Introduction
In the wake of the Presidential inauguration on January 20th, the Biden Administration will have a critical opportunity to shape U.S. foreign policy. Whether or not this opportunity is fully realized, however, will depend on the President-Elect’s management process. When approaching the management of foreign policymaking, the President-Elect should strive to build a collaborative team environment within the inner circle of the national security establishment, actively monitor and manage emerging bureaucratic competition between advisors with a strong strategic vision, and build upon—rather than outright dismissing—frameworks of previous administrations.
I: Building a Collaborative Atmosphere
The President-Elect should be purposeful with his development of interpersonal relationships in the Administration’s inner circle, setting a collaborative and harmonious atmosphere. The overarching goal of collaboration can be promoted vis-á-vis the deliberate designing of organizational arrangements and bureaucratic interactions. Hosting casual occasions—in a similar manner to President Jimmy Carter’s Friday foreign policy breakfasts—can mitigate some of the inherent tensions in the White House’s formal environment and help promote working relationships in spite of diverging backgrounds or ideologies.
Interpersonal relationships are not only important between advisors. The President-Elect should strive to develop close friendships with critical advisors through conventional and unconventional means, taking moderate amounts of time for shared recreational activities. Investments in friendships should also include occasions directly removed from immediate political posturing. Perhaps the best illustration is between President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, who maintained a special friendship from their time in Texas playing golf and hosting family barbecues.
The President-Elect should lead by example, being friendly and modest during his interactions with the inner circle. Feedback should be encouraged and rewarded by framing himself as an approachable and graceful leader. He must also be cognizant of setting unrealistic expectations, relative to his envisioned scale of accomplishments, as doing so can discourage discussion and cut off meaningful conversations. These consequences can be attributable to the fact that the direct presentation of the President’s opinion in the opening stages of discussion can create an unproductive incentive for advisors to pursue flattery over genuine criticism. Once again, the Carter Administration provides a clear example of this, albeit in a negative manner; by opening a meeting with the statement on his proclivity for daring rescue operation during the Iranian embassy hostage crisis, President Carter inadvertently empowered the Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs (APNSA, more colloquially known as the National Security Advisor)—Zbigniew Brzezinski—to conclusively impede Secretary Vance’s important insights and criticisms.
II: Monitoring and Managing Bureaucratic Conflict
As mentioned in Section I, President-Elect Biden should strive to reward and encourage collaboration within his inner circle. However, the President-Elect must also reckon with the reality that his political coalition consists of a wide array of ideologies. Disagreements will inevitably form among advisors from high-pressure geopolitical crises and divergent beliefs on critical matters of foreign policy. Members of the Biden Administration must learn to respectfully engage and deliberate with one another in order to overcome this obstacle. Despite a number of diverging viewpoints and assumptions, President John F. Kennedy was able to effectively manage the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Empowered through close relationships with critical primary advisors, he did not shy away from entering contentious and honest discussions.
Another important consideration for the President-Elect to manage foreign policy is to not “go wobbly” by accompanying the aforementioned discussions on policy with a grounded strategic vision. A President’s failure to provide a clear framework for political priorities can result in unchecked bureaucratic conflict. While the conclusion of President Ronald Reagan’s term was marked by the favorable conclusion of the Cold War and the rollback of Communism, its early years fell victim to unchecked bureaucratic conflict; in the absence of clear priorities, executive indecision resulted in uncertainty on strategic goals in the inner circle of advisors and excessive room for interpretation. President Reagan’s reluctance to confront the resulting sources of disagreement within his administration—whether it be major differences in policy or petty disputes—did little to address the paralyzed state of communication between advisors at the start of his administration.
A mutual understanding of the balance of power within the administration is an important condition for effective bureaucratic management. This is particularly relevant when it comes to the relationship between the Secretary of State and the APNSA. The APNSA should serve as an honest broker and advisor of foreign policy relative to the Secretary of State’s role of implementation and execution. Both the White House’s National Security Council—headed by the APNSA—and the State Department must attempt to effectively coordinate policy, rather than removing a critical department or faction from the decision-making curve such as Henry Kissinger during the Nixon Administration. A prime example of a favorable working relationship was that between Secretary of State James Baker and APNSA Brent Scowcroft; despite voiced disagreements over outlook and policy, they actively sought to find agreement and coordinate with one another.
III: Reflecting on Previous Frameworks
When encountering emerging international challenges, President-Elect Biden should reflect on his foreign policy goals in the context of frameworks developed by previous administrations. Dismissing prior accomplishments sets oneself up for overreaching with foreign policy initiatives. Two prominent examples originate from the 1970s: the Nixon Administration’s insistence on delivering “peace with honor” did not avert the fall of Saigon and delayed the withdrawal of American forces, and President Carter’s initial insistence on large-scale reductions of the Soviet nuclear arsenal—rather than building off of the Ford Administration’s work at the Vladivostok Summit—set back negotiations for the SALT II Treaty.
In order to prevent unknown and unintended consequences with foreign policymaking, it is also important for the President-Elect to be well informed of the scope of inherited policies. The Biden Administration should pause and seek to fully understand potential actions before taking drastic measures of national security. The most striking warning from history is President Harry Truman. After being sworn in as President, he was ill-informed about the Manhattan Project and the targeting procedure of bombing aircraft, thereby misleading him on the destructive potential of both atomic bombings. President Truman soon halted plans for future nuclear strikes on Japan after getting reports back from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The immense consequences of the dropping of the atomic bomb should have been subject to prior deliberation by Truman’s cabinet, rather than being accepted as a fait accompli.
Conclusion
The United States of America will be faced with a wide array of emerging international challenges during these next four years. In order to ensure an effective foreign policymaking process, President-Elect Biden should strive to build collaborative teams, actively manage bureaucratic interactions and conflict, and reflect on decisions in the context of prior Presidencies and their frameworks. It should also be recognized that the broad array of contemporary global trends—such as biosecurity, inter-state competition with near-peer rivals, climate change, and challenges to the post-war international order and the rule of law—may precipitate the need for new institutional arrangements within the executive branch. While history provides a useful lens to examine emerging challenges in policy and bureaucracy, it is far from isomorphic. Policymakers must carefully examine similarities and differences between the past and the present, not beholding themselves to precedent and flexibly adapting to meet emerging challenges.
Ethan Lee is a sophomore at Stanford University studying Political Science.