It is perhaps ironic to suggest that the Russian invasion of Ukraine amounts to the biggest military conflict in Europe since World War II, when World War II itself, at least between Russia and Japan, has not officially concluded. Following the Russian invasion, Japan-Russia relations dove to new lows as the Kishida cabinet froze the assets of the Russian central bank and Putin-linked oligarchs and revoked Russia’s “most favoured nation” trading status. In retaliation, the Kremlin withdrew from World War II peace treaty talks and named Japan in a list of “unfriendly countries.” These developments precluded the slightest possibility of resolving the Northern Territories (北方四島; known in Russia as the Southern Kuril Islands) dispute in the foreseeable future.
Situated along the Kuril chain that stretches from the Kamchatka Peninsula to Hokkaido, the Northern Territories comprises Etorofu Island (択捉島; Iturup), Kunashiri Island (国後島; Kunashir), Shikotan Island (色丹島), and the Habomai Islands (歯舞群島). These islands serve as an ice-free outlet to the Pacific Ocean from the Sea of Okhotsk, whilst the territorial waters are abundant in fishery resources, ore minerals, and oil. These islands were annexed by the Soviet Union from Japan at the end of World War II. Their status remains disputed, because the Soviet Union and Japan never concluded a final peace treaty at the end of the war.
Although scholarship in this area is often eclipsed by focus on the US-Japan security alliance, both Japan and Russia are regional powers that are crucial to stability in Northeast Asia. In 1956, the USSR and Japan signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration to conclude the state of war and normalise relations. The 1956 Joint Declaration laid the framework for future negotiations over the territorial dispute, but it was not a peace treaty. For more than 75 years, no peace agreement has been reached between Tokyo and Moscow, although both have actively engaged in trade and economic cooperation over the years.
The prospects of a peace treaty depend on a delicate balance of domestic politics, the US-Japan alliance, and the prevailing regional order. So far, none of them have proved fertile ground for a permanent peace treaty. Though both countries discussed joint economic activity proposals on the disputed islands, peace treaty negotiations failed to produce any substantive progress. Owing to indivisible perceptions of sovereignty and rising Russian ambitions, it would be virtually impossible to reach an agreement in the future.
Domestic resentment and partisan politics
The Northern Territories dispute is an outgrowth of World War II rooted in conflicting interpretations of certain international agreements leading to Japan’s surrender, which the issue in dispute is whether the Northern Territories should be considered part of the “Kuril Islands” as stated in these international agreements. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, the Allied powers agreed that the Kuril Islands would be “handed over to” the USSR subject to its entry into the war against Japan. The Potsdam Declaration of the same year limited Japan’s sovereignty to primarily the main islands, and Japan formally renounced its claim on the Kuril Islands in accordance with Article 2(c) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951). Yet, there was never any explicit reference to the Northern Territories in these instruments.
Although the Japanese public generally embraces a pacificist ethos, many remain indignant about Russian occupation of the Northern Territories as a result of victimisation by Soviet opportunism. Controversially, it was after Japan’s surrender that Soviet troops captured the Northern Territories and expelled all Japanese inhabitants. Since then, communities of former residents have campaigned for the islands’ return, and their humanitarian appeals to visit ancestral homes and family graves have won widespread public sympathy. Still, most people in Japan consider the entirety of the Northern Territories to be inherent Japanese territory unlawfully seized by Moscow, so repatriation has a symbolic meaning: that Russia is willing to tangibly display remorse for wrongdoing.
Consequently, long-time domestic resentment on the dispute has made it difficult for the Japanese government to convince the public why compromise for a peace treaty is justifiable, after insisting on the orthodox “all-or-nothing” position for several decades. As a result, Tokyo has refused to concede its territorial claims. Since the negotiations for the 1956 Joint Declaration, the USSR has offered to transfer the smaller Shikotan and Habomai islands (accounting for only 7% of the disputed territory) upon conclusion of a peace treaty “in which the borders… would be definitely demarcated.” Russia maintained this same position after the fall of the USSR; however, it would also certainly mean that Japan would have to recognise Russian sovereignty over Etorofu and Kunashiri as the premise for any meaningful progress.
Nevertheless, Russian foreign policy statements fuelled false hopes in Japan that at least two islands could be recovered. Japan saw an opportunity to break through the impasse during the early post-Soviet years of Russian weakness, where President Boris Yeltsin (1991-99) agreed “to discuss the disposition of all four islands”. In 1993, the Tokyo Declaration affirmed Soviet assurances to transfer Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, as stated in the 1956 Joint Declaration. Such a commitment was renewed in the 2001 Irkutsk Statement and reiterated during the high-profile presidential visit to Japan in 2004. While the Japanese public perceived hopes of complete reversion, a sudden departure from the basic stance has proven to be politically costly for the Prime Minister.
