Despite the acknowledgement that the Second World War was composed of three major theatres (Europe, Asia, and the Pacific), the Asian battlefield remains a marginalized topic outside of Asia. Even when the war in mainland Asia is mentioned, it is usually analyzed independently of the Pacific War (1941-1945), with the latter attracting more attention.
Here, I argue that it is problematic to downplay the role of the Asian battlefield, and that wars in mainland Asia and the Pacific should be considered as a continuum. If we think in this way, the war in the Asia-Pacific and WWII overall would not have started in 1941 at Pearl Harbour and 1939 in Europe, respectively, but with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and Northern China in the 1930s.
For simplicity, the ‘Asian battlefield’ mentioned in this paper mainly refers to the ‘Chinese battlefield,’ considering the much longer duration and larger scale of war in China. However, this is without the intent to downplay the participation of South-east Asian countries. Furthermore, it is understandable that people from regions like Africa, Latin America and the Middle East even question the idea of calling WWII a ‘world war’ as the participation of these regions was limited. Nonetheless, I will continue to use the term WWII to stress the interplay of the three major battlefields in a cross-regional manner, without necessarily agreeing that the war was global.
The Asian Theatre in Existing WWII Narratives
While Western perspectives about WWII are not lacking in their mentions of the ‘Battlefront of the Far East,’ the majority purely focuses on the Pacific War whereas the Asian battlefield is downplayed, if not totally ignored. For people who acknowledge the importance of the Asian battlefield, they usually understand it as independent from the Pacific War. For instance, most Western scholars portray it ‘neutrally’ as a bilateral conflict by calling it the ‘Second Sino-Japanese War,’ even though the Japanese side was the obvious invader. The dominant usage of words such as ‘Manchuria’ in Western narratives further exposes the lack of impartiality and actual prejudice, as the word ‘Manchuria’ is the Latinization of the Japanese place named Manshū (Region of the Manchus), which was never used by Manchus or Qing Dynasty itself to refer to their homeland. In China, terms like yiqing erzhou, liaodong, guandong, and dongbei were used to refer to the more or less corresponding geographical area much earlier than the time when ‘Manchuria’ first appeared, but they never gained international popularity. In this paper, I still use ‘Manchuria’ to refer to this area of North-eastern China given its dominant reference in academia, although I advocate the abandoning of this term.
If we jump out of Western literature and look at Chinese perspectives, its war against Japan is overall regarded as an important page of WWII and the so-called shijie fan faxisi zhanzheng (World Anti-Fascism War). However, the Chinese put more emphasis on proclaiming the war as the ‘Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression,’ because it marks the peak of suffering during its ‘Century of Humiliation’ (1839-1949) and its first victory vis-à-vis foreign invaders since its defeat in the First Opium War by the British.
The Asian and Pacific Theatres: a Continuum
Instead of analyzing the two battlefields separately — which usually leads to the downplay of the Asian theatre — I contend that wars in China and the Pacific are interrelated and should be treated as a continuum.
Occurrences of war can be understood either as acts of deliberation or inadvertence. In the case of the Asia-Pacific sphere of WWII, it falls into the first category because Japan’s activities reflected predatory state behaviour guided by a clear plan rather than a deterrence strategy resulting from self-defence purposes. I advocate for understanding the two theatres as a continuum, first, because there was continuity of Japan’s expansionist policy and ideological justifications. In 1936, Japan passed ‘Fundamental Principles of National Policy’ and decided to adopt it as a long-term national strategy. Under this framework, Japan’s incremental blueprints for expansion from Japan-Manchukuo-China Economic Bloc and New Order in East Asia to Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and Unifying the Eight Corners of the World (Hakkō ichiu) were integral components. These concepts and slogans outlined a well-designed plan to occupy Asian mainland first and then Pacific countries to ‘liberate’ these regions from Western imperialism. However, in reality, these ‘liberations’ were all implemented by similar ‘ruthless policy of local plunder,’ as described by historians Ikuhiko Hata and Alvin Coox. In other words, Japan’s military aggression in the Asian mainland and Pacific region was a succession of territorial appropriations which reflected its desire to produce a cross-Asia Japanese empire.
