The Taliban regime recently announced the formation of a caretaker government in Afghanistan. It has since gained notoriety for its inclusion of terrorists wanted by America and exclusion of ethnic minorities and women. The US expressed strong condemnations over the move. But at the same time, it and other countries in the West and beyond have frantically tried to engage the Taliban to bring their citizens home.
Over the coming years, the Taliban takeover will generate considerable security implications in South Asia. Neighbouring Pakistan, initially pleased with the success of the Taliban, is preparing to accommodate an influx of refugees fleeing Afghanistan. It must also now contend with an intensifying threat from terrorist outfits that take inspiration from the new government.
China, the aspiring hegemon, looks to expand its presence in Afghanistan through economic engagement and a plausible extension of its grand Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India, meanwhile, is perturbed by the takeover of the Islamist group in Kabul and anticipates turmoil in Kashmir engineered by those in Islamabad.
This article examines in greater depth the consequences of the Taliban takeover for South Asia. It argues that it will consolidate existing security alliances and deepen existing antagonisms in the region.
Background
The genesis of the present configuration of alliances in the region can be traced back to the Cold War era. Despite early signs of post-colonial and non-allied camaraderie, any geniality between China and India ended in the early 1960s. The 1962 war between the two countries resulted in a terrible defeat for New Delhi, setting the stage for their fraught relations over the next several decades. The war also encouraged Pakistan, India’s nemesis, to cultivate relations with communist China despite its robust security alliance with the US and the West.
The current “all-weather” friendship between Beijing and Islamabad is an evolution of the rapport that was established between the two states in the 1960s. “The alliance system that dominates Asian politics—pitting China and Pakistan as allies against India, with the US tilting toward India—was created in the 1962 crisis,” once wrote former National Security Council official Bruce Riedel.
As China evolves into a global superpower with the ability to challenge Washington’s supremacy, this dynamic in South Asia will assume greater significance. The US’ drawdown of troops from Afghanistan and the resulting rise of Taliban to power in the country will likely accentuate these trends in the coming years.
Another pariah state?
In the wake of the Taliban’s seizure of Kabul on August 15, American policy-makers paid renewed attention to the role of Pakistan in harbouring and assisting Taliban leaders. The Inter-services-intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistan army have been deeply involved in the project to reinstall the Taliban in the seat of government in Kabul. There is strong evidence that the Taliban regrouped and smuggled arms from Pakistan. They also received medical treatment in Pakistani hospitals and have extensive business interests in Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta. Pakistan’s sheltering of the Taliban and global jihadist groups allied to it was most prominently displayed in 2011. In May of that year, US Navy SEALs tracked down and killed Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
Relations with Pakistan have further soured with the US because Washington has gifted millions of dollars in aid to Islamabad to combat these terrorist groups. At the time, it believed Pakistan could leverage its influence over the Taliban and convince it to participate in productive negotiations. And so Washington never took stern action against Islamabad. Although Pakistan persuaded their Islamist allies to engage in talks in Qatar, the ISI surreptitiously sought (and pushed for) a complete Taliban takeover.
Now that this goal has been realised, Pakistan’s leaders are pleased. Indeed, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan publicly celebrated the Taliban’s victory last month. He said the group had “broken the shackles of slavery.” The US, on the other hand, will be angered by Islamabad’s duplicity. It will likely take stern actions against the country. With the Taliban assuming full control of Afghanistan, the US has lost incentive to exercise restraint in its engagement with Pakistan.
Some analysts are already calling for tough action against Pakistan. Former Department of Defence official Daniel Silverberg wrote, “US officials should approach Pakistan in a bluntly transactional manner by asking its leaders to assess the cost of preventing terror groups from using its borderlands as a refuge.” Another former National Security official declared that the country should be treated as a “pariah state” if it continues aiding jihadist groups. Others are pushing for the imposition of targeted sanctions on Pakistani officials who support the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Ahead of a potential escalation in relations with the US, Islamabad is counting on China for greater financial and diplomatic support.
Twin troubles
US retribution is not Islamabad’s only concern. A significant influx of refugees from Afghanistan would place an enormous burden on its troubled economy. The country already hosts around three million Afghan refugees, even though Pakistan does not allow Afghans to enter its borders without necessary documentation. But as members of the previous Afghan government, Afghan national army, journalists and others flee their country fearing reprisals, Islamabad is forced to accommodate them.
There is a second issue resulting from the Taliban takeover that bedevils Islamabad. Cadres of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) were released from Afghan prisons once the Taliban ascended to power. The TTP, modelling itself on the Taliban, is a notorious terrorist outfit that seeks to oust the regime in Pakistan and establish an Islamic theocracy. The deep state in Islamabad, composed of its military and the ISI, is growing more concerned about the potential implications of an empowered TTP. It is particularly worried about TTP fighters trickling into Pakistan under the guise of refugees.
Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed, chief of ISI, visited Kabul several weeks ago and attempted to push for a reconciliation between the Taliban and rebels in Panjshir Valley. An Afghanistan home to multiple factions of independent militias would provide fertile ground for groups like the TTP that seek to remake Pakistan in the image of Afghanistan. The Pakistani government reportedly asked the Taliban to hand over key TTP prisoners. The Taliban declined, and it suggested instead that any disagreement be resolved through further dialogue.
China’s ambitions
China, meanwhile, has already made conspicuous overtures (and deliberately so) to the Taliban. Importantly, Pakistan’s camaraderie with the group will make it easier for Beijing to realise its ambitions in Kabul. Soon after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul, a foreign ministry spokesperson said Beijing was ready for “friendly cooperation with Afghanistan.” In a meeting between the Chinese foreign minister and a Taliban delegation in late July, Beijing obtained assurances that the group would not support Uyghur separatist militias that exist in Afghanistan.
China is seeking to intensify its outreach to Afghanistan, both politically and economically. Some analysts warned that Beijing aims to exploit Kabul’s rare earth minerals. And given the rapport between Pakistan and Taliban, China might also extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan.
The CPEC is one of the key projects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through which China seeks to gain access to the Arabian Sea and Central Asia. A partnership between the Taliban regime and Beijing would clear the way for China to make inroads into Afghanistan and expand its colossal infrastructure connectivity scheme. It has already reportedly spoken with Taliban leaders about a Peshawar-Kabul motorway. This would bring Beijing close in proximity to the landlocked Central Asian states.
China is also building a road through the Wakhan corridor, connecting Xinjiang with Afghanistan and adding to its sprawling network of transportation systems in that region. In Central Asia, Beijing envisages an explosion in trade with the region. It also seeks access to the ocean through the Gwadar Port. A stable and secure Taliban-led Afghanistan would prove a key partner in this project.
Anxiety in India
The takeover of Kabul by the Taliban has caused great fear and anxiety in India. The government is perturbed that the group fostered, sheltered and armed by Pakistan has risen to power, even after it gifted billions of dollars to the American-backed Ghani administration. India’s anxiety is unsurprising. Indeed, one of the principal reasons for Islamabad’s support to the Taliban was to gain “strategic depth” in South Asia vis-à-vis India. New Delhi is worried that Pakistan will exploit this opportunity by dispatching scores of jihadist ideologues from Afghanistan to create disturbances in Kashmir.
When a Taliban seizure seemed imminent, countries like Russia, China and Iran sought to foster diplomatic ties with group. But India remained committed to its support for the frail Afghan government. After all, India had expended $3 billion in development work and remained one of the Ghani administration’s closest allies. Now that the Taliban has ascended to power, India is gradually coming to grips with this new reality. It is grudgingly negotiating with the Taliban to secure its interests.
The first formal talks between New Delhi and Kabul took place in late August in Doha. India’s Ambassador to Qatar led the talks with a Taliban representative. He raised his country’s concern regarding the threat of jihadist attacks from groups harboured in Kabul. Whether the Taliban will address this concern in earnest remains to be seen.
More worrying for Indian security, perhaps, is a closer partnership between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Flanked on either side by hostile neighbours, India has been closely monitoring its borders for fear of incursions. Last year twenty Indian soldiers died in a bloody skirmish with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on the Ladakh border. Although raids launched by ISI-affiliated Islamist outfits into Indian-administered Kashmir have dwindled over the past year, the border is always volatile and India cannot afford any complacency. The resurgence of the Taliban could embolden the anti-India alliance between China and Pakistan.
To make things worse, China’s careful cultivation of amicable relations with India’s neighbours has also engendered anxiety in New Delhi. Countries like Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka all maintain robust economic and security relations with Beijing. Although these countries are not firmly ensconced in an alliance with China, it is hard to imagine them supporting New Delhi in the event of further conflict between India and China.
Surrounded by either antagonistic or indifferent countries, India feels deeply insecure. Russia, a nation India has normally relied on for support, is also growing closer to China, as veteran Indian foreign policy expert Raja Mohan noted in a recent article. It leaves New Delhi with few allies in the region. India now only has the United States to look to for friendship and cooperation.
The future of South Asian security
When President Biden announced his withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, he said that his country has greater security considerations with which to grapple. The great power competition with China and Russia will define American foreign policy in the coming decades. Southeast Asia and the Pacific region will likely emerge as the centre of geopolitical confrontation. America is less inclined to expend its attention and resources on areas of less strategic significance.
It is likely – indeed, probable – that South Asia will no longer be a major region of friction between the two superpowers. The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan heralds a new era of growing Chinese influence. China’s conquest for regional hegemony is nearing fruition.
The establishment of a pro-China Taliban regime, functioning in close coordination with Pakistan, favours Chinese ambitions in the region. At the same time, issues relating to stability and large-scale movement of refugees will plague South Asia in the near future, particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Beijing will likely spearhead an economic boom and entrench its presence in the region through its BRI scheme.
As for India, it increasingly looks out of place in a China-dominated South Asia. It remains to be seen whether its overtures to the Taliban will bear fruit. But New Delhi is likely to continue deepening its security coordination with the US, leaving it vulnerable to Chinese ire.
Aditya Prasanna is an incoming MSc International Relations student at the London School of Economics (LSE)