The gist of the mismatch boils down to the fragility of the Japanese premiership, which is often characterised by brief tenures of 1-2 years, if not only months. On one hand, frequent leadership turnovers could induce uncertainties and adjustments in foreign policy, which involves a nuanced exercise to maintain the delicate balance among rivalling factions within the ruling party, Diet members, and voters. By the same token, lengthy negotiations are further complicated by the trust-building efforts when Japanese prime ministers are replaced from time to time, contrary to the stability of Russian strongman politics. Thus, Moscow would have to assess the political will of each government to overcome domestic and external pressures on deviating from the basic stance.
At the 1998 Kawana Summit, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro suggested that Russia recognise Japanese sovereignty over the Northern Territories but retain administrative control for an unspecified period, but the proposal was rejected by the Kremlin. In 2018, the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo hinted his willingness to settle for a two-island deal so that negotiations could be accelerated. Abe’s approach was widely viewed to be a major concession from Hashimoto’s proposal. Given Abe’s national conservative credentials, however, this position appeared too soft, putting his cabinet ministers under fire by the opposition and journalists. After all, the Diet was unlikely to ratify a peace treaty on these terms. As time drew closer to the 2021 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership contest, Abe would have to work to secure his faction’s political future instead of commanding fellow parliamentarians’ support for a settlement deal that was already itself unpopular and not a boiling issue.
Since the Russo-Ukrainian war, public scepticism towards Russia has hit all-time highs, with more than 73% of the respondents in favour of sanctions. While public opinion exhibits overwhelming solidarity with Ukraine, many feared that the war would embolden China’s ambitions. Thus, Russian hostilities galvanised the existing domestic opposition to a compromise on the Northern Territories dispute. As a result, giving in to Russian demands would surely provoke severe backlash, which would end any Japanese political career in disgrace.
Security implications and the US-Japan alliance
Even if the Japanese government managed to align domestic expectations with that of the Kremlin, any resolution on the Northern Territories dispute is not possible without Washington’s input, given its longstanding military alliance with Japan. Under the Yoshida doctrine, the security arrangement represents a mutualistic relationship between the two countries, in which Japan relies on the protection of the US security umbrella, while the US enjoys “significant strategic benefits” to deter aggression from China, Russia, and North Korea. As a result, any alterations to Japanese sovereignty must address American security concerns, but also Russian perceptions of the US-Japan alliance in the context of the Northern Territories.
During the Cold War, the USSR used the islands as a strategic naval frontline for deploying ballistic missile submarines capable of striking the US mainland. Although the “two-island” proposal falls within the common ground for both Moscow and Tokyo, the Kremlin is reluctant to hand over Shikotan and Habomai after hopes for a neutral Japan perished. If the scope of the US-Japan Security Treaty is extended to include the Northern Territories, Moscow might risk the instalment of US naval bases near Siberia, while defence systems would mitigate the capabilities of Russian missiles, thereby weakening its leverage over Northeast Asia.
Washington also has an interest in keeping the status quo between Japan and Russia frozen but ongoing. American involvement in the peace treaty negotiations can be traced back to the 1950s, when the US-Soviet global rivalry was heightening. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, Japan assumed the role as the Capitalist Bloc’s bastion against the expansion of Soviet communism in Asia, conforming to the American policy of containment. Meanwhile, Tokyo was endeavouring to normalise relations and sign a peace treaty with the USSR, who did not participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference. In 1956, when Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru was about to accept the Soviet offer to return two islands and settle for peace, US Secretary of State John F. Dulles warned that this would jeopardise the future return of Okinawa.
Dulles’s intervention was motivated by the rising geopolitical significance of Okinawa and calculated to “prevent a rapprochement between Japan and the USSR”, as well as the Communist Bloc at-large. After the communists took over mainland China, the Ryukyu Islands became strategically important for the US military to respond swiftly whenever new developments arise in the Taiwan Strait and Southeast Asia. However, if Tokyo managed to reach a settlement with Moscow on the Northern Territories, there would be “considerable pressure for the US to vacate Okinawa” because it would further weaken the basis for American retention. Furthermore, Cold War tensions did not de-escalate in the mid-1950s, as American policymakers feared the aftershocks of the Korean War would provoke instability and spread communism in Asia. The US viewed China to be “a prime target” of its containment strategy because of its military intervention in Korea. By the same token, Washington was concerned that Japanese-Soviet rapprochement would open the possibility of Japan switching diplomatic recognition to Beijing.
American relations wedged Japan to its current position on the Northern Territories, as the US saw détente to be strategically advantageous to the USSR. Peace talks between Japan and the USSR coincided with the merger of the two major conservative parties led by then-Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro and former Prime Minister Yoshida. Although Hatoyama was staunchly anti-communist, he sought peaceful co-existence with the USSR and China, while Yoshida was a leading proponent to further US-Japan collaboration, which would infuriate both Moscow and Beijing. Among others, their approaches towards peace treaty negotiations became “political bargaining tools” in the LDP’s formation, in which the “four island” claim gained traction. This soon became a longstanding position in Japanese foreign policy as the LDP maintained its hegemony for decades under the “1955 system.”
When Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Japan merely imposed token sanctions but also continued economic collaboration and joint efforts to resolve the territorial dispute. Since the invasion, the scale of sanctions and export restrictions reached unprecedented levels. In the eyes of the Kremlin, this is another sign that Tokyo has abandoned the policy of “separating economics from politics” and would align with its Western allies insofar as Russia is concerned. Meanwhile, Washington exerted more pressure on Japan to plug sanction loopholes and inflict more pain on the Russian economy. Amid growing distrust, Moscow terminated peace treaty negotiations, as handing over the two islands could endanger the security of the Russian Far East, especially when relations with the US became tense. By the same token, the interests of both American concerns over collective security and Russian perceptions of the US-Japan alliance fall into polar opposites, which render them irreconcilable.
Balance of power in Northeast Asia
In addition, prospects of resolving the Northern Territories dispute are contingent upon the prevailing international order, and its impact on the balance of power in Northeast Asia. In other words, shifts in the international system could induce adjustments in the attitudes and bargaining positions of both Japan and Russia, thereby occasionally warming the relations between them and hinting possibility of a peace treaty. Under this framework, relations with China and North Korea also influence how Japan approaches Russia and the territorial dispute with it, taking both regional security and economic cooperation into consideration. Despite so, improvement in Japan-Russia relations has not been able to overcome fierce domestic opposition and fundamental disagreements on territorial claims.
The Cold War saw a bipolar state of the global order as the US and the USSR engaged in intense rivalry and geopolitical tension with their allies. Still, Japan remilitarised upon American pressure and signed the US-Japan Security Treaty, which were contrary to Soviet strategic interests. Consequently, Moscow used the Northern Territories as diplomatic leverage on Tokyo to weaken its alliance with Washington and avoid rapprochement with Beijing following the Sino-Soviet split. Ironically, this move was counterproductive, as Soviet fortification on the Northern Territories reinforced perceptions of Soviet threat which contributed to Japanese policymakers’ willingness to pursue further ties with Washington and normalise relations with Beijing. During the Sino-Japanese peace treaty negotiations in 1976, USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko abruptly offered to return two of the disputed islands if Japan pledged not to be a party to a non-hegemony clause. Gromyko’s efforts were in vain as Tokyo closely identified with Washington’s views of Soviet aggression, especially after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
After the dissolution of the USSR, the international order entered an era of unipolarity characterised by American hegemony, which was when Yeltsin sought détente with the Western Bloc and Japan to bring Russia out of post-Soviet economic misery. With the balance of power shifted towards Washington, Japan used financial incentives to negotiate on more favourable terms on the Northern Territories dispute, as opposed to a weakened Russia. Although the Kanawa plan mentioned earlier failed, both countries explored proposals that grant special status to the disputed islands and enable joint development efforts.
The new multipolar regional order featuring a rising China and increasingly nuclear-threatening North Korea also prompted Japan to approach Russia as an important partner for security and counterbalancing. This time, it was Japan who used concessions to the dispute as a bargaining chip to stop a Sino-Russian alliance, which Abe did not reject to Putin’s peace treaty offer without preconditions, and unprecedentedly removed references to Japan’s claims over the Northern Territories in the annual Foreign Ministry Bluebook. When the Ukrainian crisis broke out in 2014, Japan merely imposed token sanctions and did not expel Russian diplomats following the attempted assassination of a former spy.
However, Abe’s gestures of goodwill had not prevented Moscow from siding with Beijing and tipping the security equation after its unprovoked attack on Ukraine. On one hand, American support for Japan’s claims essentially brought Russia and China closer together to confront Washington’s encirclement in its Indo-Pacific strategy. Instead of reciprocal concessions, Russia had no intention to accelerate peace talks, while manipulating the issue to its advantage by inducing economic benefits from Japan and cracks in its relations with the West. The war in Ukraine amounted to another Russian challenge to the US-led, rules-based international order, so collaboration in resolving the dispute ceases to be a viable option, especially because Tokyo reached a climax of distrust towards the Kremlin’s willingness to be bound by its words.
Prospects for peace
Russia is the only belligerent of World War II with which Japan has not concluded a peace treaty, and it has become apparent that it is unable to do so because both countries lack the political will to resolve the Northern Territories dispute. Longstanding public sympathy for the evicted residents of the territories is embedded into resentment towards Russia, with which the Japanese government is barred from acceding for fear that it would displease the electorate. Also, the US-Japan military alliance has stoked Russian security concerns over reversion of the islands, while the US encouraged Japan to take firmer positions upon escalating US-Russian rivalry.
Under a multilateral international system, Japan envisioned that Russia would act to check a more ambitious China and North Korea in exchange for peace deal concessions, but these hopes were quashed when Japan’s economic approach was proven to be ineffective. Worse still, the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine intensified unfavourable factors at all three levels, which casted the death spell on the settlement of the Northern Territories dispute.