Second, animosity towards Japan from the countries constituting the Allies did not start with Pearl Harbour. Instead, their interests were constantly at stake during Japan’s earlier invasion of China. Japan’s claim of an exclusive sphere of influence on the Asian mainland was in sharp contrast with the Open Door Policy initiated by Western countries who were reluctant to cede their privilege. It was Japan’s pursuit of a New Order in East Asia in the 1930s which entailed an effort to impose direct rule in China proper after 1937 and the resulting opposition of the USA and UK that precipitated the outbreak of the Pacific War. In addition, Japan’s revisionist movements which led to the West’s animosity originated from its entanglement in China. To be more specific, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933 after the assembly had adopted a report blaming Japan for events in Manchuria. The Japanese delegate Yosuke Matsuoka made his final speech in the League by claiming ‘Japan will oppose any attempt at international control of Manchuria’ and concluded by saying ‘we are not coming back‘ as he left the hall, signalling the impossibility of reaching an agreement with the West. Besides, Japan decided to join the Tripartite Pact in 1940 partly due to its inability to resolve the conflict in China alone while regarding Britain as the major barrier.
Third, the Asian battlefield was not simply a bilateral conflict between Japan and China, just like the Pacific War was not simply a war between the USA and Japan. The USA and other Allied powers indirectly participated in the Asian battlefield even before the Pearl Harbour attack. For example, constant international supplies to China from the USA and Britain via British Burma was important for China’s survival. The USA even formed a voluntary air force team, the Flying Tigers, with China to fight Japan together, while China also helped the USA in the Pacific War. In addition, we can see that China’s resistance against massive odds was constant, which was first reflected in its fighting largely alone for four years and later through its inclusion into the Allies’ strategy to ‘keep China in the war.’ Thus, the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 absorbed the war in China into the Pacific War. This shifted the main battlefield from Asian mainland to the Pacific where Japan started to hold a defensive stance. It is therefore more appropriate to treat the two as a continuum starting in the 1930s.
The Starting Date of the Asia-Pacific Theatre
After the Peace of Westphalia, it became easier to draw clear boundaries of what constituted wars in Europe, since they usually started with the declaration of war between two sovereign countries and ended with a peace treaty. In Asia, the situation was more complicated. The notion of sovereignty was weaker and one country’s invasion of another did not necessarily lead to the declaration of wars. For example, China only officially declared war on Japan in December 1941, 10 years after the latter’s initial invasion of Manchuria. Still, historians and international relations scholars like to use benchmark dates to demarcate events and make more sense of history.
There are constant debates regarding the starting point of the Asia-Pacific theatre of WWII, even in China. Since 2015, the 70th anniversary of the victory of War against Japanese Aggression, the dominant ‘8 years of resistance against Japan’ (1937-1945) has been gradually challenged by the 14-year narrative (1931-1945) advocated by the government. Since war is generally defined as ‘reciprocation of violence in a sustained manner,’ the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident should still be regarded as a more accurate starting point of the Asia-Pacific battlefield. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident marked Japan’s expansion of its invasion to Northern China and other parts of Chinese Mainland, and it precipitated China’s nation-wide military resistance under the second United Front established between the Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Communist Party (CPC).
In comparison, the 1931 Manchuria Incident is a less convincing starting point because, at that time, the warlord governing the region had not announced allegiance to the National Government of the Republic of China. In the meantime, the National Government led by Chiang Kai-shek advocated a strategy of appeasement towards Japan’s aggression without ordering military resistance. Specifically, despite country-wide civilian fury against Japan’s invasion since 1931, Chiang Kai-shek had insisted on the policy of rangwai bixian annei (internal pacification before external resistance, i.e. to eliminate the Communists before fighting Japan). It was only after the Xi’an Incident in December 1936 when Chiang was detained by his subordinate Chang Hsüeh-liang that he finally agreed to form the Second United Front with the CPC to fight the Japanese together. Still, deeper causes of the war should be recognized as dating back to 1931, when China was unable to effectively fight back, because Manchuria (dongbei) was part of China and Japan’s annexation of the region was a warm-up of its more ambitious strategy to occupy larger parts of China.
