Since its conception in 1956, three core principles have guided the deployment and undertakings of UN peacekeeping operations: 1) consent of the parties, 2) impartiality, and 3) the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Today, this so-called ‘Holy Trinity’ of UN peacekeeping continues to hold on to its original role as reflected in the Capstone Doctrine, despite the fact that the context of peacekeeping has changed considerably since these principles were initially envisioned. Peacekeeping, as initially conceived, was a ‘military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars.’ On this conception, peacekeeping implies the end of violence. However, UN peace operations are now most often deployed to scenarios where high-intensity armed conflict is still present. Commentators therefore increasingly question the compatibility and coherence of its basic principles with the complex tasks and environments that modern peacekeeping has come to face. Nevertheless, the Holy Trinity remains the basis of peacekeeping despite relentless criticism and pressures calling for its abolition.
In this short essay, I explore why the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force remain an integral part of the Capstone Doctrine. I argue that these principles serve important semantic, political and hermeneutic purposes. Consequently, the Holy Trinity is likely to persist, even as peacekeeping continues to evolve and the gap between its doctrine and praxis continues to widen.
Semantics
The Holy Trinity of UN peacekeeping is central to set peacekeeping apart from other UN peace operations. In particular, it distinguishes peacekeeping from peace enforcement, which involves the application of coercive measures, including the use of military force. The dividing line between these types of operations became increasingly blurred when ‘robust peacekeeping’ was introduced in the late 1990’s to enhance the coercive capacities of peacekeeping forces. The Holy Trinity thus serves a semantic purpose by distinguishing between a coercive peacekeeping mission from a peace enforcement mission.
All three principles are important in setting these types of operations apart. For instance, robust peacekeeping requires consent of the parties, while peace enforcement operations can be carried out without such consent. The same can be said about the principle of impartiality: peace enforcement is not meant to be impartial, as it explicitly assigns blame to a party that is construed as an enemy, and which calls for action to be taken. Instead, the success of peacekeeping rests on its legitimacy, which stems from the operation’s perceived impartiality. Finally, the semantics underlying the non-use of force contrasts with the use of coercion as the essence and main instrument of peace enforcement operations. In short, all three principles play an important semantic role in defining peacekeeping from the realm of peace enforcement, which helps to explain why the Holy Trinity is still part of the Capstone Doctrine.
The UN has successfully adapted the Holy Trinity to the evolution of peacekeeping, in both linguistic and conceptual terms. For example, this has occurred with respect to the principle of impartiality, which contained the word ‘neutrality’ until 1999. Following the peacekeeping failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan argued that the organisation had ‘learned that while impartiality is a vital condition for peacekeeping, it must be impartiality in the execution of the mandate – not just an unthinking neutrality between warring parties.’ This led to the disappearance of neutrality from peacekeeping vocabulary. This change has facilitated the UN’s ability to enforce its political agenda in increasingly complex scenarios of crisis management.
Something similar has happened with the language of the third principle – the non-use of force – to fit the growing complexity and challenges faced by peacekeeping. From the 1990s, the principle has undergone a gradual expansion from individual self-defence to include ‘in defence of the mission’. This expansion followed appeals within the UN to adopt a more muscular peacekeeping strategy, with a greater inclination to use force. This subtle doctrinal change provides peacekeeping with a vague and ambiguous framework to justify an increasingly flexible use of force, enabling missions to effectively confront the growing challenges it faces at ground level with coercion. In addition, the persistence of a language of self-defence sets semantic and conceptual boundaries to distinguish peacekeeping from peace enforcement.
The above modifications to the Holy Trinity reflect the UN’s capacity to adapt to the challenges of modern peacekeeping whilst preserving its semantic and conceptual value. This helps to explain why the Holy Trinity continues to be integral to peacekeeping. An implication is that if the UN wishes to continue to uphold the Holy Trinity, it must retain its capacity to further adapt it.
