The New Ottoman: Turkish Foreign Policy, Erdoğan’s Libyan Adventure, and the Ideal US Response

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Introduction

Known as the sick man of Europe in its dying days, the Ottoman Empire, a Muslim polity that straddled the entirety of the Middle East at its zenith, was long heralded as a bridge between the East and the West dating back to the Seljuk conquest of Constantinople. Although not nearly as powerful or influential as its predecessor, modern Turkey under President Recep Erdoğan aspires to exert a similar pull over global affairs and reclaim its past Ottoman glory. From Syria to Libya, Erdoğan has proven himself capable of deploying troops into other countries to protect and uphold Turkey’s geopolitical interests.

America should negotiate a ceasefire to the Libyan civil war that will preserve the UN-backed Libyan government and Turkish interests while also protecting the political position/standing of its principal opponent Khalifi Haftar. Doing so will encourage Turkey to align with the Western powers in other regional proxy wars and to check Russia’s growing influence in the Middle East and North Africa. In light of the repeated and failed attempts by other countries and international organizations to broker a peace agreement in Libya, America may be the only credible actor on the international stage with the necessary influence to bring all of Libya’s warring parties to the negotiating table. By assisting Erdoğan and the UN-backed Libyan government through a US-sponsored ceasefire, America and other Western countries would form a common front against Islamic terrorism in Libya and would likely extract concessions from Turkey in other regional conflicts.

If the US does not assume a leading role in any potential Libyan ceasefire, Russia will instead, as exemplified by its recent brokering of a ceasefire in Idlib, Syria with Turkey. In fact, Moscow has indicated its eagerness to sponsor several Libyan-related mediation initiatives, which will further expand the Russian sphere of influence in North Africa. If steps are not taken to bring Turkey back into the Western community, Turkey will veer towards countries hostile to the West, and its government will continue its spiraling descent towards authoritarianism. It is imperative that America and its allies check the advances made in the Middle East by rising, anti-Western hegemons such as Russia and China before their grip over the region’s affairs becomes too strong to dislodge.

The Libyan Civil War

Instead of stabilizing Libya, the 2011 Western-backed overthrow of the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi further heightened tensions between the country’s people based on divergent religious, sectarian, and ethnic lines. As there was no one central power to fill the vacuum left after Gaddafi’s removal from office, the country became a breeding ground for terrorism. The democratically-elected GNC parliament initially exhibited some promise in uniting Libya, but its Islamist inclined policies alienated opposing parties that espoused more liberal and moderate platforms.

The popular backlash to the policies of the GNC and its refusal to disband and hold new elections after its mandate expired was such that a rival parliament, the Libyan House of Representatives, emerged to reconsolidate control of the country. As the outbreaks of fighting between Libya’s rival parties grew worse and as Islamic militant activity steadily increased, the House of Representatives was forced to flee the Libyan capital of Tripoli for Tobruk. It also appointed Khalifi Haftar, a general from the Qaddafi regime, as the commander of the Libyan army. As the civil war intensified, Haftar and the House of Representatives refused to recognize the legitimacy of Libya’s interim government, the GNA, and continued their military operations. The GNA, a unity government that would include all of the Libyan civil war factions, was formed under the UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement, which intended to broker a ceasefire among Libya’s warring parties due to the prior infighting between the GNC, the House of Representatives, and other political groups. A number of nations including France, Russia, and the UAE back Haftar due to his anti-Islamist political leanings and his aggressive stance against ISIS even though the United Nations has recognized the current legitimacy of the Libyan government and ordered an arms embargo to curb the fighting.

As is the case with conflicts in many of its Middle Eastern and North African counterparts, the civil war in Libya has evolved into a regional proxy war, where outside nations back the warring domestic parties and risk further destabilizing the country. Islamic militant groups such as ISIS have seized on the ensuing chaos, which further abets the rise of terrorism to the detriment of the local populace and Libya’s political institutions. In the past, Haftar, although he is currently more agreeable to peace talks, has rejected past Turkish and Russian calls for an immediate ceasefire, which undermines international efforts to stabilize the country and unify it against ISIS. In turn, Turkey and the Libyan government have rejected Egypt’s plan for a ceasefire, and Egypt, a Haftar ally, has threatened to intervene militarily if Libya and Turkey take the city of Sirte. For any potential ceasefire to work effectively, the US must prevail upon Haftar and the Libyan government as well as their sovereign backers to lay down their arms. Also, the ceasefire must mandate that Haftar and the House of Representatives be granted representation within the framework of the current Libyan government. In light of the sudden and decisive Turkish intervention in Libya that has tipped the balance in the GNA’s favor, the US must also pay some heed to Turkey’s wishes for the country’s future if a ceasefire is to take place.

Turkish Intervention in Libya

The passage of a one year mandate by the Turkish National Assembly that deployed troops to Libya marked the beginning of Turkey’s armed intervention in the Second Libyan Civil War. Since January, the Turkey military, with the assistance of Syrian mercenaries, has successfully removed Haftar’s forces from several towns and reconnected Libya with the Tunisian borders. Multiple countries condemned the Turkish intervention in Libya for unduly meddling in Libya’s sovereignty contrary to the principles of international law. After signing a maritime arrangement with Libya granting Turkey access to waters in the southwest of the Eastern Mediterranean, Erdoğan seems poised to undercut an Israeli, Greek, and Cypriot €6 billion gas pipeline deal as part of the EastMed energy project. America’s leading role as an impartial arbiter in any potential Libyan ceasefire could bring Libya’s warring parties together to put aside their differences and to form a common front against terrorist groups like ISIS. Also, regardless of one country’s geopolitical interests, the world has an interest in seeing peace and stability restored in Libya. As America and Turkey both have a vested interest in ending the Libyan civil war, cooperation between the two countries on this front would not only pave the way for substantial progress in the Libyan peace-making process but also lead to a marked improvement in US-Turkey relations.

US Foreign Policy Towards Turkey

Although America and Turkey have been allies since the dawn of the Cold War, contemporary US-Turkish relations have worsened throughout this decade as Ankara continues to drift from the West. The most significant and recent development in US–Turkey relations under the Trump administration began when President Trump ordered the withdrawal of the American military from northern Syria  due to an incoming Turkish incursion into Kurdish territory. In a near-total victory for Turkey after its foray, Erdoğan promised that he would not exact retribution against the Kurds, a long-standing US ally in the Middle East, if they retreated from their positions. If America can assist Turkey with its interests in Libya, Turkey would likely be more receptive to respecting American interests in Syria. Hypothetically speaking, the US could use its support of the Turkish position for a ceasefire in Libya as a bargaining chip to end Turkish reprisals against the Kurds and other American-backed forces in Syria and to urge a more proactive Turkish stance against ISIS. Finally, a successful US sponsored peace arrangement with Turkey and other leading powers in Libya could open the door for other similar, multilateral peace negotiations to take place in the Middle East’s various warzones under the mantle of American leadership. 

Conclusion

A US sponsored peace conference to end the Libyan civil war presents a golden opportunity for American leadership in the Middle East and North Africa. It would placate Turkey, form a broad international coalition against ISIS, and bring an end to the untold suffering and devastation inflicted on thousands of Libya’s citizens by its own warring parties after Gaddafi’s removal from power. American cooperation with Turkey in Libya could herald the dawn of a new US-Turkish partnership that could dampen the flames that have spread across the entire Middle East. By acting as a peacemaker with American cooperation in this conflict and others instead of being a continual belligerent, Turkey could live up to its past historical promise as a link between the West and East and pay homage to its Ottoman roots as a Middle Eastern power-broker, albeit in a very different light.