Reasons behind the Downplay of the Asian Theatre
The exclusion of China (and Asian mainland) from WWII narratives has multiple reasons requiring reflection. In fact, in the period leading to the end of WWII, China’s role was emphasized by Western countries and the wider international community. It was among the major signatories of the Cairo (1943) and Potsdam (1945) Declarations, and it was nominated as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. However, the result of China’s civil war and Cold War mentality have changed the perspectives.
China’s civil war from 1946 to 1949 ended with the CPC’s victory and the establishment of the People’s Republic (PRC) in Chinese mainland and the KMT’s exodus to Taiwan. In the context of the Cold War, the USA’s aim to deter the USSR and the newly established PRC changed Japan from a wartime rival to a post-war ally, which in the long term led to the Western Bloc’s loss of memory about Japanese aggression. For the small number of Westerners who still remember China’s participation in WWII, they over-exaggerate the role of nuclear weapon in ending the war. In reality, China fought mostly alone for more than four years and about 1.3 million Japanese soldiers surrendered to China in 1945, which accounted for more than 40% of all Japanese soldiers fighting in WWII. The Soviet Union, leader of the Communist Bloc, initially emphasized the importance of China in WWII, but after the Sino-Soviet Split which started in late 1950s, it also deliberately downplayed China’s role.
For China itself, the CPC in Mao’s era concentrated on ideological struggle and tried to understate the role of the KMT and China’s wartime alliance with Western countries. This led to marginalization of major battles fought by KMT soldiers in the war and overemphasis on guerrilla battles led by the CPC. In Deng’s era, the Reform and Opening-Up and the development of Chinese economy relied heavily on Japanese investment and aid, which made the Chinese government less reminiscent of past history in its interactions with Japan. Japan was also among the earliest countries to lift sanctions against China and resume foreign aid after the June Fourth Incident (Tian’anmen Square protests) in 1989. In Jiang, Hu and Xi’s eras, there has been re-accentuation of China’s suffering, resistance, and victory in WWII. Since the international community has long been accustomed to China’s exclusion in WWII narratives while China’s move has been increasingly accused of being too nationalist in the background of its rise of power, it is difficult to challenge the dominant perspectives.
For the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, at first it also focused on ideological struggle and aimed at recapturing the Mainland from the CPC. After losing international recognition in the 1970s, it clung to the USA-Japan bloc and became more silent about its own (ROC and KMT’s) resistance in WWII. The democratization of Taiwan after the late 1980s led to the localization movement on the island, exemplified by the forming of a unique Taiwanese identity as opposed to a Chinese identity. The pro-independent Democratic Progressive Party even went further to proclaim the so-called ‘long-term Taiwanese-Japanese friendship’ and glorify Japan’s rule on the island to consolidate the party’s domestic support and strengthen its international recognition.
In addition, Japan’s unapologetic attitudes and the rise of far-right politicians in the country should not be ignored in explaining the downplay of the Asian battlefield. Moreover, Japan’s usual image as a developed and democratic country makes it difficult for the wider international audience outside of Asia to link it towards its militarist past as a formidable enemy of the Allied powers.
Re-emphasizing the Role of the Asian Battlefield
As I see it, the downplay of the Asian battlefield resulting from politicization is undesirable because it, first, turns a blind eye to the high casualties (35 million deaths on Chinese side) and some of the most terrific atrocities and war crimes in WWII, including Japan’s Unit 731 (Manshu Detachment 731), Nanjing Massacre, and Chongqing bombardments. Second, it also provides a limited and incomplete understanding of WWII. Dominant western narratives normally ignore the role of the Asian battlefield in the Allies’ grand strategy to win the war, which was dependent on the continuation of war in China to constrain Japan’s southern and northern move. The war in China diminished Japan’s capabilities of supporting Germany in the European Front and its reinforcements in the Pacific Front, damaged the unity of the Axis Powers, and helped the Allies gain time to finish war in the other two battlefields first. It is thus necessary to bring China and the Asian theatre back to core discussions about WWII.
As I also argued, the Asian theatre and the Pacific theatre should be treated as a continuum because of Japan’s continuous expansive strategy, the tension between the West and Japan regarding China prior to Pearl Harbour, and the intertwining of participants in the two battlefields. If we think in this way, the universally-acknowledged timeline of the Asia-Pacific War (or even WWII itself) can be seen as dating back to the outbreak of full-scale conflict between China and Japan in 1937, and perhaps even Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931.