It has been just over one year since Myanmar saw the reimposition of the ancien régime as the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s armed forces) deposed the democratically-elected civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD). The NLD first won power in 2015 after the military junta introduced political reforms, and after the 2020 general election, its parliamentary supermajority was further expanded. Alleging electoral fraud, the Tatmadaw took over Myanmar’s government and declared a year-long state of emergency. However, their coup provoked mass protests across the country. While some conclude this to be the demise of Myanmar’s democratic experiment, optimists see hope in the nationwide resistance movement, suggesting it to have organised from the flourishing civil society during the NLD’s rule.
Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw has managed to stay in power since the 1962 military coup and maintain considerable political influence even after democratisation attempts. This affirms the prospects of the Tatmadaw’s continual military dominance into the future, albeit behind the veneer of constitutional restoration.
The stabilising effects of shifting international dynamics
As the international order is trending towards bipolarity, the Tatmadaw can claim the benefit of hedging between China and the US, thereby reducing external challenges to its regime’s stability. The Tatmadaw’s central role in Burmese politics thus remains uncontested. After the Tatmadaw’s brutal crackdown on nationwide student protests in 1988 (otherwise known as the 8888 Uprising) and annulment of the 1990 elections, the West imposed crippling sanctions and denied foreign aid; hence, Myanmar sought to break through its economic predicament by aligning with China.
These developments later paved way for democratic reforms as the Tatmadaw wished to dilute Myanmar’s dependence on China in terms of trade, infrastructure, and security. To achieve this goal, the Tatmadaw saw a practical necessity to re-engage the West through democratisation and economic liberalisation, in addition to lobbying for the easing of sanctions and granting of multilateral loans. Consequently, the junta devised the 2008 Constitution as part of Myanmar’s ‘Roadmap to Democracy,’ despite also maintaining its influence over the parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) and a potential civilian government by reserving 25% of the seats for the Tatmadaw’s appointment. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees the Tatmadaw a number of prerogatives. Most notably, these include the authority to take over legislative, executive, and judicial powers when a state of emergency is declared, which was precisely the doublespeak for the 2021 coup.
The democratic reforms ended Myanmar’s diplomatic and economic isolation, but the progress of democratisation was reversed with the Tatmadaw’s coup in February 2021. Although the reinstated junta lacks international recognition and once again faces sanctions by the West, it is unlikely that Myanmar will return to its pre-reform state. Firstly, the COVID-19 pandemic left Western countries embattled in disease control and economic recovery, which diverted their attention away from the Tatmadaw’s human rights abuses. More importantly, a rising China sees benefits in Myanmar’s strategic location in the Belt and Road Initiative, which offers maritime and pipeline access to the Bay of Bengal.
With intensifying Sino-US rivalry, Western sanctions become less effective at preventing Myanmar from entirely aligning with China. Washington has only imposed targeted sanctions and export restrictions, while maintaining US aid for civilian purposes. Also, the impacts of these sanctions are limited since Myanmar’s economy has never relied on the US, whereas alternative sources of foreign investments are still readily available. International responses to the 2021 coup were either condemnations or mere expressions of concern, which pose little deterrence to the military junta, in contrast to the sanctions and embargoes of the past.
The Tatmadaw’s fear of a ‘full-blown’ civil war
However, continued military dominance in politics does not mean the return of the junta as it was, since General Min Aung Hlaing has publicly promised to restore democracy and hold elections in 2023. While Myanmar is still ruled by a military junta, the Tatmadaw will exercise political influence by proxy through its civilian political party and may also change the electoral system to proportional representation. Elections will supply popular mandate to the Tatmadaw’s rule, whilst proportional representation would favour smaller ethnic parties and greatly reduce the number of seats the NLD could win. At most, it would be the restoration of the pre-coup power arrangement but precluding the possibility of the NLD removing the Tatmadaw’s prerogatives.
Behind the façade of democracy, the Tatmadaw could then achieve a balance between seeking both power and legitimacy, while taking popular discontent and Myanmar’s ethnic diversity into account. The 2021 coup is widely perceived to be a blatant assault on the popular will reflected in the 2020 elections; as such, the Tatmadaw frustrated the NLD’s attempts to remove the military’s constitutional privileges. Consequently, mass demonstrations broke out all across Myanmar, particularly among the younger generations who desperately want a future of social progress and modernisation. Meanwhile, the coup reignited ongoing, deep-rooted ethnic divisions as the Kachin and Karen insurgents escalated their armed struggle against the Tatmadaw, with some of them joining the National Unity Government formed by NLD legislators in exile.