Politics
Peacekeeping is political at its core. The evolution of peacekeeping, and particularly the emergence of robust peacekeeping, has led to different understandings of what the practice entails, feeding mistrust among member states who often feel that modern peacekeeping may undermine their sovereignty. The success of peacekeeping therefore relies on the political support of member states. In consequence, the persistence of the Holy Trinity in the Capstone Doctrine can also be explained by the political purpose it serves in acquiring the political will and cooperation of states.
Considering that the effectiveness of peacekeeping depends on the political backing of Security Council members, the Holy Trinity makes its activities possible by ensuring cooperation from states. For instance, the principle of consent – which derives from the deep-seated and cherished principle of state sovereignty – remains a prerequisite for peacekeeping operations to be deployed, as it guarantees political cooperation from members, especially the host states. The same applies for the principle of impartiality, as a peacekeeping mission must be at least seen to operate impartially. Otherwise, it is likely to lose the political support that enables it to execute its mandate. It may hence be politically unfeasible for the UN to change the principles dictating peacekeeping doctrine, even as the practice of peacekeeping continues to evolve away from its theory.
Since peacekeeping was conceived by the UN to preserve its relevance in global affairs, the organisation can be expected to continue upholding these principles, which have made peacekeeping viable and arguably reinvigorated its significance in the realm of international peace and security. In this sense, the survival of the UN as we know it may rely on its degree of adherence to the Holy Trinity.
Hermeneutics
Lastly, the Holy Trinity of peacekeeping is at its core a hermeneutic element. Even as myths, these principles constitute the fundamental nature of peacekeeping and define the UN’s perception of itself and of its role in the world. Although the practice of peacekeeping has evolved in response to a constantly changing world order, the Holy Trinity continues to reaffirm the UN’s institutional self-understanding as a peacemaker rather than a war-fighter. This connects to the semantic argument above, as these basic principles help differentiate the nature of peacekeeping from the war-fighting raison d’être of peace enforcement. This also explains the UN’s enduring commitment towards peacekeeping, as well as its reluctance to deploy peace enforcement missions or recognise the development of many such missions into peace enforcement operations.
The Holy Trinity also has a significant impact on the goals pursued by peacekeeping, which are political and humanitarian, instead of military. This reaffirms the UN’s sense of self, acting as a mechanism of self-assurance which persuades the organisation that it attains its goals through peacekeeping, even in cases where the reality on the ground resembles enforcement. Furthermore, whilst recognising that the gap between the conceptual objectives and the reality of peacekeeping is wide and growing, there are powerful voices within the UN, including many troop contributors, who resist abandoning the Holy Trinity as the cornerstone of peacekeeping, as doing so may potentially convert the UN into an instrument for fighting wars, rather than cultivating peace.
These views support the argument that the Holy Trinity remains the basis of the Capstone Doctrine, at least in part, because it holds a key hermeneutic function. It defines the nature of peacekeeping and UN’s understanding of itself as the global pacemaker, a role in harmony with its self-perceived responsibility to maintain international peace and security.
Conclusion
In this essay, I explored the reasons why the Holy Trinity of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate – remains the cornerstone of the Capstone Doctrine. This is puzzling, considering the increasingly complex and volatile framework of tasks and environments in which UN peacekeeping has come to operate. Contrary to the view of many critics, who regard these principles as fundamentally anachronic and inapplicable to the praxis of UN peacekeeping today, I argued that the Holy Trinity serves important semantic, political and hermeneutic purposes. In discussing each element, it became evident that abandoning these principles would entail a radical redefinition of the essence and understanding of the UN’s largest task, and therefore, of the organisation itself. To detach peacekeeping from these principles risk blurring the lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, challenging the central values, legitimacy, political support, and self-perception of the organisation. Therefore, even as the gap between doctrine and practice of peacekeeping continues to widen, the Holy Trinity is likely to persist as the basis of the Capstone Doctrine.
Alejandro Posada Téllez is a DPhil Candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford.