interests of the ‘primordial public’ which is characterized by tribal affiliation. This subordination has resulted in an amoral political system, where the extraversion of elites and prebendal political culture continue to influence proceedings. The fact that Nigeria has lost over $400 billion to corruption since 1960 is a testament to the amorality and culture of indifference that pervades Nigerian politics, thereby reinforcing the claim that it is firmly located within the civic public realm and conforms to prebendal logics.

Rife prebendalism and the amorality of the political sphere has had severe consequences for Nigerian citizens. Along with using public funds as a form of political patronage, some politicians have arbitrarily seized land for private and primordial gain. In addition, the state maintains funding for a regressive fuel subsidy which has long been claimed to be a mere cover for political corruption. The fact that the fuel subsidy scheme remains in place—11 years after corruption allegations against it first surfaced—reinforces the notion that Nigerian politics is underpinned by an amoral civic public mentality that is indifferent to the misdemeanours of elites.

However, Nigeria may be moving in a new direction, characterised by a popular notion of citizenship that shuns the disruption engendered by ethnic divisions. The ‘Obidients’ – supporters of Mr Obi in the 2023 election – were energised by a message of hope, renewal and disruption. What does this show? 

Importantly, it is a testament to the formation of a new consciousness amongst Nigerians which the political elite either didn’t realise, failed to take seriously or outright ignored. Biodun Ajiboye, an adviser to Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s presidential election campaign, explained the wave of support for Mr Obi as rooted in the fact that “[Nigerian] children are still smarting from the event of EndSARS”. Nevertheless, Mr Ajiboye still went on to claim that Obi’s supporters were involved in a “religious politics” ploy – that is despite the fact that Mr Obi consistently encouraged voters to ignore primordial and religious differences when heading to the polls. 

Yet, in view of the fact that Mr Obi’s supporters were mainly young and atypically enthused by his alternative politics, such an accusation is crucial. It points to the great extent to which the political elite, such as Mr Ajiboye, have come to embrace a politics characterised by a primordial ethic and how many young Nigerians, in the face of the possible continuation of such, have opted for its rejection. The implications of this are noteworthy.

Given that much has recently been made of the idea that Nigeria is a failed state, one can point to Mr Obi’s campaign as evidence that many Nigerians are keen to imbue a new politics and notion of citizenship that is rooted in the unitary concept of ‘Nigeria’ as well the implementation of morality and responsibility within the historically amoral civic political space. In doing so, young Nigerians appear to be sending the message that they desire a politics no longer characterised by an amoral civic logic as well as a tribal primordial one. 

Therefore, the phenomenon of ‘Japa’ Syndrome and even that which presents a more hopeful vision of Nigeria’s future such as the Obidience movement appear to be premised on the widespread nature of public discontent towards the Nigerian state. Given this, one must consider where this seemingly new formation of a youth-led national consciousness will take Nigerians. Undeniably for some, it will drive them to ‘Japa’. However, for the majority who remain, it is unlikely that the legitimacy deficit of the state will be something that they will tolerate without making their voices heard. The #EndSARS protests, social media activism and ‘Obidience movement’ are a testament to this fact. For this reason, ‘Japa’ syndrome may merely be symptomatic of the beginnings of a long-term legitimacy crisis of the Nigerian state. 

Osaremen Iluobe is a finalist Politics and International Relations student at Churchill College, University of Cambridge and an incoming MA candidate in Economic History at the University of Pennsylvania.