While suppression is useful in the short term, the Tatmadaw would not wish to heighten internal tensions into a full-scale civil war and push Myanmar further into the brink of collapse, especially amid the worsening COVID-19 pandemic. In this national crisis, the Tatmadaw will remain in power because it has the most means to maintain regime stability compared to other forces within Myanmar. Yet, as long as the Tatmadaw’s authority is not meaningfully challenged, military rule will continue behind the masquerade of civilian involvement and democratic institutions to enhance regime legitimacy.
Thailand’s roadmap to normalcy as a comparative experience
Despite its different historical background, Thailand’s experience with military juntas sheds light on the prospects of Burmese democracy. Similar to Myanmar, Thailand experienced decades of intermittent military rule interspersed with intervals of parliamentary democracy. Party politics in Thailand once again thrived following democratisation and changes to the electoral system, giving rise to a strong majority government led by populist and charismatic Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001. Thaksin awarded rural-biased benefits to his business cronies and subsidies to please his rural voter base, while exhibiting a hard-line ‘law and order’ approach towards Southern separatists and drug cartels. However, urban elites became frustrated with his irresponsible fiscal policy, whereas the military was increasingly worried with his consolidatory moves, which culminated in his downfall after the 2006 coup.
A disruptive figure, Thaksin demonstrated stamina in transforming Thailand’s political landscape. Despite being ousted in a coup, Thaksin was succeeded by two of his cronies, and even his own sister Yingluck, after the 2011 general election. Still, the Royal Thai Armed Forces overthrew Yingluck’s government after it attempted to seek a stronger popular mandate. The military felt threatened by the prospect of losing political control and hence launched a coup to pre-emptively dispel the remaining Thaksinist remnants from government.
Yet, the military junta could not last forever. General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, the coup leader later appointed Prime Minister by the King, eventually introduced a new Constitution in 2017 and held parliamentary elections in 2019. The Thai National Assembly is now a bicameral legislature with a military-appointed Senate that keeps Prayuth’s power unchallenged by Thailand’s rural majority, while elections deliver the mandate and legitimacy Prayuth needs.
Prayuth Chan-o-cha’s attempt in legitimising his rule through elections arguably inspired Min Aung Hlaing to make similar pledges on restoring democracy in the future, after the groundwork was laid down by the Tatmadaw. Unlike Prayuth, Min Aung Hlaing is confronted by both overwhelming domestic opposition and ethnic insurgents, which arguably has created a more dire need for legitimacy. Nonetheless, the 2014 Thai military coup did not draw the same level of international outrage. ASEAN even breached its protocol of non-interference in trying to mediate Myanmar’s domestic conflict, although its efforts were short of unified response (particularly, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s high-profile meeting with Min Aung Hlaing). The difference in response may be due to the fact that the Tatmadaw’s suppression would further destabilise Myanmar, which affects the business interests of other member states, as opposed to Thailand’s bloodless coups.
The future of Burmese democracy
The Sino-US rivalry gave the Tatmadaw a head start for its resurgence after the 2021 coup, as the junta faces no severe consequences from the international community. Most countries have adopted a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude towards Myanmar’s internal conflict, instead of committing forceful action for or against either side. While the Tatmadaw’s continual rule is likely under these favourable international dynamics, it is only sustainable with a pseudo-democracy to pacify the massive domestic backlash and weaken the NLD’s momentum. This is unlike its Thai counterpart, which can readily be legitimised by their revered monarchy. Perhaps normalisation ought not to take place so swiftly as the state of emergency remains justifiable by the domestic insurgency, ongoing purge of NLD leaders, and surging COVID-19 cases, whilst the Tatmadaw seeks more time to build up strength and civilian support. Still, the legacy of jailed democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi and the emerging civil society leave the prospects of genuine democratisation open—but only for some time in the future.
Anfield Tam is a third-year BSocSc (Government & Law) & LLB student and works as a Research Assistant at the Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong.