Much of the existing literature on China’s climate change response has focussed on either the efforts of the Chinese civil society[1], or those of the central administration in Beijing[2]. Such accounts note the significant room for collaboration and conflict between the state and citizenry in tackling climate change.[3] I seek to highlight and advocate the role of inter-provincial competition, defined here as the forces of competitive rivalry, performative or actual, between administrative leaderships of provinces in China.
Whilst drawing upon existing frameworks concerning inter-provincial competition and cooperation[4], I submit that provincial officials compete via racing to maximally fulfil quantifiable and discrete policy objectives in response to climate change[5], out of a combination of formal promotional pressures and informal careerist considerations. We begin by outlining the provincial influence and competition theses comprising the bulwark of the proposed theory, prior to evaluating the theory against empirical evidence.
The Provincial Influence Thesis
China possesses 23 provinces, four municipalities, five autonomous regions, and two Special Administrative Regions. Provinces serve as the highest-level administrative divisions adopted in China, with the Party Secretary of each province acting as the de facto ruler in charge of the division, as supported by deputies (including the provincial Governor).[6] With few exceptions, Provincial Secretaries are mostly full or alternate members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, with leaders of direct-administered municipalities (e.g. Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin) all members of the 25-member Politburo – the top decision-making state organ. The view that Zhongnanhai alone determines and sees through decisions concerning local and provincial affairs in a highly centralised manner, underestimates the extent to which provincial rulers exercise discretion in interpreting and implementing policy objectives.[7] Whilst the Politburo generates the ideological and value underpinnings of governance, it is the provincial Party Standing Committee that steers policies’ enactment and implementation on a coordinative level.
Provincial governors hold substantial influence over provincial environmental and climate change policies. Kostka finds that only 25% of existing Environmental Protection Bureau leaders at provincial level were promoted through the ranks within the bureau; the other 75% source primarily from generalist bureaucrats and administrators cultivated in the provincial administrators.[8] The substantial influence wielded by provincial leadership in directly shaping the composition of county-level administrations and indirectly influencing sub-provincial personnel arrangement renders their grip over environmental policies on the provincial level highly significant, on the contrary to the view that environmental policy is largely centralised through the State Council. Furthermore, the extensive connections between provincial leadership and province-level SOEs enable leaderships to tailor and amplify climate change response policies, whether it be in generating renewable energy research, eliminating emissions, incentivising recycling, and implementing strict traffic controls.[9] Provincial leaders also bear responsibility for setting policy priorities and incentive mechanisms for local and municipal cadres.[10]
The Competition Thesis
Provincial administrations compete against one another for a multitude of reasons. Such competitive incentives in turn spur administrations to seek to out-compete one another in governance outcomes, as loosely stipulated by the Standing Committee and technocratic heads of specific bureau in the State Council.
Firstly, there exist clear career incentives associated with standing and privileges within the party. Party Secretaries and Governors who are alternate membersmay seek promotion to status of full members of the Central Committee – whether this be in their current, or future offices (e.g. reassignment to a more prominent province). Full membership of the committee comes with voting rights; alternate members can only voice their views in deliberative plenums, but cannot vote. The composition of the committee – whilst nominally determined through democratic elections – is produced as the de facto result of conferral between members of the Politburo. As Kung and Chen note in analysing the Great Leap Forward[11], the career incentives of alternate members played a significant role in engendering ideological purism and radicalism amongst those seeking promotion to a position of greater privilege and networking prowess (full membership). Such careerism in turn manifested in heightened death totals (political rank explained 16.83% of excess death rates and 3% excess procurement ratios).
Nearly five decades on, the broad metric of competition has clearly shifted towards one of greater pragmatic merit and stable governance. Yet the underlying incentive structures remain largely similar – excelling on stipulated dimensions enables one to climb the career ladder, through exemplifying competence, precision, and loyalty in China’s hierarchal, technocratic governance system.
Yet a question lingers – why, if at all, should provincial leaders compete along the dimension of climate change responsiveness? Instinctively, it should appear that metrics such as economic growth (GDP per capita), accountability (number of exposed corruption cases), public satisfaction (poll results) should be prized more heavily as indicators of governance success.
Hence comes the second explanation – officials have incentives to match clearly defined and quantifiable goals that are stipulated as national priorities. As noted by Sun et al.[12], they also possess the desire to out-compete each other in highlighting their adherence to officially embraced ideology. Li Keqiang declared “war” on pollution during the 2014 National People’s Congress opening[13]; in 2019, the International Green Development Coalition was established under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative[14]; in 2020, Xi announced that China would seek peak emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon-neutrality by 2060.[15]
The ability to demonstrate one’s compliance with the ethos most prominently touted and espoused by the Party Secretary, does not merely render the provincial leaders candidates for consideration for future promotion into the party’s upper echelons, but also enables them to withstand criticisms for their failure to fulfil competing demands on governance – e.g. economic growth, accountability and transparency, and national security. In any case, the latter two metrics also often go hand-in-hand with environmental concerns – as noted by the Chinese Minister of Public Security in 1990s, “incidents [that] broke out over disputes over forests, grasslands, and mineral resources” are among “four factors in social instability”.[16]
Tentative Evidence
Does the theory hold up in practice? The measurement of responsiveness towards climate change response should be treated as a bundle of indicators, including: a) actual (pledged) reduction in carbon emissions, b) commitment to R/D funding for renewables, and c) volume of investment into defensive architecture/adaptive measures. This article shall focus on a) as an exemplary indicator.
