Outer space infrastructure forms the foundation of modern civilian and military life. From a civilian perspective, the industry is valued at nearly $360 billion and enables everything from ATM transactions to navigation. From a military perspective, global reliance on space assets is even more alarming. Space infrastructure supports virtually all warfighting efforts, including intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, drone operations, and GPS-enabled weapons. Yet, despite enabling wars across the globe, the final frontier has remained a peaceful domain. That peace might now be in jeopardy.
On July 15th, 2020, the U.S. Space Command confirmed that Russia conducted a non-destructive test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Anti-satellite weapons, which could include everything from a disruptive cyberattack to a missile launched into space, have recently increased in intensity and frequency. In 2007, China conducted a kinetic anti-satellite test against its Fengyun satellite, creating nearly 3000 trackable (and countless un-trackable) pieces of space debris. The United States and India have also conducted recent anti-satellite tests. The increased testing of anti-satellite weapons reflects a dangerous path that could bring conflict and chaos into the final frontier and threaten the modern way of life.
Alarmingly, despite the intense worldwide reliance on space infrastructure, few, if any, agreements exist to regulate the use of anti-satellite weapons in this emerging domain. With 13 spacefaring nations each with independent launch capabilities and nearly every country dependent on space assets, the likelihood of conflict in this contested, congested, and competitive domain will only increase unless states can find agreement. Moreover, states that are heavily reliant on space infrastructure would suffer the most if war were to occur. As recent destructive anti-satellite tests show, if conflict were to occur, the potential to create massive amounts of orbital debris poses a risk to all states. Concerningly, the number of debris objects has steadily increased since 1957. As more space debris accumulates, it becomes “directly related” to the expected number of future collisions. Such debris has the potential at best to force satellites to perform evasive maneuvers and at worst destroy the satellite in a direct collision. As NASA scientist Donald Kessler argued, any collision in space has the potential to create a chain reaction of subsequent collisions, leaving the orbit unusable.
In sum, as more states become reliant on space infrastructure and the threat posed by space debris increases, this article proposes that the leading space-faring nations should pursue an agreement akin to the Incidents at Sea agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to regulate the use of space weapons and establish norms of behavior in outer space. Such an agreement would at the minimum open a dialogue on acceptable behavior in outer space and could lead to more specific agreements or even a qualitative ban on certain space weapons in the future.
There is considerable historical precedent for such agreements. In 1977, the United States started a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union to ban the deployment of anti-satellite weapons. Because of the United States’ reliance on satellite infrastructure, the country favored a ban that would protect their space resources. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had more to lose from the negotiations as they had already tested an anti-satellite weapon. As a result of these differences, the discussions stalled after three rounds of negotiations.
Several legal documents govern the use of particular weapons in outer space as well; however, none regulate the use of anti-satellite weapons specifically. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty forms the bedrock of outer space law, establishing that space must remain for peaceful purposes only. The treaty also requires states to notify the international community of any activity in outer space that could cause potentially harmful interference with the activity of any other state. Of note, the United States engaged in talks with international experts before its 2008 anti-satellite test whereas the Chinese 2007 test was unannounced to the international community. The Limited Test Ban Treaty also prohibits the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space and the Environmental Modification Convention prohibits activity that would permanently change the outer space environment. Moreover, it is generally agreed that the principles of international humanitarian law would apply in outer space warfare – although the exact manner in which these principles would apply is subject to debate.
After a pause of several decades, China and Russia have renewed discussion on constraining the use of outer space weapons with their proposed “Prohibitions of the Placement of Weapons in Space” (PPWT) treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. Much of the discussion concerning the PPWT is that it fails to address all kinds of anti-satellite weapons, focusing its attention on a select few. Other qualms with the treaty include the lack of discussion on space debris – a crucial concern for most space-faring nations. Moreover, continued Russian and Chinese testing of anti-satellite weapons decreases their legitimacy in forwarding such a proposal.
Future agreements could look toward the discussions that created the Incidents at Sea Agreement during the Cold War. In the 1960s, a series of incidents between American and Soviet naval forces encouraged the United States to propose talks between the countries to prevent these incidents from escalating in severity or sparking conflict. The agreement outlined several important behavioral norms, including regulations for preventing collisions at sea and outlining applicable international legal principles. Importantly, the agreements aimed to regulate conduct in international waters rather than ban weapons. An all out ban might be too difficult at the moment, but an agreement mirroring the Incidents at Sea with an “Incidents in Space Agreement,” would provide much needed guidance and behavioral norms in an otherwise lacking realm. The agreement would ensure established principles such as the safety of navigation and freedom from interference for spacecraft. Moreover, the “Rules of the Road” approach established in the Sea Agreement has particularly useful parallels in deconflicting navigation in outer space. Notably, such an agreement would establish guidelines for placing satellites in orbit and could deny certain activities that would make space hazardous for other states (i.e. the anti-satellite testing that creates space debris). The agreement would likely find greater success than the more aggressive attempts in the past such as the 1977 ASAT negotiations or the recent PPWT proposals in that it does not ban or restrict the function of strategic space infrastructure but rather “limits the possibility of incidents” from occurring.
States are increasingly reliant on space infrastructure and this reliance is challenged by more destructive and more frequent anti-satellite weapons testing. While aggressive proposals in the past to ban or curtail these weapons have failed, a different approach, mirroring the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement could offer a useful template to start regulating harmful space behavior. Moreover, it could fare better than previous attempts at regulation in that it would establish guidelines rather than restrict the nature and function of space weapons. The international community must finally recognize that a war in space is a war with no winner.
This work is the author’s own and does not represent the views of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or the United States Air Force.