The commencement of Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine on the 24th of February was quick to receive condemnation throughout the world. On the 2nd of March, the UN General Assembly saw 141 out of the 193 UN Member States vote in favour of a resolution demanding an immediate end to the conflict.
Yet, despite such widespread condemnation, the world is divided on how best to achieve peace as soon as possible. While the West has pursued significant actions including the imposition of unilateral sanctions, the removal of Russian banks from the SWIFT system, and supplying weapons to assist Ukraine’s military in the conflict the vast majority of countries outside of the West, such as those within Latin America, have not followed suit, and many have instead criticised such measures, especially the use of “indiscriminate sanctions”. Such a situation poses the question of why this variation of responses to the crisis exist.
While US President Joe Biden has boasted that Russia is increasingly ‘isolated from the world’, we are presented with a very different response when turning to look at other regions, especially developing ones. Latin America, for one, provides an informative case for understanding why the crisis in Ukraine has prompted such a different response amongst developing states compared to that of the West. Latin American states have chosen to not isolate Russia through the use of measures like that of implementing sanctions, for many rely on Russia for core economic sectors, most significantly in agriculture. The West must carefully address the concerns raised by the profound impact of its measures, for ignoring this matter risks both fermenting further animosity against the West’s position on the crisis as well as risking the creation of a much more severe global crisis.
Since the start of the crisis in late February, Latin America has been very much disunited in their diplomatic response. For instance, the process of suspending Russia from the UNHCR saw Honduras, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Ecuador voting in favour, Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia voting against, and Brazil, Mexico and El Salvador abstaining. The region was again divided when states like Colombia saw its outgoing President Iván Duque Márquez directly condemn Russia for its ‘premeditated and unjustified attack’, while those like Brazil emphasised its ‘impartiality’ on the matter and supported the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin at this year’s G20 Summit in November, despite Western calls to block him.
As expressed by Argentinian foreign policy expert Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Latin America has faced a ‘dramatic fragmentation’ when it comes to the rhetoric of their response to the conflict, unlike the unified narrative we see from Europe or the US. However, when it comes to the matter of sanctions, Latin America is to some extent unofficially united no Latin American state has imposed sanctions against Russia, and has instead often criticized the West for doing so. In March, Argentina’s Foreign Minister Santiago Cafiero argued that the use of sanctions would not be efficient for achieving peace. This perspective was promoted further in May, when Brazil attempted to pass an amendment on a UN resolution which highlighted the negative impacts of sanctions on the global food supply, which was ultimately vetoed by the US. Economic, political and ideological factors all contribute to a tendency in Latin America to avoid isolating Russia, for the consequences of doing so would be greatly problematic for each state.
In the economic sphere, Russia’s relationship with the region should not be underestimated. Latin America and Russia have long been building economic ties which have seen significant investments by Russia in a variety of sectors one of the most critical being in agribusiness. For many Latin American states, economic relations with Russia are essential due to a high dependency on Russian fertilizer required for their agribusiness sectors. Brazil, for one, is the largest producer and exporter of products like soybeans and must import 85% of its fertilizer, with 23% coming from Russia. Other states like Peru, which has seen fruit exports to Russia increase by 28% annually in the past 5 years, relies on Russia for over 50% of its fertilizer. With this dependency, there is a real fear that the impact of sanctions on fertilizer prices would be detrimental to these sectors. Eduardo Zegarra, Peruvian agrarian economist and researcher at the Group for the Analysis of Development (GRADE) think tank, stated in late April that Peru was at risk of seeing a 40% decrease in the output of staple foods like rice and corn, potentially worsening the already precarious global food situation.
As a result, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay came together to ensure that fertilizer products would be excluded from sanctions submitting such a proposal to the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation in early March. Yet, the sanctions that were already imposed by Western states have indirectly disrupted the supply chain, and the US alone is expected to see the price for fertilizer increase by 12%. The consequence of this will be significantly more severe for states in Latin America which lack financial resources. Considering this alongside the severe fuel shortages which have led to the increased cost to transport food has meant that food prices have also increased putting profound pressure on households which saw 40% of their income utilised for food and energy expenses by the end of 2021.
In this context, Latin American governments are in a precarious situation which deeply influences their responses to the conflict. With the simultaneous threat of a global food shortage and economies still recovering from the pandemic, governments across the region have little flexibility. Moreover, each state is facing these crises in a variety of circumstances. Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro faces an upcoming election in October, and with his opponent former President Luiz Inacio Lula leading him in the polls by 14%, he cannot afford to damage relations with Russia and thus threaten the Brazilian economy which is still recovering from the pandemic. The states of Cuba and Venezuela, both sanctioned by the US, still heavily rely on Russian support in order to operate. Cuba, for example, has recently had its debt repayment of $2.3 billion in loans from Russia postponed until 2027.
In other states, like Mexico, the reason for its neutrality and insistence on a negotiated peace as opposed to sanctions is much more ideological, though still with economic undertones. Under the current President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Mexico has subscribed to what is known as the Estrada Doctrine which effectively commits the nation to a policy of non-intervention and a focus on respecting state sovereignty. This has led to AMLO opposing the Western strategy of sanctions and supplying weapons
to Ukraine which only risks prolonging the conflict. Thus, Mexico continues to communicate with Russia and instead focusing on providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine.
The circumstances of Latin America and other developing states should be closely examined and kept in mind by policymakers in the West. So far, the EU, US, and its allies have imposed sanctions even at the detriment of their own interests. Alongside an increase in gas prices, several states in the West are facing a cost of living crisis, with the Bank of England, for example, expecting the British economy to fall into recession this year. The shock to the global economic system as a result of the sanctions has had a significant impact on all, but such an impact will be unevenly distributed. Developing states which lack financial flexibility will suffer the most from these crises if nothing is done to remedy the situation.
If the West continues to approach the situation as it has done for the last three months and continues to fail to consider the overarching impact of their actions on states outside of Europe, then it risks undermining its own position no matter how noble they perceive it to be. Western states, especially the US, must realize that it cannot solely prioritize the provision of funding to Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Russia if they wish to achieve peace, at least not without significantly damaging its standing and precipitating a global crisis. Already, with $40 billion scheduled to be sent by the US to Ukraine, the US has made it apparent how willing they are to provide war support over providing any sort of alleviation to developing states. ASEAN, for instance, an organisation of ten member states, was promised only $150 million for new projects.
There is much to be gained in understanding the ramifications of the conflict through an alternative, Latin American lens. By empathizing with the struggles faced by developing states like those in Latin America, the West may adjust their approach in responding to the conflict in a way that both achieves peace in Ukraine and minimizes the consequences of their actions. This is a much better strategy than the current one which prolongs the conflict and risks generating an even more severe global crisis in the future that, as is often the case, will see the people of the developing world suffer disproportionately greater consequences.
Aidan Cross studies International Relations and Chinese at the London School of Economics.
This piece previously appeared in our 7th print issue, “Looking South.” You can read the full issue here: https://issuu.com/oxfordpoliticalreview/docs/opr_issue_7_final.