Michaela Espenschied is a Consultant currently working with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other international organizations. The opinion’s expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of UNODC.
Varied levels of civil unrest continue within the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), with the current social structures not conducive to rebuilding communities or concluding the long-term armed conflict.[1] Recent years events within the southern Philippines have enabled human rights violations, unlawful killings, an expanding breeding ground for extremist groups, and the continued conflation of the crime-terror nexus. The current threat environment in Bangsamoro, if left unaddressed, will result in the further militarization of security services, deepening of embedded grievances, the expansion of violent conflict and armed splinter groups, and the eradication of the remaining hope that the BARMM can be reconstructed. The Philippines was ranked as the 9th country most impacted by terrorism in the 2019 Global Terrorism Index, illustrating the weak governance and structural barriers faced in achieving sustainable change.[2] Without changing the current environment and levels of social responsibility within the BARMM, post-conflict change will require a political, institutional and socio-economic overhaul.
In early 2019, voters approved the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), thereby establishing the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).[3] This was a pivotal step towards bringing citizens closer to achieving self-governance and implementing peace agreements. The Bangsamoro region consists of a marginalized vulnerable population where violence has escalated following the five-month Marawi siege in 2017, where a firefight broke out between government forces and Islamic State militants. This has resulted in growing radical religious discourse and expansionist criminal actors, clan feuds (also referred to as “Rido),”[4] displaced people following the siege, and proliferating transnational organised crime.[5] This escalation has been propelled forward by President Duterte who, thus far, has addressed the conflicts root causes by further militarizing policing operations as a means of asserting dominance and ensuring social control.[6] This creates the perfect fertile environment for international and local terrorists to recruit and expand, radicalize vulnerable groups, and continue their efforts in disbanding the BARMM’s territorial integrity.
The conflicting challenges currently stalemating the Philippines
Terrorist group expansion continues to be at the forefront of discussions. Groups such as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaeda, and splinter groups are moving into new areas by exploiting local grievances, further contributing to increases in local violence and terrorist activities. Consequently, the BARMM peace process provides some legal insulation, ensuring terrorist groups are unable to be separated from the Philippines’ critical regional goals of demilitarization, inhibiting weapons proliferation, and communal reconciliation. Nationally, the Philippines continues to leverage its unique geographical position in the Celebes Seas to increase its trade links, thereby building its connectivity to the wider Southeast Asia region. The focus on promoting sustainable investments from international partners, however, remains limited and short-term in nature, as global donors continue to assess the evolving issues.
In 2014, the Philippines government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a group fighting for self-governance, produced a peace agreement, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).[7] This peace agreement provided for the normalization of separatist groups and the decommissioning of certain armed groups. Its implementation, however, has been slow due to the highly securitized policing services within the BARMM. The Philippines historical hybrid policing structure in combatting parallel conflicts has had dynamic changes and has established new norms, limiting social cohesion, and delaying successes with the post-conflict reconstruction process following the jihadists of the ISIS-linked Maute group’s destruction after the Marawi siege.[8] Additional challenges such as narcotics have created clear arguments for police militarization, due to pertaining an ‘enemy within’ component. This mindset is likely to continue, demonstrating the need for a shift in focus toward conflict resolution to proactively rebuild communities trust in institutions.
Within Bangsamoro, an area still heavily impacted by devastation following the Marawi siege, it is an area that is in dire need for a community-based policing model. There is a small window of opportunity with the upcoming 2022 elections, an optimal time for police to engage with communities, agencies, and leverage existing legal frameworks and mechanisms. Currently within Bangsamoro, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are perceived to some extent as part of the community. Following the siege there has been a complete disconnect between communities and their trust in institutions, primarily due to police’s inaction regarding prior warnings of the siege. This was further evidenced during a (2017) interview with Channel News Asia, in which the MILF leader detailed that “the longer this process takes, the more people are going to be radicalized.”[9] The current focus on terror threats is also distracting from police’s focus on other forms of crime, accompanied by delays in policy due to the uncertain political climate, traumatized internally displaced persons, outward discrimination toward Muslims, and the community’s previous homes still resembling a war zone.[10]
The clan and “Rido” ties are destroying efforts of community reconstruction, essentially identity-based structures due to family being at the pinnacle of activity in Mindanao. These ties lead individuals to engaging or supporting extremist groups, primarily due to counting their relatives by either blood or marriage among its members.[11]
Response Capabilities
Whilst newsworthy in the Philippines and Southeast Asian media, there is very little mentioned on conflict in the BARMM on the world stage. Efforts including detailed overviews from institutions coupled with proactive action is necessary to continue encouraging international investments, protect communities and further strengthen the rule of law. Without consistent regional and global attention, increasing cooperation between terror groups will continue. Governments and agencies need to set aside differences, strengthen linkages and leverage existing mechanisms and frameworks with international groups.[12] Manila and Jakarta have collaborated to strengthen security measures within the Celebes Sea to address potential reinforcement by Indonesian militants, according to the Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)’s evidence that Islamic State-aligned militant groups in Indonesia are allegedly aiding counterparts in Marawi.[13] This questions if maritime routes between Indonesia and the Philippines prove an optimal mobility corridor for migration and free terrorist movement, adding to concerns that maritime routes operate as an effective back-door. This has also produced additional concerns from experts in the region regarding the increasing practice of foreigner’s efforts in training locals in suicide bombing methodologies.[14] Clearly, these are routes that need to be more closely monitored and discussed openly in the media.
