Earlier this year, at the annual G7 Summit, leaders spearheaded an ambitious $600 billion ‘Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment’ (PGII) plan for infrastructure investment in developing countries.
This sends a clear message to China: the US and the West are attempting to counter its global ambition to become a full-fledged superpower. Granted, the plan mainly aims to support less developed countries in tackling pressing economic issues. But, to realize it, Western leaders must look beyond its economic dimension and execute the grand plan multidimensionally, particularly in security and political dimensions.
As declared by the G7 leaders in the first day of the meeting, the $600 billion, five year infrastructure plan is designed to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It mainly emphasizes pillars such as climate change, global health, gender equity, and digital infrastructure. Compared to the G7’s ‘Build Back Better World‘ plan from last year, the PGII plan has a more clear agenda and more institutionalized cooperation from a variety of sectors, illustrated by the announcement of some new projects in specific countries, along with projects that were already underway.
This is a remarkable step by the US and its Western allies to rebuild a rule-based order that has recently been in decline. Moreover, as I argued previously, countries receiving money from the BRI have been thinking twice given the potential risks caused by BRI-funded projects, instead looking for reliable alternative sources for infrastructure development. Notwithstanding these favorable conditions, though, without being implemented multidimensionally, the PGII will be far from a success.
Though the BRI is largely focusing on economic cooperation through infrastructure development as well as trade and investment, its implications are not limited to the economic dimension. Its political implications are obvious; China wants to export its economic and political model to other countries in order to pull them into its sphere of influence. The logic is simple: when the recipient countries receive a substantial amount of money from China without the ability to pay it off, they will be politically influenced by Beijing. Most countries that have received money from BRI are still developing, meaning it is difficult for them to access sources of money from Western-led institutions such as WTO or IMF due to these bodies’ strict requirements on economic reform and transparency. Thus, many countries have turned to the BRI for money thanks to the BRI’s less stringent, though not transparent, credit requirements.
These countries’ dependence on Beijing’s money then tethers them to Beijing’s politics as well. Through a network of projects in different regions, from South and Southeast Asia to Central Asia and South America, China aims to gradually exert its political influence and establish a Sinocentric order. Indeed, this is evidenced by China’s support for autocratic or military regimes in countries like Myanmar, Zambia, Cambodia, and Uganda, among others, through exporting technologies supporting the repression of citizens to these states. As long as the Chinese Communist Party expands the BRI, this trend towards autocratisation will continue.
The BRI’s security implications are also remarkable: BRI-funded projects have been directly raising security concerns for host countries. On the one hand, the BRI is seen as ‘a modern-day Trojan horse,’ given the opacity of lending conditions and implementation in recipient states. Most BRI-funded projects are infrastructure-related, and infrastructure is the backbone of economic development. Furthermore, through infrastructure investment, Beijing can both capture the ‘economic throat’ of the host economies and encroach across their border without resorting to war, which poses a great threat to their sovereignty.
Specifically, countries receiving money from China, due to their low level of economic development, are facing the risk of falling into Beijing’s debt trap. Pundits have argued that China implements this strategy by lending to less-developed countries at high risk of default without strict conditions, then forcing them to cede their strategic assets when they do default. The clearest example is Sri Lanka. Having received billions of dollars of loans from China mainly for infrastructure development, Sri Lanka defaulted, and therefore gave up control of its strategic Hambantota Port to China.
On the other hand, BRI-funded projects also pose non-traditional security threats to the hosts. Most of these projects are notorious for having negative consequences on the environment in the recipient countries as well as unmanageable debt due to their substantial delay. These issues caused by BRI-funded projects often have a catastrophic impact on people’s lives in the host states, which in turn threatens their economic and environmental security.
In the same vein, the BRI threatens interregional security, particularly in Asia. Once a network of BRI-funded projects is well-developed across the region, it can give Beijing leverage in expanding its sphere of influence. A Sinocentric system of regional infrastructure is conducive to Beijing’s ambition to become a true ‘hegemon,’ according to Charles Kindleberger. Not only can China establish itself as a major provider of public goods, but it can also turn this economic advantage into a military advantage by using the wealth from the BRI to develop military technologies and cutting-edge weapons.
Moreover, with such a favorable infrastructure system, China can increase its military presence in those regions it has invested in, much like the US has. Through this mechanism, China’s military expansion is putting all countries in the region at enormous risk, especially those that have territorial disputes with China, including but not limited to Japan, Vietnam, India, and Malaysia.
Against this backdrop, the G7 leaders must take concrete actions to strengthen the PGII as a vanguard of countering China. Above all else, they have to expand beyond mere economic cooperation under the PGII to include security cooperation with developing countries. Just as the BRI’s security implications are as important as economic ones, so too must the G7 execute its plan in both economic and security realms. Though leaders have proposed upcoming economic projects and implementing steps hinging on the pillars mentioned above, they have not yet revealed the implications for security cooperation with potential partners. This is a serious gap in the planning of the grand plan, which will lead to a gap in its implementation.
Using the economic leverages of the PGII, the G7 leaders should aim to spill over to the security realm. For instance, by helping less-developed countries improve digital infrastructure, G7 countries can set the foundations for cybersecurity coordination, particularly against threats raised by China. In addition to this, a better infrastructure system will pave the way for the US and its allies, both within and outside the G7, to increase their military presence in the PGII-applicable region. Undoubtedly, well-developed infrastructure throughout the region is conducive for military activities, such as joint military exercises with regional partners and military technological transfer, to name a few. All of these are critical for establishing a network to contain China, just as Beijing’s security influence in these areas is gradually ascending via BRI-funded projects. The US and its allies still enjoy an advantage in terms of technology and trust over China, and they should utilize this to implement security facets of the PGII.
Complementary to security cooperation, political activities are also necessary to make the grand plan more effective. Political cooperation is undetachable from a comprehensive counter-China initiative due to the substantial political influence of Beijing over BRI recipients. In this regard, G7 leaders must simultaneously foster economic, political, and security cooperation with potential partners in the developing world. One of the ultimate goals of the PGII is to rebuild a rule-based international order led by the West, and a core component of this order is liberal Western values. These values are being threatened by the expansion of Beijing’s political footprint, as we see in the global wave of autocratisation mentioned previously.
Hence, in tandem with developing economic and security relations, G7 leaders should further build up political ties with their less-developed partners in accordance with the PGII. This remains achievable despite the relative decline in global confidence in the US and the West. According to a recent global survey, the US and its allies still enjoy an advantage over China in global perceptions. The US and its allies should thus aim to deepen strategic partnerships with more partners or provide guidance for political leaders centered around liberal Western values.
G7 states are trying to rebuild a post-COVID global landscape that is favourable to their values, or in other words, making ‘the world safe for democracy.‘ The PGII is an important step towards realizing this vision, and it is crucial for maintaining the G7’s global role. However, at this stage, economic cooperation alone is insufficient to bring about the containment that the PGII is really designed for. Therefore, it behooves the G7 leaders to incorporate other key areas of cooperation in the plan, specifically security and political ones, in order to bolster the PGII into a multi-pronged strategy that can successfully deal with China’s mounting threats in each of these areas. Only then can the PGII meaningfully support the establishment of a genuine Western-based order.
Phuong Pham is a PhD student at the Department of Political Science, Duke University.