President Joe Biden’s four-day tour of the Middle East at the end of July was overshadowed by Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial trip to Taiwan. In light of escalated US-China tensions over Taiwan, Biden’s tour becomes even more significant for maintaining regional balances of power.
There has been an abundance of misplaced criticism regarding Biden’s empty-handed return from his trip to Saudi Arabia. Worse, he was criticized for appearing to contradict his previous comment that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman al Saud (MBS) was a ‘pariah’ which came as a result of the US intelligence’s assessment of his role in the death of Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018. Biden was harshly condemned for what appeared to be a softer stance toward the Saudi autocrat after he was photographed giving MBS a fist bump.
Ahead of the trip, there was considerable discussion about regional integration on security and even Israeli talk about a Middle East Air Defense Alliance. Some observers, including Dan Kurtzer and Aaron Miller, were quick to point out that nothing of the sort transpired during the trip. Even as Washington hoped to secure more oil in the face of rising prices caused by the Russia-Ukraine crisis, many critics argued there was also no guarantee of an increase in oil production beyond its current levels. MBS revealed that his country was nearly depleted and unable to produce more than 13 million more barrels per day.
In the shorter term, Biden’s visit does appear to be ineffective in ensuring the Middle Eastern countries’ reciprocal commitment to the US. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine not only highlighted the crucial role Gulf oil producers would play, but also reflected the risks of allowing Russia and China to gain influence with traditional partners the United States had either taken for granted or, in the case of Saudi Arabia, ostracized. Despite the fact that Biden compromised his previous hardline stance against MBS and received tremendous scrutiny for doing so, the criticism was exacerbated by the failure to secure a concrete return of friendship and favour to the US during his visit.
Regarding the Palestine question, sentiment on Biden’s trip remained doubtful, both domestically and internationally. Abbas stated that prospects for a two-state solution to the conflict (i.e. an independent state of Palestine alongside an independent state of Israel), the model favoured by the United States and international organizations including the United Nations, were receding and the opportunity ‘may not remain for a long time.’ Even the Palestinian and Israeli populations viewed the two-state solution with cynicism. In an interview with the BBC, Tal Schneider, a correspondent for The New York Times in Israel, states categorically that the idea is completely out of the question in Israel.
Even though the majority of critics condemned the United States for failing to secure a concrete security alliance, we should not dismiss the visit just yet. Instead, examining the implications of Biden’s visit from both short- and long-term, symbolic and concrete perspectives would provide a deeper insight into the issue.
It is conspicuous that oil was the catalyst for Biden’s Middle East visit. Although Biden did not secure a commitment for an expansion of Saudi oil production, there is still a possibility when the current Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) agreement expires in late August. Without the meetings in Saudi Arabia, that potential concession would have been a non-starter. While Saudi officials have remarked that the decision will be based on the market and in consultation with the other OPEC+ members, including Russia, the US-Saudi partnership will also factor into Saudi calculations. Martin Indyk told Al-Monitor last week that an agreement to increase production is likely to be finalised. Karen Elliott House recently wrote that while MBS would not sever his relationship with Russia in OPEC+, she too expects OPEC+ to boost production in September.
Before rushing to judgment, we should also examine the historical relationship of the US with the Middle Eastern players and how it can correspond to its future. It is evident from Biden’s visit that Israel and Saudi Arabia are at the centre of the Biden administration’s Middle East strategy. In both countries, there were reaffirmations of US commitments to their security—with US assistance to strengthen Israel’s military capabilities to ensure that Israel could do what has always been a crucible for it: ‘defend itself by itself against any threat or combination of threats.’
During Biden’s visit to Israel, the two countries signed the Jerusalem Declaration, which explicitly mentioned the US’ pledge ‘never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,’ and that it is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.; The US also reaffirmed its ‘commitment to work together with other partners to confront Iran’s aggression and destabilizing activities, whether advanced directly or through proxies and terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.’
Conceptually, this scenario is similar to Nixon’s Twin Pillars strategy, which guided the US’ Middle East strategy prior to Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979. According to this plan, the US would rely on Saudi Arabia and Iran as its two main allies in the Middle East to protect its interests. In the reincarnated form of this strategy, Iran has now been replaced by Israel. While Biden’s visit might have failed to bring about tangible outcomes on paper, it is the first step in a longer trajectory towards building a regional coalition against Iran.
Furthermore, in light of the intensifying tensions between the US and China, Biden’s trip was necessary to prove the US’s commitment to the Middle East. Biden’s trip was designed to signal that the US can be relied upon in the region because anything that occurs there is necessarily tied to the larger effort to restore and perpetuate that rules-based international system. Those efforts will be successful if America continues to forge regional alliances. Time will tell whether this trip proves to be a turning point, but those who dismiss its importance before Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan are making hasty judgments.
It is important to note that if the US wants to keep its position as the world’s preeminent superpower, it must strengthen its other alliances given that Pelosi’s visit has increased tension between the US and China. The Middle Eastern states have little faith in the US’ future commitment to their security. The suspicions that Washington may turn its back on the Middle East further weakened the American position. This is exacerbated by the fact that Saudi and Emirati officials fundamentally do not believe real accommodation with Iran is possible. ‘There’s a keen sense in the Gulf that the Iran problem never goes away. It’s not about the Islamic Republic; it’s about Iran,’ Mr Alterman said. While aiming to deprioritize its obligations to the Middle East and focus on China, the US rightfully understands that it must uphold its commitment to the former states in order to focus on the latter.
Despite low expectations for progress on Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, especially with an interim Israeli government in place, there appears to have been some effort put into mending Palestinian-Gulf ties. Relations between the Palestinians and especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been strained, but the Biden visit spurred some small steps toward reconciliation, securing $100 million in aid from the Gulf Cooperation Council for the East Jerusalem Hospital Network, which provides healthcare to Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Biden also informed Mahmoud Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority, that he had succeeded in stalling some Israeli settlement expansion, as Daoud Kuttab reports.
Overall, only time can tell if Biden’s trip is an inflexion point for US relations with the Middle East, whether in terms of its trajectory of scaling back obligations or its rekindling of relationships against China and Russia. However, to dismiss it so quickly would be to overlook the longer-term implications of this trip. Moreover, given the trajectory of US-China relations, the Middle East has become an even more important arena for the US to defend itself against China.
Shaun Loh is currently a research intern at the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore. His research interests lie in the intersections of gender and religion in the Gulf and Iran.