In the aftermath of Myanmar’s military coup on 1 February 2021, hundreds of thousands of people – from almost every ethnic group, including people from the Rohingya community – have marched in the streets nationwide in opposition to the military’s power grab. Some activists hope that the protests present a turning point for the persecuted Rohingya minority, given that some Burmese seem to be changing their views of their Muslim countrymen, who they considered to be illegal migrants before. But reinstating a democratic system will not automatically turn the situation in favour of the Rohingya. The reason for this? Buddhist nationalism and persisting ethno-nationalism in Rakhine State.
For decades, Myanmar ethnic minorities, who speak their own languages and have distinct cultures, have faced persecution at the hands of the military. The military draws a significant level of legitimacy from nationalism, which in Myanmar is intrinsically linked to Buddhism. The military junta has positioned itself as the protector of the faith to enhance its authority and to bolster its perceived legitimacy among the Burmese majority. The military has also continuously waged military campaigns against some groups, most notably the Rohingya, a mostly Muslim minority group indigenous to Rakhine State. More than 750,000 Rohingya have been forced to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh since 2017, when the military’s brutal campaign against the group led to the burning of villages, mass-murder, and rampant sexual violence. A United Nations human rights report concluded that the campaign was conducted with “genocidal intent.”
Following the military’s campaign, Aung San Suu Kyi boosted her own image as the protector of the Bamar—the dominant majority ethnic group—before the domestic audience by defending the Tatmadaw against charges of genocide at the ICJ. Ultimately, neither the military nor the NLD has defended the Muslim Rohingya minority in this Buddhist-majority country.
On February 8, the third day of the general strikes, I encountered a group of protesters with a placard that read “Rohingya stand for Democracy.” I walked together with them around Tamwe and Mingalar Taung Nyunt townships, singing slogans for almost one hour. The reaction I got was neutral: the crowd did not support us but we also faced no harassment, a significant change in itself. When, the next day, we—a group of Rohingya youth and I—went on to protest next to Sule Pagoda with vinyl placards bearing demands such as “reject the military coup” and “abolish the 2008 constitution,” we received a similar reaction. We received no particular attention from the crowd, although we used the term “Rohingya,” which has, in the past, been incredibly controversial in Myanmar. We were not met with criticism or threats because of the unity that the military coup had inspired. It now binds together the many different factions who oppose military rule.
The day became a significant turning point for the Rohingya community in Yangon. Whereas we had previously been too concerned to openly identify as Rohingya, in the aftermath of the coup, there was a need for solidarity and a show of unity amongst all people in Myanmar. This was what led us to overcome our fear of harassment. The initiative of a few protesters openly identifying as Rohingya encouraged others to join too. On the ground, our feelings of tension were palpable—this was a rare moment of equality, but one mixed with nervousness. The forthcoming support those first few protesters received online, however, helped inspire even more members of our community to come forward and step out of the shadow of persecution. Once more, we showed the degree of our commitment to the land of Myanmar, and that we stand together in the struggle for our country’s future.
Nascent solidarity with Rohingya
Despite the importance of opposing the coup, the fate of the Rohingya remains uncertain, especially as hundreds of thousands of Rohingya continue to live under squalid conditions. The question is whether current debates around democracy can also change the public’s perception of the Rohingya issue. In other words, now that people across the country are demanding an inclusive government and federal democracy, will their demands include all minorities—even the Rohingya?
Although it is too early to answer this question, the street protests have given us valuable insights. In the streets, a small group of protesters, mainly student groups such as the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) and others in their circle, as well as ethnic minorities, are rooting for the abolishment of the 2008 Constitution and the removal of authoritarian structures once and for all. These groups call for the establishment of a new and inclusive political system.
The demands of the majority of protesters, however, are different. They campaign for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, chairman of National League for Democracy (NLD), other political leaders, and the implementation of 2020 general election results under the 2008 constitution. Aung San Suu Kyi has used tactics with ‘ethno-racial characteristics’ and ignored democratic values and minority rights abuses in the last five years, while she led the civilian government. In a twisted turn of history, Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD, and most protestors have become protectors of the constitution they once opposed. The majority of the protesters coming to the streets to oppose the coup do so because they feel denied the government they voted for, not because they stand opposed to the grave human rights abuses that have been committed in Myanmar for decades.
However, The Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament) or CRPH, made up of elected National League for Democracy (NLD) parliamentarians announced the abolishment of 2008 Constitution following pressure from student groups and ethnic groups on March 31st.
Yet, there is hope that the current wave of protests will be a critical juncture that might inspire ethnic majority Bamar to take a more humane approach towards Rohingya. The Bamar themselves are experiencing feelings of being oppressed in their own country, emotions similar to those that have long weighed on the Rohingya. The ongoing uprising has also brought together a diverse mix of Myanmar’s more than fifty million people. It is not the first diverse uprising, however. The 1988 Uprising and the 2007 Saffron Revolution which were quelled through brutal crackdowns at the armed forces’ hands included members of the different religions, ethnicities, and age groups. They took place in hundreds of villages, towns, and cities in Myanmar. Most members of the NLD cabinet were victims of military abuse and political prisoners. Such experience, however, did not translate into social cohesion nor strong alliances between Bamar and ethnic minorities once the NLD was in power. Generation Z, primarily credited with organizing the protests today, is also inspired by the past’s protest events. But will they draw different conclusions from their time in the streets?
