After a rocky start, China reached a triumph in its economic growth amid the COVID 19 crisis that encompassed the rest of the world last year. Unlike what other countries encountered, the geopolitical nexus that Beijing has been planning through its most gigantic project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has not been shaken by the outbreak of coronavirus. On the contrary, the BRI related projects have intensified their network sharply. In particular, the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka has reached a critical juncture as Sri Lankan parliament passed the much-disputed Colombo Port City Economic Commission Bill, which has caused a political havoc in the island nation. The problematic nature of the bill has been subjected to criticism based on its twilight interpretation and some reputed Sri Lankan jurists have argued that the bill will erode the legal and political sovereignty of Sri Lanka as it has included some exceptions from the domestic laws.
In the backdrop of such political chaos, the government of Sri Lanka seems to have clung to entertaining Chinese interests further under the debt crisis that the country undergoes, and the massive surge in coronavirus cases across the island. It is not an exaggeration that China’s grip over Sri Lanka has again seen a stringent rise after the Rajapaksa brothers returned to power as the president and the prime minister respectively. The promising gesture, which was given by Colombo to India last year by adopting “India First Policy” now appears to be a pretext of Rajapaksa’s government in Colombo due to the benign relationship it tends to maintain with Beijing while looking for the Chinese aid as the last resort. In 2021 March, Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves dropped to $ 4.05 Billion, which marked a severe decline in Sri Lanka’s economy in the recent past. However, China came to the rescue after Chinese development bank extended a loan of $ 500 million ;the second tranche of a $1 Billion bailout Sri Lanka sought from China in 2020.
Apart from the financial dependency that has encompassed Sri Lanka, the Chinese vaccine diplomacy has become a crucial factor that legitimizes strong Chinese influence in the island nation. Despite Sri Lanka’s robust public health infrastructure, probably the best in the region, the ongoing corona crisis stressed the country’s healthcare system. Once again, China came to succour the island nation by donating 1.1 million Sinopharm vaccine doses to Sri Lanka that ultimately helped the health authorities to resume its vaccination process to combat the COVID surge.
This particular situation should be evaluated in the context of prevailing global vaccine politics which has unveiled how Western countries are hording vaccines. On the other hand, China’s vaccine aid to Sri Lanka has created a mortifying effect to India as India has now been unable to fulfill the delivery of the promised amount of vaccines to Sri Lanka, which paving the path for China to accelerate its vaccine diplomacy in Sri Lanka. China’s entry into vaccine distribution efforts in Sri Lanka is emblematic of its soft power success in Colombo, at a time when India has begun to lag by its diplomatic discontent with the Sri Lankan government. Ironically, this whole trajectory started a few months after Sri Lankan government called off its agreement with India and Japan to develop its East Container Terminal in Colombo Port.
A Twitter message posted by the Chinese embassy in Colombo indicated Beijing’s strong willingness to assist Sri Lanka to fight the Corona virus. This was exactly in contrast to how Sri Lankan public opinion stands inimical toward the growing Chinese presence in their country. Since the acquisition of the Hambantota port through a 99-year lease in 2017, the country’s public perception of China has been negative. Given such a hostile environment against its image, China gleefully utilized vaccine diplomacy to ward off further opposition from the public. In modern times, Soft Power stems from the appeal of a political, economic, social model or a combination of either of these attributes. Thus, China’s vaccine diplomacy is an apt strategic projection that might harbour the Chinese interests in Sri Lanka. In fact, the strategic importance of Sri Lanka for China’s BRI remains indispensable with its unique geographic position in the Indian Ocean Region. Beijing attempts to tread warily in Colombo, even though it has already received significant opposition from the general public in the island nation. Also, the Rajapaksa government in Sri Lanka deepened its hobnobbing despite knowing that it would cause discomfort in New Delhi.
Nevertheless, the practical setbacks that Sri Lanka faces in combating corona crisis has increased the credibility of China as a friend in need than India. Moreover, it should be considered that China has unconditionally buttressed the Rajapaksa regime in the international platforms such as UNHRC, where Sri Lanka was criticized by the West for evading accountability for its records on human rights in its protracted conflict with the Tamil separatists and the reconciliation process in the post conflict phase. It is worth noting that, despite India’s growing concern about Chinese influence over Sri Lanka, it has not been successful in befriending the current Sri Lankan government, which has opened scope for China to increase its influence over the Sri Lankan political economy. It can be argued that the Chinese vaccine diplomacy is likely to play a critical factor in the overall efforts surrounding the BRI projection in Sri Lanka, followed by efforts to legitimize Chinese loans and infrastructure assistance. Ostensibly, this strategy carries a risk to Colombo as it further deteriorates its relations with New Delhi. Moreover, the overall development and political cooperation established by India in Sri Lanka through public diplomacy and other means will not completely let Sri Lanka wither away from the orbit of India.
Punsara Amarasinghe is a visiting researcher at Science Po, Paris. He reads for PhD in International Law at Scuoola Superiore Sant Anna in Pisa, Italy and previously held research fellowships at Global Legal Studies Center at University of Wisconsin Madison and Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He holds LL.M in Public International Law from South Asian University in New Delhi. Punsara can be reached at punsaraprint10@gmail.com