The Philippine government lacks consistency in its accountability and upholding the rule of law. There have been numerous attacks on government targets, whilst the government’s response to terror threats remains limited due to the lack of coordination, capacity and geographical challenges.[15] Field interviews by UN Women have revealed consistent communal dissatisfaction with the government’s response and lack of accountability regarding the siege, with interviewees reiterating that returning to their homes and regaining their sense of belonging and identity is vital to efforts for post-conflict reconstruction.[16] Internationally, the United Nations Security Council’s security sector reform for the BARMM recognized 4 key focal points: political; economic; social and institutional. Although helpful in foundational knowledge for the wider institutional change required, its implementation remains slow moving. At the same time, while President Duterte supports the peace agreements, existing parallel conflicts illustrate that a security overhaul is necessary, which seems a remote possibility. There has been no acceptance from the government that these events occurred, nor any economic relief provided. The destruction essentially remains as open wounds with the government not upholding the rule of law and allowing resentment to fester, ensuring that communities vulnerability to terrorist recruitment increases. The Philippine Government needs to act now as this is already long overdue.
The government’s effort includes an anti-terror bill proposal, which ensures stronger authority regarding terrorism, although arguably weakens and dilutes human rights safeguards, effectively stifling dissent.[17] Met by waves of protests, the bill remains controversial due to its contribution toward the securitization of communities by cracking-down on anyone progressively opposing the state. Depending on its implementation, the new bill could be another security mechanism for silencing specific voices. Moreover, the Philippines has released minimal information on how it manages returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). This is an issue which must be addressed, as data suggests those of neighbouring countries with different legal structures, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, of having an increasing number of returning FTFs from the Middle East who are travelling to the Philippines as an alternative to their home countries.[18] Until action is taken to address the root causes of these issues, vulnerable groups will continue to feel increasingly neglected by the government, ensuring continued vulnerability to exploitation.
From a law enforcement perspective, ongoing clan conflicts and illicit activities continue to undermine communities trust in government and reform efforts. The local population is divided, which is further exacerbated by the pressure of heavily armed PNP officers and increasing random security checks, promoting the idealized “security state”. Securitization remains a key challenge for police, as an entrenched human rights-based approach is required, further underpinned by de-securitization, to alter peace discussions with communities. Links between clan members and insurgency groups also require further examination, although it is critical that the PNP remain impartial to prevent ‘choosing sides’ within local communities. Police’s role is to remain proactive in de-escalating community tensions and breakdown the current silo-system of policing that is restricting collaboration.
Traditional Policing: Shifting priorities and evolving evidence-based best practices
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is distancing itself from traditional policing whilst maintaining a heavy visual presence in the BARMM. This is due to a focus shift in pursuing terrorist groups, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and New People’s Army (NPA). There is an escalating integration of militarized practices within the Armed Forces, with potential ramifications ensuring their work becomes framed by the government as opposed to communities. This is highly problematic; it alters the mindset of policing and is not representative of community values or public discourse. A focus on de-securitization is needed in the BARMM to reduce the current local trust deficit stemming from the recent siege’s violence and continued trauma. This will be beneficial in promoting the Philippines new National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, critical in its promotion of a ‘whole of nation’ approach.
The PNP have largely responded to the Armed Forces shift in priorities, having ‘picked up the slack’ in responding to more regular law and justice issues, whilst increasing a heavy physical presence to restrict terrorist movement. The Philippines also established Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPST) which sit under the Police Regional Office Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (PROBAR) Republic Act No. 11054, consisting of members from the PNP and AFP, in efforts to work together on common mandates and break down the siloed nature of coordination mechanisms evident in current policing efforts. Untrained volunteers are also utilized, however this is not recommended in crisis areas due to their susceptibility to local policies and directives.