Some protesters calling for justice today show regrets over their treatment of the Rohingya in the past. Some have issued apologies to Yanghee Lee, the former UN Special Rapporteur who was hailed by the human rights community as a “champion of justice for Rohingyas,” though widely vilified in Myanmar. Some Student Unions also issued statements admitting guilt for not speaking out against the genocide committed at the hands of the Tatmadaw. Open demonstrations of solidarity with Rohingya joining the anti-coup protests and public apologies for past actions are powerful symbols.
Equality is still an uphill battle
But there exists yet another undercurrent within Myanmar, that has received little attention abroad. On February 11, a group of monks protested against the coup alongside the public in Hlegu Township, Yangon, holding a placard saying, “we don’t want a military government that will repatriate the Bengalis.” This referred to the speech made by General Min Aung Hlaing, chairman of the State Administration Council, after the coup. A popular post on Facebook asked, “Do you know why the Rohingya issue is world-famous? They are extremely talented in acting as if torture and injustice are being done to them in front of the camera. We have to adopt the same tactics, such as breast/chest-beating and crying and making grieving faces. You have to make faces in the pictures that portray the country as in the dark. Unless there is this trend, going on the streets will be useless. Are we all together for this trend when taking photos? So, let’s do dramas.”
Some of these posts received more than a thousand likes and shares within a few hours. These posts demonstrate that the fate of Rohingya will not be overturned within days by a single event, although the Rohingya community is showing solidarity with the majority at this moment. The hatred against them has been planted for generations. And it is essential not to forget here the influence of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar. The country itself is built upon this rhetoric, and its history goes back to its colonial past.
For the protestors to be successful, they need to stand united against the military. Such unity must be built on a shared belief in democracy and human rights, as opposed to on lines or grounds of ethnicity or religion. Irrespective of whether the protests will eventually prevail, those protesting for democracy in Yangon, Mandalay, and all-over central Myanmar should remember the ethnic minorities that stood with them. For minorities like the Rohingya, who have their home in a state where many supports the military, the consequences of supporting democracy will likely be severe. And even if the protests are successful in establishing a democratic government under a democratic constitution, achieving a future that recognizes the Rohingya as citizens and ensures equality for all citizens of Myanmar – will remain an uphill battle.
Persisting Rakhine’s Ethno-Nationalism
It is important to clarify that the discrimination of Rohingya is not only top down but also bottom up and that this is what makes addressing it so hard. It is not solely the central government that makes discriminatory policies towards Rohingya. Proposals often come from ethnic Rakhine politicians. Indeed, Rakhine politicians popularized the term “Bengali” to refer to Rohingya as interlopers from Bangladesh[1]. In 2015, The ANP forced President Thein Sein to issue an executive order withdrawing the voting rights for the Rohingya who were previously allowed to vote holding white cards based on the 2015 Referendum Law.
Notably, while the Rohingya have shown immense support for the democratic movement, people of the Rakhine Buddhist community have been ambiguous. Protests against the coup were held in just a few townships with small numbers of people. Rakhine politicians and armed group leaders show clear support for the military government. While the entire country was banging pots and pans at 8 pm every night to protest the military coup, on Twitter, Dr. Nyo Twan Awng, vice commander in chief of the Arakan Army (AA), called for a cheers campaign among the Rakhine community. He deleted the tweet later on. Ironically, this is the same armed group that has been fighting for the self-determination of Rakhine State, to adopt the “Way of Rakhita (ethnic Rakhine).” On the 24th of March AA publicly condemned the Tatmadaw’s violence against civilians, and declared that it stands against the Tatmadaw and with the people. It is unclear whether the AA is aligning with CRPH or has its own strategy. In any case, the Rohingya’s bold stance for democracy is not only a stance against the military, but it is one that also contradicts the position of powerful armed groups. This likely increases the threat to the future livelihood of the Rohingya in Rakhine.
After the February 2021 coup, Myanmar military joined hands with Rakhine nationalist politicians who shared similar objectives regarding the Rohingya. On February 12, Union Day of Myanmar, the State Administrative Council released Dr Aye Maung, a prominent Rakhine ultra-nationalist who has been involved in serous human rights violations targeted at the Rohingya, as part of a general amnesty together with 23000 other prisoners. He was charged by the Sittwe District Court in 2019 for high treason and sentenced to 22 years. Dr Aye Maung was the founder and chairman of the Arakan National Party, the most influential party in Rakhine state, but split with the party in 2018 and founded the Arakan Front Party in the same year.
