In spite of their clear defeat in Iraq and Syria, radical extremist militias in Sub-Saharan Africa are waging an increasingly potent insurgency against local states. These conflicts are taking place across the region, in countries such as Mali, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, and Mozambique. What started as raids against small villages and police installations in Northeastern Mozambique quickly became a terrorist insurgency linked to the Islamic State’s Central African Province (ISCAP), characterized by brutal violence against civilians and devastation to the region. To respond to the threat posed by radical extremists in its Cabo Delgado province, the Maputo government turned to the Wagner Group and Dyck Advisory Group, two Private Military Corporations that have seen extensive combat against nonstate actors in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. What resulted was a decisive failure of the two corporations to combat the growing insurgency, which managed to capture the cities of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia. Both corporations suffered extensive casualties and were ultimately withdrawn from the region. A lack of understanding of the local culture and unfamiliarity with the dense jungle conditions were the main causes of their lack of success.
The Wagner Group was initially employed by the Mozambican government at a discounted rate to provide security for upcoming elections. In exchange, certain Russian companies were granted exclusive rights over sections of Mozambique’s expansive natural gas fields. The Wagner Group is a paramilitary company which cut its teeth in the 2014 invasion of Crimea and has seen combat in Syria, the Central African Republic, Mali, and elsewhere. The Wagner Group has also faced severe criticism for its cruel methods, which have included the killing of civilians, rape, looting, and other war crimes.
Once it became clear that Mozambique’s security forces would not be able to stop attacks by radical extremists calling themselves Al-Shabab (not to be confused with Somalia’s Al-Shabaab), the government of Mozambique directed the Wagner Group to aid in counter-insurgency operations. In September of 2019, 200 mercenaries, multiple Russian helicopters, including a Hind gunship, and drones were deployed to the Cabo Delgado province. The Wagner Group was also tasked with training and leading local Mozambiquan military forces in countering Al-Shabab’s increasingly ambitious attacks. But within weeks, at least seven mercenaries had been killed, with the death toll rising to twelve over the course of the next couple of months. In November, the Wagner Group was pulled out of the operation and sent back to Nacala, 250 miles South of Cabo Delgado.
So what led to this decisive failure? The Wagner Group faced tensions between its forces and local Mozambican military forces. The mercenaries regarded local forces as being underprepared and ‘too undisciplined’ while Mozambiquan forces criticized the group for acting overconfidently and “bullying” their ranks. Poor integration with local forces was an issue that Soviet forces faced in aiding liberation movements in the 20th century, and the reason why the United States runs Robin Sage exercises for its Green Berets. With poor cooperation from local forces, the Wagner Group was not able to train nor carry out coordinated operations against Al-Shabab. The Wagner Group’s overconfidence in its approach to the situation meant that it expected Al-Shabab militants to be intimidated by their presence and increased firepower. However, in anticipation of the Wagner Group’s arrival, AlShabab reinforced its Northern positions, calling in thousands of fighters from other regions in the ISCAP and neighboring countries. Overconfidence and poor coordination between forces meant that mercenaries from the Wagner Group were very vulnerable to ambushes by Al-Shabab. These proved to be highly effective, killing just under a dozen mercenaries.
The Wagner Group also struggled to perform counter-insurgency operations because combat took place in both thick jungles and tight urban settings for which the group was not prepared. The bulk of the Wagner Group’s experience before Mozambique was in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, and Syria. The dense jungle that the mercenaries faced in the Cabo Delgado province was unlike the conditions they had experienced before. They were unfamiliar with jungle combat and survival tactics, preferring to travel by helicopter than by foot. Moreover, while the urban combat the Wagner Group faced was more reminiscent of that faced in Syria, the Group was at a disadvantage as Al-Shabab militants were more familiar with the specific architecture of cities and exploited this information asymmetry to their advantage. Brigadier Ben Barry from the International Institute for Strategic Studies stated that IS militants like AlShabab have a ‘proven ability in fighting in built-up areas.’ The Wagner Group was not able to match Al-Shabab’s ability to fight in urban contexts and thus its counter-insurgency operations were unsuccessful. In fact, during the course of the Wagner Group’s operations, Al-Shabab was able to capture more territory and even began mounting attacks on neighbouring Tanzania.
While the Wagner Group’s subsequent endeavors in other African states have been more successful, its failure in Mozambique speaks to its lack of preparation for the vastly different battlefields present in Africa. Al-Shabab was far more brutal of an enemy than the Syrian rebels and even ISIS, seemingly not caring about winning the approval of the local population, instead decapitating and dismembering many civilians in the villages it raided. Moreover, the Wagner Group failed to secure the cooperation of local forces and was not prepared for the jungle that it faced.
The Al-Shabab threat still exists to this day. Following the withdrawal of the Wagner Group from Cabo Delgado, Maputo pursued a coalition composed of forces from the Southern African Development Community and Rwanda, numbering in the thousands. This force effectively stopped Al-Shabab’s advance and even pushed it out of certain strategic cities such as Mocimboa da Praia. The Wagner Group is still active in Mozambique; however, the scope of its operations has been limited to information warfare. It was not deterred by its failure in the country; instead, the Wagner Group has recently replaced French troops as a component of Mali’s security forces in the fight against the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and has expanded its operations in Ukraine.