On 23 February, the Russian Deputy Chief of Mission in India, Roman Babushkin, ‘welcomed’ India’s ‘independent stance’ on Russia’s escalating tensions with Ukraine. Within the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) Emergency Meeting, India stopped short of condemning Russian militarization and espoused ‘restraint from all sides.’ Previously, on 10 February, India abstained from a procedural vote ahead of a UNSC meeting to discuss the building Russian troops at the Ukrainian border.
Privileged Relations
In Babushkin’s words, this stance is reflective of the ‘special and strategic partnership between the two countries.’ This privileged relation—an inherited historical tie from the Soviet Union—has military, diplomatic, and social facets. Russia remains the chief supplier of Indian military hardware, creating a defence reliance. The bilateral relations between the two states have been described as ‘friction-free‘ over the decades and have weathered multiple political transitions. The year 2017, marking 70 years of relations between the two countries, saw widespread media fanfare. An article by Vladimir Putin titled ‘India and Russia: 70 Years Together’ was carried by the widely circulated national daily, Times of India. The bilateral relations between the country have included coalitions and support over matters of mutual interest and have seen Russia support India’s call for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.
On 24 February, Russia declared a ‘Special Military Operation,’ a militarized invasion into Ukraine. As of the writing of this article, India has maintained a neutral position on the crisis. Stopping short of condemnation, once again, the Minister of External Affairs stated the only hope was a peaceful resolution.
Notes on Condemnation
In the midst of the powerful, vocal critiques of Russian actions, India’s relative silence is loud.
The Ukrainian envoy to India, Igor Polikha, pleaded intervention, stating that India’s current stance was deeply disappointing. He asked India to show a favourable attitude in the crisis—calling it a ‘moment of truth, moment of destiny.’ The envoy made note of India’s strategic relations with Russia, beseeching ‘Modi-Ji’ (Prime Minster Narendra Modi) to use his ‘strong voice’ and make Putin ‘think over‘ the invasion.
As described above, the very strategic relationship between these two countries makes condemnation far from linear. The Indian state has shown a close relationship with Russia since 1955. This interlinking of the states has seeped beyond policy. The slogan hindi-rusi bhai bhai (‘the Indians and Russians are brothers’) was officially advocated by both states from the 1950s to the 1980s and remains colloquial in India today. Russia relies on India to have its back; similarly, Russia has been India’s voice on the permanent table in international matters from its nascent days.
While India has had friendly relations with Ukraine—being one of the first to recognize it as a sovereign nation in December 1991—their relationship is nowhere near as extensive as the one shared with Russia. In the current Indian political landscape, it faces tensions on its border with China, and it is apparent that the recent Beijing-Moscow warmth has the state walking a diplomatic tightrope with Russia.
Internally, as well, India is on the cusp of major state elections. With anxieties brewing along both political and communal lines within the country, the Russia-Ukraine crisis is perceived by most Indians as a purely European problem. Although the domestic ramifications are already making themselves known with a crash in the country’s financial market, a war on Europe’s doorstep is not close enough for there to be internal pressure from Indian citizens to demand an immediate condemnation of Russian actions.
Where Do We Go Now?
India’s privileged relations with Russia suggests that it will remain on the sidelines of this crisis. Its vocabulary will retain a diplomatic, formulaic, and, most importantly, neutral tenor. The internal press from its citizenry is currently limited to the evacuation of Indian nationals within Ukraine (roughly 15,000 people and mostly students).
A question, of course, remains: where do we go now?
Ideally, the invasion of a sovereign nation would be met by immediate, international condemnation. We can see that is not the case. It remains difficult to extricate India from its ties with Russia. It is also naïve for us to imagine diplomacy as a function of national morality (whether it should be so, however, remains a separate debate). Within the realm of pragmatism, the hope for condemnation from India remains bleak. However, the crisis remains a dynamic, fast changing situation, and one can hope the intense political pushback encourages the Indian state to meet the Russian eye.