Upon his release, the people welcoming him were holding placards saying “long live Sayadaw U Wirathu”, the “Buddhist Bin Laden”. Dr Aye Maung visited another ultra-nationalist monk, Parmaukkha Sayadaw, who has helped peddle a fiery brand of Buddhist nationalism and Islamophobia in Myanmar. He went on to express his gratitude to the State Administration Council led by Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing upon his release. Thousands of ethnic Rakhine people, a far larger crowd than people protesting against the coup, greeted him at the airport, wearing garlands and chanting “long live Dr. Aye Maung”. He received similar welcoming on his visit to Rohingya populated Northern Rakhine on 21st March and hinted that his party will run in the new election promised by SAC.
The alignment of the ANP with the State Administrative Council and the release of Dr. Aye Maung will further increase the animosity towards Rohingya. This animosity is further exacerbated by the Rohingya’s pro-democracy stance. While entire country is united in its support of the democracy movement, ethno-nationalism still stands strong in Rakhine state. The remaining Rohingya in Rakhine will be in an unimaginable situation of horror and the repatriation of Rohingya refugees will remain a distant dream if the State Administrative Council remains in power.
Stance the CRPH should adopt about the Rohingya
CRPH have formally announced plans to set up a “unity government,” releasing a new interim constitution after a Charter was agreed on between the group and ethnic alliances. It included that a new collation government will be formed in the first week of April based on the agreed Federal Democracy Charter. Mahn Win Khaing Than is appointed as caretaker vice president of interim government. On March 13, he said “this is the darkest moment of the nation and the moment that the dawn is close”. It is, however, unclear whether this dawn would extend to persecuted minorities like the Rohingya since the CRPH has not formulated a position on the matter. At a time when the Tatmadaw is waging a war against its own people cooperation and unity amongst Myanmar’s many ethnic groups is imperative. Cooperation, however, can only be built on trust and the CRPH needs to take a firm stance and support the rights of the Rohingya in Myanmar to build this trust now.
Dr Sasa, the CRPH’s Special Envoy to the United Nations, has made several statements that indicate that the CRPH might recognise the plight of the Rohingya and show solidarity. During a virtual protest on the 20th of March, he promised justice for the Rohingya in reference to the atrocities committed by the military. However, it is unclear whether Dr Sasa’s stance is shared by all members of the CRPH. An official statement on the Rohingya or the repressive 1982 Citizenship Law, is yet to be published.
Yet, even if there were a change in government that accepts the Rohingya as citizens of Myanmar, the main problem will be to implement equal rights. Being citizens doesn’t assure equal rights and dignity for Muslims in Myanmar, more specifically in Rakhine state. The best example is the Ethnic Kaman Muslims who have been subjected to the similar discrimination as Rohingya although they are one of the recognized ethnic groups.
In order to implement equal rights for the Rohingya, the national Citizenship law needs to be revised to reflect a more democratic conceptualization of its nationhood. The country should embrace the principle of jus soli by abandoning ethnic citizenship system based on jus sanguinis. The existing citizenship system has not only been the source of producing millions of stateless people but also fostered the separation between different groups by privileging some over the others. The use of the jus soli would promote an inclusive citizenship policy, together with the recognition and respect for the rights of minorities, as a mean of both an integration and a conflict prevention measure.
Secondly, the long-term segregation of the Rohingya from every aspect of social life and their political marginalization must end. They must have unconditional access to every job in the civil service, such as ministries, the police, or the immigration department. This would help curb the segregation of the Rohingya and an important step towards ensuring they won’t be segregated and enjoy basic human rights.
Thirdly, the Myanmar’s electoral system needs to be revised and adopt proportional representation (PR). A PR system would promote more equitable representation of minorities, like the Rohingya, by giving all minorities representation and voices in proportion to their vote. It would ensure that minorities like the Rohingya are able to elect candidates that represent their opinions, values, and interests.
Finally, the CRPH should make a special effort to increase the representation of minority leaders at the national level, especially of those who have direct experience of living through ethnic conflict that has torn apart their communities. The CRPH should involve representatives from the Rohingya community at all stages of the monitoring and implementation process of resolving Rohingya related issues. The involvement of Rohingya representation have been virtually absent from high-level discussions about the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Myanmar as well as decisions about matters of their everyday life in the country. These measures will ensure effective and sustainable minorities’ political participation and the allocation of sufficient resources to realize identified objectives.
The CRPH has a very difficult task ahead and there are some who feel that the best way forward is to sweep the problems of ethnic minorities in Myanmar under the rug for the time being. Anyone arguing otherwise is decried as undermining the unity of the Myanmar’s people on social media. But the NLD should know better. When they party came to power it disregarded many long-standing alliances with ethnic minorities and defended the atrocities the military committed against others. Now the next generation of NLD leaders who chair the CRPH have a chance to learn from past mistakes, build meaningful relationships with ethnic minorities and pledge to work towards the protection of their rights. In this setting, supporting the rights of the Rohingya is not only the right thing to do, it would also be an important signal that the dawn Mahn Win Khaing Than promised is a dawn for everyone in Myanmar.
[1] Explained in detail by Moshe Yegar, 1972, in his book “The Muslims of Burma: a study of a minority group”