Despite the agreed upon legal basis, implementation of security practices remains highly contested within Bangsamoro. Some provinces, such as the Lanao Del Norte, rejected inclusion in the BARMM due to lingering distrust of the MILF group, with leaders expressing reservations regarding disarmament due to the already fragile community trust.[19] Additional concerns were expressed within Muslim communities regarding potential discrimination, however, the government implied that terrorism’s definition in the proposed anti-terror bill ought to protect them. This is another indication of complete ignorance regarding the harsh daily realities experienced within local BARMM communities.
Current Community-Based Policing Initiatives
Non-state actors continue to undermine peace efforts, demonstrating action moving forward must avoid further escalating violence. Terror groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), remnants of the Maute Group, and ASG, undertook heavy losses within the Marawi siege, with many fighters remaining in western Mindanao now constituting the remaining survivors of ISIS-links.[20] Moreover, there have been controversial discussions surrounding integrating previous MILF combatants into policing’s lower ranks, to be controlled by external officers outside the BARMM. This argument remains two-fold in relation to the reconstruction process, as previous combatants not integrated have minimal opportunities in re-integrating into society and having a sustainable livelihood. In contrast, integration of previous MILF combatants could impact on the quality of policing efforts, relations amongst differing groups, creating additional tensions, and questions how realistically integrated combatants would be monitored considering external supervision.
In supporting local law enforcement, gender capacity-building is needed with a focus on the role of women. There should be further efforts in training law enforcement regarding gendered drivers in all aspects of policing. Currently within the BARMM, women are often neglected, experience minimal cultural sensitivity, or met with compassion fatigue. This has been linked directly to the normalization of violence, with women often labelled as ‘hijab troopers.’[21]
Identity will remain a key feature in reconstructing the BARMM, with resentments growing stronger if current conditions remain unchanged. In 2015, the Community and Service-Oriented Policing (CSOP) system was introduced, which focused on relationship-building between police and communities to foster cohesiveness. The Bangsamoro Autonomous Region annual PRO-BAR accomplishment report (2019) stated community policing activities included community awareness lectures on crime prevention, public safety, anti-illegal drugs campaigns, conflict resolution and advocacy.[22] To ensure long-term sustainable progress, these efforts must be continued regularly to strengthen local mechanisms and achieve successful post-conflict reconstruction.
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) implementation of the “Community and Service-Oriented Policing” (CSOP) nation-wide framework was only piloted in Manila, Valenzuela City and Palawan since its’ 2015 launch. [23] The further rolling out of the framework was due to occur in March 2020, although cancelled due to COVID-19 with minimal information regarding tentative future planning.
Reconstruction in Communities: Post-conflict Engagement
To reconstruct the BARMM and achieve sustainable change, an examination of the crime-terror nexus is necessary, with a particular focus on the MILF. The government needs to consider that anti-government sentiments remain high amongst those displaced, in addition to continued indications of ongoing (successful) recruitment efforts by extremist groups within camps.[24] Reconstruction must address factors assisting other transnational organised crime, such as the possibility of MILF re-integration efforts into law enforcement and how this could potentially impact re-construction efforts. There is a distinct vulnerability with the Philippines’ border security, with numerous criminal groups motivations stemming from criminal proceeds and opportunities available through maritime exploitation. With the Philippines’ increasing trade efforts and regional connectivity, this must also be closely monitored. Furthermore, as the ripple effects from the Marawi siege remain, it is critical to assess how its post-conflict viability continues to impact the BARMM, as the rehabilitation promises from the Duterte administration continue to lack successful implementation, therefore continuing to foster resentment, further conflict, and all hopes that the population may be able to their home in Marawi.
The Philippines differs from other countries in Southeast Asia due to its lack of accessibility, although there appears to be corruption and arms trafficking, enabling the support of armed terror groups in conflicts for extended time-periods. Culturally, bearing arms represents prestige and personal security, although law enforcement continues to identify arms trafficking as a priority due to continuing high-demand. This evolving scope must include gender at the forefront of discussions, with women leading the way in capacity-building efforts to address the root causes of these issues: poverty; unemployment; lack of access to justice; good governance; discrimination and prolonged displacement.[25] Moving forward, an organised crime threat assessment would be highly beneficial in the Philippines, in addition to the de-commissioning of weapons (coupled with progressive action to support it) and further conflict resolution training for local police.
Evolving in Methodology for Achieving Sustainable Change: The Way Forward
The underlying conditions of instability present in Mindanao must be addressed to discourage aspiring militants. The anti-terror bill would be wise to follow other countries examples in this area, such as Canada and Australia, as their evidence-based successful practices focus on implementing protection mechanisms for identified vulnerable groups and the management of vulnerabilities post-radicalization.[26] Moreover, a continued emphasis on police training in conflict resolution is needed, and engagement with the population through a gender-oriented lense. Considerations must include reducing accessibility of firearms, in addition to PNP impartiality surrounding group tensions. This is critical in de-escalating tensions and taking the initial steps forward for Bangsamoro’s reconstruction.
In the global ‘war on terror,’ it is far too often that terrorists’ grievances are delegitimized and met with militarized responses, as evidenced within Bangsamoro. Known risks and problems are clear results of this declared war, and it is time to use legislation as a vehicle toward reform. Current practices remain ineffective. The Philippines National Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism has seen minority groups neglected, escalating tensions, and all out chaos thus far. Now is the time to reconsider how we police terrorism and rebuild communities.
Michaela Espenschied is a Consultant currently working with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other international organizations. The opinion’s expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of UNODC.
[1] Edwin Fernandez, “Fighting between MILF leaders displaces 2K families,” Philippine News Agency, June 8, 2020.
[2] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism,” Sydney,
(November 2019). Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/reports (Accessed: June 2020).
[3] Mathew Bukit, “In Mindanao, BARMM Is Only the Beginning,” The Diplomat, March 12, 2019.
[4] International Crisis Group, “Southern Philippines: Tackling Clan Politics in the Bangsamoro,” International Crisis Group (April 2020): 4-37.
[5] Alexandra Amling (UN Women Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific), “Gender at the nexus of violent extremism and trafficking in persons in Muslim Mindanao,” UN Women, (June 2020): 6-36.
[6] Emily Rauhala, “Liberated and angry,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2017.
[7] UN Women, “The Marawi Siege: Women’s Reflections Then and Now (Briefing Note),” UN Women, 2019: 1-12.
[8] Alireza Ahmadi, “How America’s Wars in Asia Militarized the Police at Home,” The Diplomat, June 18, 2020.
[9] Michael Hart, “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters Assume ISIS’ Mantle in the Philippines’ Troubled South,” Geopolitical Monitor, February 12, 2018.
[10] Emily Rauhala, “Liberated and angry,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2017.
[11] Juliette Loesch, “The GPH-MILF Peace Process In The Philippines To Prevent And Transform Violent Extremism In Mindanao,” SAGE Publications, Vol 12., No. 2 (August 1 2017): 96-100.
[12] Jeremy Douglas and Niki Esse De Lang, “After Marawi: Lessons, Root Causes, The Future,” in ASPI Counterterrorism Policy Centre: Counterterrorism Yearbook 2020, (Australian Strategic Policy Institute: ACT, Australia, March 2020): 53-57.
[13] Bong S. Sarmiento, “Islamic State’s backdoor to the Philippines,” Asia Times, October 10, 2017.
[14] Raul Dancel, “Foreign terrorists in Mindanao training suicide bombers: Philippine security officials,” The Straits Times, July 23, 2019.
[15] Institute for Economics & Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism,” Sydney,
(November 2019). Available from: http://visionofhumanity.org/reports (Accessed: June 2020).
[16] UN Women, “The Marawi Siege: Women’s Reflections Then and Now (Briefing Note),” UN Women, 2019: 1-12.
[17] Ratziel San Juan, “’ ‘Anti-terror’ bill defines terrorism vaguely but has clear and specific dangers,” PhilStar Global, May 30, 2020.
[18] Emma Broches, “Southeast Asia’s Overlooked Foreign Fighter Problem,” Lawfare, June 5, 2020.
[19] Mathew Bukit, “In Mindanao, BARMM Is Only the Beginning,” The Diplomat, March 12, 2019.
[20] Michael Hart, “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters Assume ISIS’ Mantle in the Philippines’ Troubled South,” Geopolitical Monitor, February 12, 2018.
[21] Apipa Bagumbaran, “Cultural sensitivity, human rights integrated in Marawi rehab activities,” Mindanao Daily, June 24, 2019.
[22] Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process, “First Quarter 2019 Accomplishment Report,” 2019.
[23] Resolution No. 2015-342, National Police Commission, Republic of the Philippines: Department of the Interior and Local Government (Accessed at: https://www.napolcom.gov.ph/ExternalLink/RES%202015-342.pdf).
[24] Jeremy Douglas and Niki Esse De Lang, “After Marawi: Lessons, Root Causes, The Future,” in ASPI Counterterrorism Policy Centre: Counterterrorism Yearbook 2020, (Australian Strategic Policy Institute: ACT, Australia, March 2020): 53-57.
[25] Jeremy Douglas and Niki Esse De Lang, “After Marawi: Lessons, Root Causes, The Future,” in ASPI Counterterrorism Policy Centre: Counterterrorism Yearbook 2020, (Australian Strategic Policy Institute: ACT, Australia, March 2020): 53-57.
[26] Charissa Luci-Atienza, “’This will save many, many lives,’: Cayetano firm on the merits of the anti-terrorism bill,” Manila Bulletin, June 15, 2020.