Techno-nationalism has been rising with an increase in political as well as technological fragmentation of countries in the post-globalization era. This has become the norm in the new era, which has been transitioning from techno-globalization to techno-nationalism. High-end or frontier technologies like artificial intelligence, 5G technology, and big data have become an integral link for both nationalism and security of the country. This has been overtly linked to national and strategic positioning of countries in terms of technology, economy and, more importantly, geostrategic terms. An interesting reversal of globalization to nationalistic or authoritarian regionalism has emerged as the new norm in international relations. Technological wherewithal and related capabilities have increasingly become symbols of sovereignty and nationalism, with linkages to the (relative) superiority of a country’s wherewithal, and achievements of the respective leader or State.
Despite the focus on the global governance of cyberspace and the emphasis of the multistakeholder approach (on which India is a major proponent), no consensus has been reached in creating an international regime that emphasizes on the features of techno-globalization. Rather the international bandwagoning of dichotomous compartmentalization has taken hold due to various reasons. The Indian narrative has hugely been influenced by the border disputes that have been escalating in the aftermath of the brief Wuhan-Mamallapuram détente between India and China. Moreover, the Trump Administration dominating the narrative of security threats from the Rise of China, the militaristic build-up of China along the border and across the prominent sea lanes of communication, the investment of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through the disputed territory of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) have all swayed Indian foreign policy towards actions that are more symbolic and consequential rather than being deliberated and devised for the interest of India.
Interestingly, this does not consider many of the lop-sidedness of the argument and actions, which has been explained in a recent interview by former National Cyber Security Coordinator for the Government of India, Dr Gulshan Rai. According to him, there have been no efforts to technically analyze the activities of the (banned) apps, particularly related to the transfer and storage of data. Often a company headquartered in China does not necessarily transfer and store the customer data in China, despite having development centres. Many of the apps originating in many developed countries have similar data-related activities and have been openly called for and criticized during Senate hearings in the US. It has been reported that most of the data leakages of Indian customers have been from apps that originate outside China. The recent example is the Facebook data leak in 2021 affecting six million Indian users, which has been a recurring incident that many consider it as more of a norm than a threat. According to the World Economic Forum’s (WEF’s) Global Risks Report 2019, the hack and leak of the Government ID base in 2018, known as the Aadhaar breach led to the largest breach in the history of cyberattacks. It amounted to data of more than a billion Indian users being breached, and their data out in the dark net for hackers to further pry on. Additionally, major apps from the US and the West have all provisions of access for the State when deemed necessary for national security. The Cambridge Analytica incident (again involving Facebook data) that was the biggest example of a defence security contractor using the app company in the UK to instigate mass political targeted campaigning and psychological warfare tactics in the US based on payments by the then-presidential candidate to influence voting patterns at the micro-level. The similar challenges and threats to the Indian State and individual citizens have already been recrudescent narrative understood and agreed amongst experts, policymakers, and civil society.
The recent Sino-US trade-cum-technology war/conflict has been inadvertently founded based on narratives and arguments by and of the proponents of techno-nationalism. With recent border conflicts with China, India has also been utilizing techno-nationalism in its foreign policy decision-making. The border conflict between Indian and China is considered to be the immediate cause for banning of more than 50 Chinese apps by the Government of India in 2020, which wasn’t a cause for concern even with the presence of apps like Facebook or Whatsapp. Despite the issues of privacy policy of Whatsapp (since 2016 and 2021 policies in India) of data transfer and its use outside the country, the Government of India hasn’t strictly followed the path of banning them, but rather have asked for clarification. An important issue in this regard is the loopholes in the legal system in the country that are increasingly being misused, creating challenges to individual privacy and national security. The ban of Chinese apps and related software is based on the argument that information and network security, data privacy and technological advancements in India are increasingly targeted by Chinese companies, affecting India’s geostrategic and economic positioning. The banned Chinese apps had a huge market in India, which according to the Indian Government economically benefitted the Chinese government and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Union Minister who holds the portfolio of Law and Justice, Electronics and Information Technology and Communications in the Government of India tweeted that this action is intended towards the “safety, security, defence, sovereignty & integrity of India and to protect data & privacy of people of India”. Though this action is considered as an immediate aftereffect of the recent border conflict in the India-China border, the Government of India also intends to reduce Chinese dominance in Indian digital market, as well as halt the flow of free, voluminous (and sometimes sensitive) data to Chinese companies that are under the ambit of Chinese law. and the control of the Chinese State. It also intents to hurt or halt the growth of Chinese economy from the use of Indian market and resources (particularly user data), especially with companies like Tiktok (having 39 per cent of total users are from India), BIGO LIVE (32 per cent of new users from India), Helo (50 million users), Liveme (13 million users). Incidentally, the ban of gaming apps like PUBG (10-15 million users), Clash of Clans (10-15 million users) etc., increasingly saw criticism and protests from users in India.
India should focus on capacity building and infrastructural upgradation for sourcing and absorbing emergent technologies coming to the market to effectively channelize and streamline the application of emergent technologies in society. This includes the urgent need to focus on the academia-industry ecosystem, specifically higher education, research and innovation. China has been competing with the West and has often displaced most developed countries in many parameters. This includes the likes of high-end technology and related exports, intellectual property rights applications and granted (arguably even the expenditure and receipts in emergent technologies), an increasing number of scientific and technical journals, research personnel, and technically skilled labour. Meanwhile, India is still ‘catching up’ and has performed relatively low with regard to these aspects. According to World Bank data, the percentage of R&D to GDP of China crossed the one per cent mark in 2002 and has been growing steadily, crossing the two per cent mark in 2014. Meanwhile, India has never crossed the one per cent mark and has been in continuous decline for nearly a decade since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
Despite the issues in implementing the data privacy law, India needs to enforce regulations on data standardization. A categorization of the types of data should be the focus, wherein testing, demonstration and monitoring of data use and storage by app companies should be regulated through a thorough understanding of the facets of technology, data and privacy within India. In India, the national security vs privacy debate has gained prominence since the institutionalization and integration of Aadhaar under the UPA Government. However, the possibility for examining a hybrid form of security-cum-privacy framework that encompasses and deals with both the national security and the privacy concern is something to be examined further. Continuous monitoring and institutionalization of relevant and appropriate punitive actions should be part of this as well.
Further, the Indian best practices can be internationalized to be part of the multistakeholder approach that India has proposed in international platforms and forums. This is important, particularly in dealing with concerns with Chinese companies having market access and economic interest in most of the countries in the world, and more importantly, for ample regulatory oversight. However, more importantly, Indian actions can create a movement for the internationalization of data sovereignty and protection as best practices while emphasizing on weeding out (alleged) authoritarian tendencies domestically and internationally. Thus, being the largest democracy, India can also set the example for developed countries to follow, one which though nationalist in interest, is more international in its approach and application.