Two months ago, in August 2022, the External Affairs Minister of India Dr S Jaishankar stated that ‘the India-China relationship is going through an extremely difficult phase.’ He cited Chinese border policy towards India as the main reason for the bilateral tensions—and expressed reservations about the reality of an ‘Asian century’ (i.e. the idea of Asia holding global hegemony in the 21st century) in case China refuses to cooperate with India.
How did the global community react to this statement? While tensions generated by Chinese expansionist policies on multiple border fronts have been globally criticized, there has been a relatively sombre intra-state criticism of India’s outlook towards China. The latter has been rooted in an understanding of India’s policy as ambiguous and confused.
However, India’s policy should instead be seen as rooted in “strategic deniability,” which aims to foster border deterrence. While India faces many compulsions and incentives to adopt this policy stance, it is ultimately infeasible in the long-term for how it may exacerbate regional tensions, positioning India on the brink of a confrontational future.
India’s Outlook: Ambiguous or Deniable?
In 2014, Chinese state media termed Indian foreign policy as ‘ambiguous,’ characterized by an unwillingness to take definitive policy stances as a function of appeasement tactics. Such a reasoning was not novel, reminiscent of the American criticism of India’s non-alignment during the Cold War. Yet, this assessment has been internally echoed among researchers and the political opposition wherein a lack of public discussion about India’s policy—towards Chinese border incursions and interferences in the maritime zone surrounding the Indian coastline—is a sign of confusion and ambiguity.
However, this perspective needs to be contested with the understanding that strategic deniability, rather than ambiguity, takes centre-stage in India’s policy outlook towards China. This can be further contextualized by understanding the difference between these two strategies.
While ambiguity implies a degree of confusion in the policy stance reflected by actionable inconsistencies (as seen in India’s response towards human rights abuses against the Uyghur Muslims in China’s Xinjiang province), deniability is more concerned with the lack of public expression of a tension area or security threat, irrespective of the preventive policy measures which remain unnoticed within public discourse. This is where deterrence by denial comes into play: a strategy which is focussed on deterring the threat via robust preventive measures with a short-term vision instead of a long-term settlement.
This application of deterrence by denial is apparent, as discussed by former Indian ambassador Shyam Saran during a panel discussion moderated by Suhasini Haider on the two year anniversary of the Galwan Valley incident. He identified the lack of retrospective governmental acknowledgement and media discourse about this specific incident as strategic denial. Nevertheless, a continuous villanizing of the Chinese threat within internal electoral discourse—by political parties and media broadcasters— without a specific focus on the threats experienced along the Indian border and the coastline demonstrates the intent to reap intra-state political benefits while being deniable towards a long term inter-state settlement.
This strategy is rather antithetical to the one towards India’s other security nemesis—Pakistan—wherein a direct and arguably confrontational approach while addressing specific tension areas has been prioritized. This is often expressed by a vehement criticism of incidents articulated in a clear and specific manner. For instance, the accusations of state sponsored terrorisms in relation to the Uri and Pathankot attacks and an annual remembrance of these attacks, in contrast to the case of Galwan Valley and Doklam incidents.
Compulsions and Incentives behind India’s Deniability
During a time when the Indo-Pacific is being accorded the centre-stage in geopolitics—and with China rapidly expanding its presence therein—India is leaving no stone unturned in asserting itself as a decisive stakeholder in the region. INS Vikrant, its first indigenously made aircraft carrier, is the latest addition to its swiftly modernising naval fleet, as part of its ambitious expansion plan.
Diplomatically, it is taking much interest in collaborating with Southeast Asian nations and ASEAN. It has revived the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation and is steering a major revamping of its structure, mandate and functions. More so, engagement through the Quad, a security forum between Australia, India, Japan, and the US, has become central to its Indo-Pacific strategy.
Yet, it must not be overlooked how India actively projects such endeavours as not aimed at a particular nation but towards the peace, prosperity and stability of the region. In the Quad, for instance, India is quite unlike the other three players in its reluctance to mention China in press releases.
Instead, it endorses the ‘spirit of the Quad’ and the all-concerning themes of global health, infrastructure, climate change, new and emerging technologies, etc. This reflects its attempt at ensuring the absence of “alliance-like” overtones, also bringing to action its deniability policy.
India does acknowledge the security risks posed by the Belt and Road, the String of Pearls, and other Chinese expansionist ventures. But in deterring the potential threats, it is erecting the aforementioned barricades of strategic leverage—political, diplomatic, and military.
This is fundamentally different from how the US is deterring China on the Taiwan issue or how NATO and the EU deterred Russia against invading Ukraine. In fact, the Taiwan and Ukraine examples bring forth another aspect relevant for this discussion; in employing a deterrence by punishment approach, political outspokenness, public warnings, and proclamations of consequences take over the rhetoric, inevitably taking a toll on diplomatic relations.
India cannot afford this risk as the Indo-Pacific is only one of its many concerns. Certainly, among many others, Afghanistan is a major concern in Central Asia and India cannot deal with it without China—and Russia—on its side. Perhaps, this also explains its increased interest in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, involving both China and Russia.
At such fora, India has been ardently advocating for common interest areas such as terrorism, radicalisation, trafficking of humans, weapons and drugs, etc. Further, India’s attempts at enhancing relations with the Central Asian nations—as seen in its convening of the India-Central Asia Summit and Delhi Regional Security Dialogue—may be frustrated if China is on the opposing side.
Ambiguity, Deniability and a Deadlock: Chinese Strategy
If two things were to characterize the Chinese policy on India, it would be the lack of consensus within its strategic circles and the co-existence of strong optimism with an equally strong pessimism. More specifically, the conflict between President Xi Jinping’s global visions of Asia. Nonetheless, ‘Major Power Diplomacy’ sees India as a potential partner in China’s expansionism while ‘Neighbourhood Strategy’ sees it as a rival in securing a China-centred and China-led regional order.
Adding to the predicament is the awareness of India’s positioning as the ‘key variable’ in the success of any Indo-Pacific strategy, be that of the US or China, and yet, a lack of clear knowledge over which side India intends to choose. In this context—and given the volatility of the situation—Chinese strategists have not been able to settle on a concrete, long-term policy.
What follows instead is a loosely bound, “ambiguous” and reactive approach seeking to hold India—as well as China’s relationship with India—where it currently is. Needless to say, China immensely benefits from its political, military and economic might, which provides it sufficient leeway to be able to afford such an ambiguous outlook. This Chinese ambiguity coupled with India’s deniability results in a deadlock where neither party is interested in making a move towards improving relations, but neither party wants a deterioration, either.
Deniable Policy, Undeniable Tensions
This deadlock resulting from a combination of India’s deniability strategy and China’s ambiguous policy is consequential for peace in the region. While there are a myriad of potential impacts, there are two main dimensions in particular to focus on: first, transformations in the regional developmental milieu and, second, threats to the balance of power structures in US-China bilateral tensions.
Recalling Jaishankar’s apprehensions about a potential India-China escalation, it is reasonable to wonder how it could affect the possibility of an “Asian century.” Consequences relating to the regional developmental ecosystem are arguably a prominent consideration.
Though unseen, the India-China deadlock has much to do with major infrastructural advancements planned in Central and South Asia, as well as in much of the extended Indian Ocean Region. In what is conceived as the “string of pearls,” competition between India and China is accelerating the pace of infrastructural projects and improving connectivity, while also effectuating a system of checks and balances.
Especially in the small island nations of Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, etc., such competition is crucial not only to prevent economic coercion but also to protect their stability and sovereignty. Interestingly, Indian involvement is implicit, if not explicit, even in projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. As much as India diplomatically denounces the Corridor, it tactically falls short of creating barriers to it.
It is meaningful, therefore, to assess the impact of ‘the deadlock breaking in favour of confrontation’ in this milieu of development. Would every pearl in the string have to inevitably side with one of the two adversaries, letting go the benefits it was conveniently reaping before? Would India begin obstructing Chinese projects in its disputed Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir region, possibly by instigating political destabilisation?
However, the scope of consequences extends beyond the Indo-China battle over influencing development in the region. As discussed previously, the Sino-American rivalry remains central to the peace and security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific.
It is important to contextualise the relevance of India’s foreign policy to this balance of power arrangement. Currently, India has retained an interest-based, non-aligned approach, evident from a simultaneous active engagement in Quad as well as intending to revive BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Former National Security Advisor for India, Shivashankar Menon, has strongly argued in favour of a non-aligned approach akin to the strategy adopted by India during the Cold War. Yet, Lieutenant General Prakash Menon has contested this opinion due to the impossibility of ignoring Indo-Chinese border tensions.
This assessment places India in a unique limbo: inaction in the face of Chinese border ambiguity fosters a threat to territorial sovereignty, but pro-US alignment reinforces a bipolar order which threatens India’s capacity to take independent decisions on other issues such as bilateral economic exchanges with China. This positions India on the brink of a tradeoff between losing some control over sovereign decisions either way. That is, unless India decides to opt in favour of a diplomatically confrontational approach that builds on Jaishankar’s message from earlier this year: normalization in bilateral relations is not possible without normalized border deployments.