On the eve of the 2021 US-led Summit for Democracy, the Chinese and Russian ambassadors to the US made an unprecedented move. They jointly published an op-ed in The National Interest in which they portrayed the discussion of democracy as an ‘ideological confrontation’ designed to cause a global ‘rift.’ They argued that favouring economic development should be the key measuring stick for whether a country’s governance ‘works’ and portrayed themselves as the standard-bearers of a polycentric system—while relegating the US and other Western and democratic countries as the gatekeepers of a monocentric system.
Most astonishingly, they portrayed democratization as a Western concept which serves as a pretext for foreign intervention. In doing so, they outrightly ignored the agency of local actors and communities and the many different movements for democracy these have spawned. For instance, they portray ‘colour revolutions’ as wholly foreign-orchestrated plots rather than legitimate protests with genuine grievances.
This rhetoric is nothing new. In fact, China has long been trumpeting ‘the China model‘ as a blueprint for developing countries to adopt and emulate. The most benign component of the China model is that economic development is not primarily driven by aid, but by a domestic growth strategy that focuses on increasing commerce and trade. Yet, the China model is also often invoked to establish a dichotomy between democratization and development. Political stability is held up as the most important factor for development, and democracies are portrayed as inherently destabilizing. Democracy is portrayed as a ‘Western-style luxury,’ while economic rights are elevated as being far more important than political rights.
Various despotic regimes throughout the 20th century have invoked this dichotomy as pretext for ‘strongman rule.’ However, China’s rapid growth has produced strong economic incentives for developing countries to give credence to ‘the China model, despite growing concerns over whether China’s economic growth can be sustained. The Evergrande scandal may expose greater vulnerabilities to a wider property bubble. Additionally, despite President Xi’s earlier exhortations of liberalization, Beijing has failed to adequately promote privatization, the rule of law, or reduce bureaucratic red tape and undue politicization of commerce and entrepreneurship.
Despite some attempts to curb the power of individual Chinese billionaires as well as some populist measures such as restrictions on private lessons, Beijing’s inability or unwillingness to sufficiently address income inequality and the growing urban-rural divide through its economic development strategy continues to generate ‘high social tensions.’ Despite concerns about these emerging issues, China continues to serve as an attractive model for many Global South countries looking to spur their economic growth.
Furthermore, Beijing’s trillion dollar Belt and Road Initiative has produced strong economic incentives for developing countries to give credence to ‘the China model’ of development and governance. Beijing’s offer of FDI and loans—combined with promises of economic engagement being divorced from human rights commitments and non-interventions—or at least intervening only on the side of government forces fighting their own people—has allowed authoritarian development models to proliferate like never before. Countering these models requires alternative narratives that empower local will rather than perceptions of imported will. It requires centring other countries’ internally-developed priorities and highlighting key success stories from the Global South.
Enter Bangladesh.
After a successful, if costly, nine-month struggle for independence from Pakistan, the appalling conditions in the infant country set the groundwork for key priorities. Post-liberation Bangladesh faced a host of colossal challenges, including obliterated infrastructure, and a huge portion of human capital either murdered or displaced. These crises were compounded by repeated record-breaking natural disasters and an exploding population and would serve as key drivers for a human development-centred approach in which NGOs play a leading role.
The Bangladesh model has two layers—both of which serve as critical counterweights to authoritarian development models which belittle democratization. The classic itineration of the Bangladesh model holds that human development can be accomplished before and without economic development. In fact, it demonstrates that human development can even spur economic development. The Bangladesh model is particularly unique because it does not include high spending by the government in either economic growth or welfare programs. Rather, the state has focused on implementing low-cost infrastructures and campaigns to promote education, health and gender equality. The government implements legislation and structural reforms where they are needed but exercises restraint as to not stifle private businesses. This has resulted in a wealth of added benefits, such as increased female participation in the workforce, the flourishing of private enterprise, and the doubling of Bangladesh’s per capita income since 2002.
Bangladesh’s model places social development at the centre of the country’s overall development priorities, and has succeeded in dramatically reducing poverty throughout the nation. This component of the Bangladesh model alone would serve as an effective counterweight to the China model. Yet, there is another key component of the Bangladesh model which is often overlooked, but arguably has an even greater relevance given the blindspots of viewing Bangladesh’s development journey through purely economic lenses. Bangladesh has demonstrated the vital role that NGOs can play in advancing development, and the importance of creating and nurturing a healthy NGO culture.
Bangladesh’s post-war desperation for poverty alleviation allowed NGOs in Bangladesh to thrive. While various NGOs around the world set up shop in Bangladesh, domestic NGOs were in the driving seat. BRAC, Grameen, Nijera Kori, Association for Social Advancement (ASA), Surjer Hashi Network, and a host of other innovative Bangladeshi NGOs demonstrated how NGOs can serve as ‘role models’ for piloting effective interventions that advance social and economic development. Bangladeshi NGOs are profoundly adept at replicating and scaling up interventions that work. They can drive innovation, leading the government to often adapt solutions crafted by NGOs and scale them up even further. Bangladeshi NGOs have embraced the ‘social business’ model and have developed innovations in several areas, especially in the first few decades after independence. For instance, a 1996 study reported a 34 percent reduction in childhood (under five years) mortality after mothers joined the Grameen Bank. Likewise, BRAC’s Ultra-Poor Graduation Program reported that participants increased their earnings by 37 percent, and resulted in women transforming from casual wage labourers (e.g. maid services and agricultural labor) into livestock rearing.
The NGOs that focused on social and human development paved the way for more specialized NGOs and CSOs who work on a variety of issues, such as gender-based violence, access to justice, workers’ rights, and religious freedom. For instance, the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) is a pioneer in utilizing Public Interest Litigation to strategically advance workers’ rights through courts that are otherwise overburdened. Likewise, both BLAST and other legal aid and human rights organizations such as Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK) are instrumental in countering gender-based violence as well as advancing rights for religious minorities
These innovative NGOs were soon able to not just uplift Bangladesh, but to pioneer microcredit and other innovations that help advance social and economic development throughout the Global South. For instance, BRAC’s women’s empowerment programming in Uganda has significantly reduced child marriage which was attributed ‘almost entirely’ to the program, while BRAC’s programs to reduce child mortality in Uganda reduced the death rates for infants, children under 5 and newborns by 28, 33, and 27 percent respectively.
While authoritarianism, corruption, and the existential threat of climate change threaten to hamper the country’s ability to fully realize its development potential, the stark transformation from a country that was infamously brushed aside as a perennially aid-dependent economic ‘basket case‘ is remarkable. The role of NGOs in setting up Bangladesh to serve as a role model for post-conflict development and peace-building is a lesson that continues to have relevance for other post-colonial and developing countries throughout the Global South.
However, the prerequisite for such a vibrant and healthy NGO culture requires ensuring sufficient political space for NGOs to thrive. Bangladeshi NGOs have been able to tackle several sensitive cultural issues, such as sexual and reproductive health and female labor participation. They have been able to operate through extremely turbulent periods in the country’s history, including under highly authoritarian regimes, and continue to be a vital voice of progress under increasingly restrictive political spaces for civil society and increasing wealth and power inequality. To be sure, Bangladeshi NGOs have certainly faced significant challenges even after the overthrow of General Ershad and the beginning of ‘democratic era’—and in many cases, those challenges have actually amplified to a greater degree under current democratic backsliding. In fact, during the first Khaleda Zia administration (the first government of the ‘democratic era’), the government instituted restrictive NGO laws and even attempted to shut down a NGO umbrella group while simultaneously including some NGOs as collaborative partners for its Fifth Five Year Plan (1995-2000). Some of those government actions against NGOs have been very targeted, such as the government’s politically motivated spat with Dr. Yunus and his Grameen Bank. There continue to be significant challenges in the country’s current democratic trajectory, including continued harassment of NGOs working on particularly sensitive human rights issues such as enforced disappearances.
Such hostile government actions have likely influenced public perceptions towards NGOs, leading to increasing public distrust of NGOs for a variety of reasons. These critiques include perceptions that NGOs serving tax-exempt ‘social business’ entities having an unfair advantage against small and medium-sized enterprises; absolving the state from delivering key public services; and subverting the state and cultural norms and traditions and promote foreign agendas through foreign funding.
Despite these challenges, it seems that at least the largest NGOs in the country are likely going to be able to operate without too many undue restrictions in the foreseeable future. As multi-billion dollar ‘social business’ enterprises with a global network of institutional and individual backers, NGOs like BRAC and Grameen can draw upon resources which can check and push back against major undue government restrictions. In perhaps a rarity in the Global South, indigenous NGOs have accumulated a level of power that largely has parity with state authorities, allowing NGOs to both shape development practices and to protect themselves from undue state restrictions.
Following the US rolling out sanctions against the Rapid Action Battalion for human rights abuses on International Human Rights Day. Washington-Dhaka relations are in uncharted waters. Despite Washington’s concerns about Dhaka’s reported interest in potentially importing Russian wheat and refined petroleum, an escalation of US-Bangladesh tensions seems unlikely. Washington continues to view Bangladesh as an increasingly important trade partner. Likewise, Washington, Delhi, and other members of the quad view Bangladesh as a potential future partner—either officially or unofficially. Indeed, Washington publicly backed Bangladesh in Dhaka’s response to the PRC Ambassador’s unsolicited advice for Dhaka to avoid joining the Quad, and is reportedly pushing Dhaka to join the quad..
The rise and proliferation of China’s ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy‘—which centres President Xi, other CCP hardliners, and nationalistic sentiments of the public as the key audience for diplomatic statements—has made Chinese diplomacy turn into a much more aggressive tool in South Asia, Africa, and around the world. Nevertheless, it was quite needless diplomatic own goal for the Ambassador to comment on Bangladesh’s hypothetical membership in the Quad. For one, Bangladesh’s historic support for the non-alignment movement and its continued ‘zero problems’ foreign policy virtually ensures that there is no real chance of Dhaka joining the Quad—at least, as the Quad is currently perceived in Dhaka.
Perceptions of the Quad serving as a military alliance is a big turn-off for not just Dhaka, but for Colombo, Kathmandu, and others in the region. An even a bigger problem is a perception the Quad as an explicitly anti-China alliance—a perception that is further fuelled through senior US politicians, news outlets, think tanks, and even military-affiliated think tanks packaging the quad as an anti-China alliance. As long as that perception remains, Dhaka will likely remain very way about any engagements that are perceived as being Quad-adjacent, much less any that are explicitly Quad-supported. This is especially true given Dhaka’s ongoing defence ties with Beijing, as well as its continued desire for Chinese FDI, development assistance, and infrastructure projects. Furthermore, when fourth wave of the pandemic ramped up, Bangladesh continued to seek all the medical aid that the country could receive—especially after Lithuania’s backtracking on its vaccine donations to Bangladesh. Likewise, despite offering a historic $200 million currency swap deal to Sri Lanka, the impact of rising commodity prices (including relatively rare public protests against an unprecedented hike in fuel prices) and the consequent slowdown in demand for Bangladeshi garments has led to Dhaka exploring a debt restructuring and seeking a 4.5 billion dollar loan package under the IMF’s resilience trust. There is also increased resentment in Bangladesh regarding the country’s exclusion from the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, especially when juxtaposed with Beijing’s decision to waive tariffs for 97 percent of Bangladesh’s exports to China.
Bangladesh’s revulsion towards zero-game sum mentalities, particularly as it ‘navigates strategic survival‘, is a message that countries throughout Latin America and Africa have been telling Washington as well. While Washington may have better luck pressuring Dhaka to oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Dhaka may be precluded from doing so due to a range of vulnerabilities and national interests tied up in its relations with Moscow.
While Washington continues to push Dhaka for political reforms through targeted sanctions and snubbed invitations to the Summit for Democracy, the Bangladesh model can still be heralded as a key counterweight to authoritarian development models. The Bangladesh NGO-driven development model can be viewed in tandem with a range of studies that indicate that democratic and transparent governance spurs economic development. A key MIT study indicates that transitioning into democratic systems can yield GDP per capita growth of twenty percent, even to the extent that it doesn’t depend on the initial level of economic development. The study notes that democracies employ ‘broad-based investment’ that particularly focuses on health, education, and human capital—which authoritarian states tend to neglect. The study also indicates that authoritarian countries disincentivize the conditions necessary to economic growth due to their inclination for ‘special favours’ for economic and business elites and their patronage networks, to the detriment of governance and economic reforms–in contrast to countries reaping ‘the democratic dividend.’ Even a study concluding that stability is a more important factor for driving economic growth emphasizes a key caveat, indicating that democratization is a desirable end-goal for cementing socio-economic growth. Its findings shared: “Highly democratic countries were strongly correlated with robust and forward-thinking economies. Countries with weaker democracies were less predictable in terms of social-economic outlook.”
Advancing the Bangladesh model will serve as a key response from the Global South to authoritarian development models. For one, Beijing can’t easily discount it, as Bangladesh occupies increasing geopolitical importance for China and remains a critical BRI infrastructure, FDI loans, and military customer. Despite ongoing tensions in Washington-Dhaka relations, the U.S. and other countries can and should ‘bet on Bangladesh‘ by promoting the Bangladesh development model to advance human-centred development through supporting civil society.
Beijing and Moscow’s posturing goes beyond rhetoric and is backed up by policy. Russian mercenaries continue to play key roles in conflicts throughout the Middle East and Africa. Likewise, China has been exporting surveillance technology to a range of increasingly authoritarian states around the world.
In a recent letter to Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, U.S. President Joe Biden stated, “The drive, resourcefulness, and innovation of Bangladeshis-rebuilding after the 1971 war and now forging a path of economic growth and development–serves as a model for the rest of the world, Bangladesh and US share the ideals of democracy, human rights and equality.”
Washington fully understands the vital importance of Bangladesh as a driver and model for social development. While the state of democratization and civil rights and liberties in Bangladesh remains as precarious as ever, the nation’s NGOs continue to find ways to innovate and pioneer bold approaches to human development continues unabated. Bangladeshi NGOs continue to serve as the ‘world’s laboratory’ on socio-economic development and social businesses.
The stakes for developing countries throughout the Global South have never been higher. By elevating and championing alternative models from the Global South, anti-corruption, democratization, and both human and economic development can all be promoted. As Bangladesh approaches its 52th birthday, the Bangladesh development model is perhaps the young country’s greatest gift to both fellow Global South countries and the broader international community.
Atif Choudhury (LL.M, J.D.) is a Program Manager at the University of South Carolina Rule of Law Collaborative (ROLC), and previously worked for the Carter Center’s China Program. Extra research support for this article was provided by Donna Birdsong. The perspectives expressed in this article reflect the author’s own analysis, and not the views of any other organization, institution, or individual affiliated with the author.