The 14th Five Year Plan[17] called for China to reach peak carbon emissions by 2030, and for the country to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.[18] In August 2021, the Zhejiang provincial government (spearheaded by Yuan Jiajun, a Central Committee member) officially pledged that it had sought to achieve peak carbon by 2025, and carbon neutrality by 2030 – bringing the former deadline ahead by 5 years; latter by 10 years.[19] Elsewhere, Shanghai has pledged more modest commitments, to limit coal consumption to 43 million tonnes by 2025, and lower the coal share of energy mix to 30%. Similarly, whilst Guangdong provincial officials have stepped up to reducing provincial carbon emissions through introducing measures such as a carbon market, a zero-carbon demonstration zone, and a Carbon Capture Use and Storage Center – drawing upon a synthesis of market and state-driven solutions to differentiate itself from rival provinces – Guangdong remains temperate in its efforts to race towards carbon neutrality.[20] Both Shanghai and Guangdong are helmed by Politburo members.
In searching for clear evidence of provincial officials taking their interpretations of national agenda too far – pace the second explanation, such cases arise where compliance with environment/climate change-related objectives inadvertently crowds out competing indicators. Throughout the past two decades, provincial and local officials, in seeking to meet specified emissions targets, have often engaged in what was eventually repudiated by the Central government as “pursuing forcefully engineered ‘greenification’ results”[21] Indeed, as recently as during the winter of 2020, Zhejiang officials had sought to meet and exceed the energy-control objectives stipulated in the 13th Five Year Plan, through severely constricting electricity consumption and supply, which induced widespread local disruptions.[22] Recent disruptions and power cuts in Northeast China attest, once again, to the dangers of allowing inter-provincial incentives (along the dimension of sustainability-centric policies) to run rampant amongst party officials.
An objection to this thesis may cite as counter-examples the relative sluggishness of inland provincial governments to transition to green energy. [23] In response, whilst inland provinces (e.g. Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Jiangxi) have remained comparatively tardy in shifting away from coal, the heightened emphasis placed by the Central Administration upon tackling climate change and carbon neutrality has indeed spurred vocal pledges and commitments on promotion of “clean coal production and efficient mining”. Even coal/non-renewable-dependent provincial economies have felt the heat from Beijing, and are making a push for cleaner, greener modifications to their primary fuel source.
Prescriptions and the Path Forward
The above setbacks do not inherently rule out the potential for the Central Government’s harnessing of inter-provincial competition incentives when it comes to propelling provincial leaders to act. Instead, these episodes point to the need for the calibration and implementation of more carefully tailored indicators – such that provincial officials do not sacrifice holistically sustainable governance in exchange for what ostensibly comes across, on paper, as environmentally sustainable accomplishments. Much of this is easier said than done, though a few prescriptions may be helpful here:
Firstly, the Central Government and Politburo in Beijing would benefit from encouraging and opening itself up to more candid local and provincial feedback concerning the difficulties and challenges of striking the balance between satisfying the “Double Controls”[24] targets through upholding some semblance of stability and continuity in energy policy – especially in face of inclement weather. Implementing a ‘dual circulation’ in feedback would go a long way in averting or ameliorating the detrimental consequences arising from unrealistic expectations being handed down from the above – in light, specifically, of the communication and information shortfalls between Beijing and provincial governments.
Secondly, on top of emphasising the need for curbing emissions and reducing electricity consumption, it is advisable that senior party administrators frame their discourses concerning sustainability as a part of – as a core ingredient in, perhaps – governance aimed at improving the quality of life of citizens across multiple dimensions, as opposed to merely environmental quality, pollution, and sustainability. As much as tackling climate change is an imperative – and one that President Xi himself has repeatedly insisted upon, it is equally clear that provincial officials are in need of balance and pragmatism in their approach to sustainability.
Conclusion
This article has examined how inter-provincial competition acts as a force in promulgating more sustainable, environmentally friendly policies in China. The significance of this mechanism cannot be overstated – the Politburo and invested civil society actors alike would benefit from harnessing the competitive drive of provincial leaders, through delineating (more) measured, achievable, and detailed dimensions along which competition is feasible and can be duly rewarded.[25] As with all competitions, however, the rules must be carefully calibrated and moderated – lest they goes too far.
[1] Zhang, Shiqiu, “China’s Growing Environmental Civil Society”, Chinese Research Perspectives on the Environment 9 (2019), 1-23, https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004401570/BP000007.xml.
[2]Engels, Anita, “Understanding how China is championing climate change mitigation”, Palgrave Communications 4, 101 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-018-0150-4; Fang, Jingyun, Guirui Yu, Lingli Liu, Shuijin Hu, and F. Chapin III, “Climate change, human impacts, and carbon sequestration in China”, Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 115 (2018).
[3] See Alpermann, Björn, “State and Society in China’s Environmental Politics”, China’s Environmental Crisis (2010).
[4] Sun, Dong-qi, Zhu Chuan-geng, Wu Li-ping, Zhou Li, “The History, Current Situation and Outlook of Study on Economic Competition and Cooperation between Provinces of China”, Human Geography 24 (6) (2009), 36-39.
[5] Such as repairing the costs of climate change, reducing emissions to prevent the encroachment of climate change, as well as constructing defensive/responsive architecture to adjust to the deleterious effects of climate change
[6] Chung, Jae Ho, “Studies of Central–Provincial Relations in the People’s Republic of China: A Mid-Term Appraisal”, The China Quarterly (1995), 487-508. Also cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Administrative Division System”, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/zgjk_665467/3572_665469/t1140993.shtml.
[7] Chung, “Studies of Central-Provincial Relations”
[8] Kostka, Genia, “Environmental Protection Bureau Leadership at the Provincial Level in China: Examining Diverging Career Backgrounds and Appointment Patterns”, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning (2013), 15 (1), 4-20.
[9] Hong, Dong-Li, Shiuh-Shen Chien, Yu-Kai Liao, “Green developmentalism and trade-offs between natural preservation and environmental exploitation in China”, Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space (2019), 3 (3): 688-705.
[10] Bo, Zhiyue, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949 (2002); Li, Cheng, “The significance of the SOE executives serving in the provincial leadership” (Guoqi gaoguan jinru shengji lingdaoceng de yiyi), China Newsweek (2017), 41; Choi, Eun Kyong, “Patronage and Performance: Factors in the Political Mobility of Provincial Leaders in Post-Deng China”, The China Quarterly (2012), 17, 965-981.
[11] Kung, James Kai-Sing and Shuo Chen, “The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura Career Incentives and Political Radicalism During China’s Great Leap Forward”, The American Political Science Review, 105, 1, 27-45.
[12] Sun, Jiajing, Michael Cole, Zhiyuan Huang, Shouyang Wang, “Chinese leadership: Pronvicial perspectives on promotion and performance”, Environment and Planning (2019), 37 (4), 750-772; Kostka, “Environmental Protection Bureau Leadership”.
[13] Branigan, Tania, “Chinese Premier declares war on pollution in economic overhaul”, The Guardian, Mar 5 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/china-pollution-economic-reform-growth-target.
[14] “Belt and Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition”, Green Belt and Road Initiative Center, https://green-bri.org/belt-and-road-initiative-green-coalition-brigc/.
[15] Mazzoco, Ilaria, “Beijing Lines Up the Pieces for Peaking Emissions by 2030”, MacroPolo, April 7 2021, https://macropolo.org/analysis/china-peak-carbon-emissions-2030/; McGrath, Matt, “Climate change: China aims for ‘carbon neutrality by 2060’”, BBC News, September 22 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54256826.
[16] Economy, Elizabeth, “China’s Environmental Challenge: Political, Social and Economic Implications”, Testimony before the Congressional Executive Commission on China Roundtable on the Environment, January 27 2003, reprinted by Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/report/chinas-environmental-challenge-political-social-and-economic-implications.
[17] Brusse, Vincent, and Nis Grünberg, “China’s 14th Five-Year Plan – strengthening the domestic base to become a superpower”, Mercator Institute for China Studies, April 9 2021, https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/chinas-14th-five-year-plan-strengthening-domestic-base-become-superpower.
[18] CarbonBrief,“Q&A: What does China’s 14th ‘five year plan’ mean for climate change?”, March 12 2021, https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-what-does-chinas-14th-five-year-plan-mean-for-climate-change.
[19] 国际能源网，《提前30年实现碳中和！浙江方案震惊全国！》，Aug 06 2021, https://msolar.in-en.com/html/solar-2384507.shtml.
[20] Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, “Subnational Climate Change Policy in China”, February 2020, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/200213-1632-china-subnational-designed-final.pdf.
[21] 河北日报，《警惕“染绿的绿色政绩” 》, Sept 07 2010, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/09-07/2517808.shtml.
[22] 21世纪经济报道，《多省拉闸限电调查：浙江为何截至31日？》, Dec 18 2020, https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2020-12-18/doc-iiznctke7085624.shtml.
[23] Xie, Echo, “China wants to be carbon neutral by 2060, but can its provinces manage it?”, South China Morning Post, Feb 17 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3121901/china-wants-be-carbon-neutral-2060-can-its-provinces-manage-it.
[24] 財經新報，正視「能耗雙控」對中國經濟與全球供應鏈的衝擊》，Sept 29 2021, https://finance.technews.tw/2021/09/29/the-impact-of-dual-energy-consumption-control-on-chinas-economy-and-global-supply-chain/
[25] Such dimensions should, of course, holistically reflect a wide range of environmental/climate change-related objectives, amidst other indicators of successful and competent governance in the 21st century.