Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have maintained a close relationship with Moscow. From energy and transport partnerships to extensive commercial and security cooperation, the Turkic energy powerhouses of Central Asia have appeared intrinsically linked with the Kremlin.
However, any definitive continuation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan within Russia’s sphere of influence seems increasingly unlikely, as Putin’s ‘special military operation’ severely strains its relationships with the governments in Nur-Sultan and Tashkent. Troubling to Putin, both China and Turkey are poised and ready to fill the geopolitical and economic void that waning Russian influence in Central Asia presents.
Xi Jinping’s trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) includes an ambitious project to create a new ‘Silk Road’ from China to Europe through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This provides Beijing with the perfect opportunity to expand its growing influence in Central Asia. The provision of advantageous economic benefits to both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will allow China to freely consolidate its ‘“Sinostan” empire.’
Notwithstanding, Turkey, too, can exploit such an evaporation of allegiance to Moscow in Central Asia. In the absence of Russian ascendancy, Recep Erdogan can implement his pan-Turkism agenda to pull Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan closer into Ankara’s sphere of influence through Turkey’s strong cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties with the two states.
The relationship between Russia and its post-Soviet neighbours in Central Asia has been traditionally secure, so how did we get to this position of declining Russian influence?
The first signs of this over Kazakhstan arose at the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June 2022. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared he would not recognize the Kremlin-backed quasi-states of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine. Enraged, Putin responded by claiming that all former Soviet republics are rightfully under Russia’s jurisdiction: ‘What is the Soviet Union? [It is] historic Russia…[Kazakhstan is] part of historic Russia.’ According to this view, the Kremlin views Kazakhstan as little more than an appendix of Russia proper, as opposed to a crucial political and economic partner.
Despite these veiled threats from Moscow, the government in Nur-Sultan has not shied away from expressing its views on Putin’s ‘special military operation.’ Tokayev further declared that no Kazakh troops will be supplied to Moscow. Moreover, Tokayev reiterated his opposition to Russian aggression at the Qatar Economic Forum in June, stating that the ‘territorial integrity of countries should prevail.’ Such rhetoric demonstrates an unprecedented defiance against the Russian position, and what Moscow expects from Kazakhstan.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had traditionally been Moscow’s closest ally. As a founding member of both the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it was wholly reasonable to assume the country would support Russia’s invasion as an ally. It was only in January of this year that Tokayev’s government sought military support from Russia to assist in the quelling of violent unrest over rising fuel prices. The decision to not only offer no support, but to overtly condemn the invasion questions the very future of the ties between the two countries.
So why has Kazakhstan decided to distance itself from Russia?
A key explanation is pragmatic politicking. Nur-Sultan has recognized the economic dangers of being Russia’s ‘right-hand man’ whilst it continues to conduct indescribable humanitarian horrors in Ukraine. By shunning a close alliance with its northern neighbour, Kazakhstan can avoid being targeted by the international sanctions imposed on Russia and its allies by the West. In fact, a separation from Moscow’s hold can also facilitate an advantageous flow of economic investment into the country, as businesses continue their exodus out of Russia. The only danger of distancing from Moscow is the possible threat to the country’s territorial integrity. When Joseph Stalin created the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936, the borders were drawn exaggeratively-northward into Russia, to encompass a large Russian-speaking population. The effects of such an arbitrary conceptualization of Kazakhstan’s territory are still pertinent today, with over 15 per cent of the Kazakh population ethnically Russian.
As Kazakhstan moves further from Moscow’s influence, Nur-Sultan should be cautious that northern Kazakhstan does not become another Donbas. Fears of Russian annexations in Kazakhstan have existed prior to Putin’s ‘special military operation.’ However, his disregard for territorial integrity in Ukraine is sure to have compounded concerns in Nur-Sultan.
For Uzbekistan, the relationship with Russia is not as close as that of their Kazakh neighbours. Tashkent has maintained a considerable distance from Russia politically and economically, best evidenced by its rejection of both EEU and CSTO memberships. Nevertheless, this does not curtail Uzbekistan’s ability to further undermine Russia’s influence in Central Asia.
Successful economic development in Uzbekistan, consequences of the liberalization implemented under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev since 2016, presents Tashkent with fruitful opportunities to further expand its economy, independent of Moscow. Mirziyoyev has already significantly reduced Uzbek dependency on the Russian oil pipelines through the investment of new energy infrastructure projects. This has led to a severe undermining of Moscow’s sources of revenue and political leverage in the country.
Beijing’s influence in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan can be consolidated by investing in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)—the ‘middle route’ of the BRI. Successful implementation of the TITR would provide significant economic benefits for the region, which Beijing can convert into strong political leverage.
Success of the BRI is, however, crucial for China to fortify its influence in Central Asia. Beijing desperately needs a distraction from accusations of committing genocide on its Uyghur population. Kazakhs and Uzbeks are Turkic, which ethnically links them to the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Among Turkic nations, there is growing anti-Chinese sentiment in reaction to Beijing’s persecution. For reference, there are over 220,000 Uyghurs in Kazakhstan and around 50,000 in Uzbekistan. Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in widespread anti-Chinese protests over the Uyghurs issue, such as weekly pickets in Almaty—Kazakhstan’s largest city. This demonstrates the increasing centrality of the Uyghur problem in Central Asian political discourse. Will this pose a major obstacle, however, to China in its efforts to incorporate the region into its sphere of influence?
The answer is likely in the negative. Money talks. Any economic successes consequential of Chinese investment are sure to sway the moods of those in power in Nur-Sultan and Tashkent. However, the hearts of their populations are likely to follow the affinity they have towards Turkey, given the shared Turkic identity.
With Putin preoccupied with his war in Ukraine, and with Moscow’s resources stretched to the extremities, it is unlikely Russia has the capacity to regain the crucial influence it has lost. What remains to be seen is the extent of influence either China or Turkey can now assert.