For one-party states like Vietnam, regime security is one of the indispensable components constituting national security, meaning that the ruling parties see this as their vital interest. Besides economic and territorial integrity, Vietnam sees regime security, as its core security interests. With the current domestic socio-political and economic landscapes, it behooves the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to do more to enhance its regime security in the upcoming time.
Most recently, the land dispute and its tragic consequences pose a threat to the CPV’s regime security. Because of its scale, controversy and deadliness, the incident in Dong Tam is “a culmination of 40 years of problems with land”, as described by Professor Carl Thayer, University of New South Wale, Australia. The dispute began in 2017 when the Vietnamese military began work on an airport in this area. Residents complained that about 50 hectares (124 acres) of their land had been unfairly taken over and handed to Viettel Group, Vietnam’s military-run communications company, as they had not been properly compensated. The land has been subject to a dispute with villagers afterward. In January 2020, the government mobilized thousands of policemen coming to the village to grab the land. A skirmish erupted and three policemen and a civilian named Le Dinh Kinh, 84 year-old, were killed. On 14 September, a court in Vietnam sentenced 29 people involved in this notorious disputes, with two death sentences and 27 other ones ranging from life imprisonment to 15 months suspended. Due to the incident’s complexity as well as the investigation which is criticized as lack of transparency, the verdict is deemed contentious. The CPV should worry about this incident, and more generaly, the issue of land ownership, which may raise a grave concern for the CPV’s regime security. The strict punishment for 29 villagers in Dong Tam aims to warn against any such actions threatening the regime security. It may, to some extent, be counter-effective, because it could lead to stronger dissent, even backlash against the ruling party. Imposing strict punishment or adopting any other hardline would just exacerbate the situation, in two senses. First, these methods are just preventive, not exhaustive ones, meaning that they could not ensure that incidents like Dong Tam or other violent land disputes would not happen in the future. Second, even worse, the recent verdict could be too stringent, possibly making the relationship between people involved in land disputes and the government soured, which could trigger backlash against the regime.
Another challenge for the CPV to tackle in order to protect the regime security is the economic one. Vietnam has been long enjoying a high GDP growth, turning it into one of the most potential emerging Asian markets, which is dedicated to the Party’s economic leadership. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Vietnam has been praised for its effective response by the international community, thanks to the CPV’s strong leadership again. Notwithstanding these achievements, the economic challenge to Vietnam is still existential. Similar to most countries in the region, Vietnam has been economically hit by the virus. Its GDP growth in Q2/2020 was about 0.4%, which is exceptional compared to its neighbors suffering from negative growth rate. Despite this, the growth rate is the lowest one recorded over the last three decades. Moreover, although Vietnam has done relatively well in containing the virus, it is far from being immune to COVID-19. Importantly, many other countries are warned about the second wave that may be worse by the end of this year. As there has yet been a vaccine for it, the threat of COVID-19 has not yet been totally eliminated. Given these economic repercussions and the uncertainty of the COVID-19 situation, whether Vietnam’s economy can bounce back to its previous high growth rate is questionable at best. If the CPV cannot bring back the economic momentum that it had maintained prior to the pandemic, its regime security would undoubtably be undermined by the socio-economic problems caused by COVID-19.
Additionally, the political context in Vietnam necessitates the ruling party strengthening the security regime. In January 2021, the CPV’s 13th National Congress will be tentatively held. This is the most important political event in Vietnam, which is held quinquennially. In the Congress, a new Central Committee, the highest authority within the Communist Party of Vietnam, would be elected, and crucial positions in the CPV for the 2021-2026 period will be appointed, as well as new policies and strategies in the next will be introduced. For these reasons, the following pre-Congress months would be highly sensitive. Specifically, those “hostile forces” will take advantage of this politically pivotal moment to tarnish the CPV’s domestic and international image, even to seek for regime change. They will take several CPV’s socio-economic and political issues that are arguably attributed to the CPV’s inefficiency in recent years to delegitimize its political leadership by a variety of methods, from propaganda, demonstration to backing up protests against the CPV. These actions are highly deleterious for the regime security, as they could spread “misinformation” among people. When people do not trust the ruling party, its political power would be negatively influenced, which poses a great threat to the security of the regime. Under this situation, it is even more pressing for the CPV to solidify its political leadership, an essential way for ensuring its regime security.
The above-mentioned factors undoubtedly urge the CPV to step further in maintaining its regime security. The question now is: What would they do next to achieve this goal?
1. Increase propaganda activities.
Propaganda has long been an effective instrument of the CPV to ensure its legitimacy, both in domestic and international environments. In retrospect, its propaganda system was efficacious during the COVID-19 outbreak, touching people’s nerve, bounding them together to stand with their “motherland” and overcome the crisis, as I have written elsewhere. For the sake of a successful Party’s Congress and following policies, the Party has to gain people’s trust on the regime’s legitimacy and ability to lead the country. To this extent, the propaganda apparatus is essential. Since the beginning of the year, state-run mass media channels have been frequently posting news and articles on the topic of 13th National Party Congress, what the country has achieved so far under the Party’s leadership, and future orientations for the country’s development. This will be the case in those next months until the Congress is held.
2. Maximize the security apparatus’ activities
Vietnam’s security apparatus, constituted by two major forces: police and military, is also vital for the regime security. If propaganda is the “soft” instrument, security apparatus is the “hard” one that is critical to the regime security. Analyzed previously, the “hostile forces” are currently increasing their activities against the CPV. Threats from these malign forces incentivize the CPV to implement hard method simultaneously with soft one. On the one hand, police and military would expand their activities in terms of scope and intensity to ensure that no violent protests or demonstrations take place before the Congress. On the other hand, they would have to co-ordinate with the propaganda forces to maintain the cybersecurity and counter malicious information negatively influences the CPV’s image. In fact, relevant public security units and agencies nationwide has been requested to pay attention to counter actions that are detrimental to the CPV, meaning security forces will be fully mobilized before the Congress.
3. Intensify the crackdown on corruption.
It has long regarded corruption as one of the most pressing issues that threaten the Party’s legitimacy, or to a larger extent the regime security. Widespread corruption has not only caused economic losses for the country but also plagued the ruling party. One of the most popular mottos of the CPV is: “Building a transparent and strong Party” (Xây dựng Đảng trong sạch, vững mạnh), implying that anti-graft is among its most important tasks. Granted, although the CPV is far from being free from corruption, it has shown its strong determination on cleansing the Party. Many senior Party’s members have been subject to the anti-corruption campaign over the last months, and the CPV will certainly step up this crusade to enhance its image.
Notwithstanding its merits, the CPV is still facing numerous challenges to its regime security. Therefore, strengthening the regime security would be the top priority in the Party’s agenda, and the CPV would take more actions against any threats for the regime security. For a more-than-40-year ruling party and what it has achieved, provided it acts soundly as above, its regime security would not be undermined by any detrimental factors in a remarkably serious way.
Phuong Pham is a Writer and Editor at the European Student Thinktank, and an Associate Feature Editors at E-International Relations. He has written extensively on politics, economics and international affairs, his works have appeared in well-known online platforms, including Asia Times, The Diplomat, East Asia Forum, Policy Forum and Geopolitical Monitor.