At first glance, the current UK-EU negotiations remark a new step forward towards ‘a fully independent Britain’ from the European law and institutions. But looking deeper we can find that they reflect the previous Brexit negotiations in 2017-2018 when the UK was still a part of the EU. Same contradictions, rhetoric, strategy from both sides. In this piece, I will explore the similarities and differences between the previous and current UK-EU negotiations and argue that, in fact, these talks are rather alike in terms of the UK and EU approaches. Thus, the Tory Government should finally learn from previous mistakes and negotiate a trade deal which will be the least harmful for the UK. Another question for all of us is – if everything is similar, will it lead to the same results: such as another extension, vague deal and change of PM?
‘OK, the situation may be the same, but the context is different’ – a reader would argue. Indeed, the Covid-19 pandemic has frustrated plans for proper negotiations which now have to be conducted online. And that alone is disturbing. For example, instead of discussing trade agreements face-to-face, going out to grab a coffee and fresh air, have lunch together while talking and finding possibilities, the UK and EU negotiators, like all of us, are stuck with their computer screens. No doubt, negotiating online is much more challenging.
Moreover, one may argue that with Boris Johnson’s Government, the strategy of leaving the EU would be ‘harder’ and tougher than ever before, thus not comparable to Theresa May’s strategy. In fact, Theresa May’s Government was also proposing ‘hard’ Brexit but the plan slid down to ‘soft’ version in the end (otherwise the UK was risking not leaving EU at all). My suggestion is that the UK will possibly follow the same scenario today and even PM’s line ‘take back control’ is perhaps going to shift to ‘take back some control, but in many areas, everything will be the same’.
The period of struggle between the UK and EU to reach a proper deal, from June 2017 to November 2018, is a very interesting process for two reasons. First, it is amusing to trace a clear evolution from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ versions of Brexit strategy from the UK. Second, it is a great lesson for the current UK negotiators on ‘how not to reach a no-deal’ and ‘how not to plan negotiations’.
As a reminder, the negotiations with the EU started in June 2017 after the then UK PM Theresa May triggered the Article 50 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union which states that ‘any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union’. First phase of negotiations officially ended in November 2018 when both actors came to sign the key negotiation documents – the Agreement and the Political Declaration.
By June 2017, the United Kingdom approached the first stage of negotiations from the ‘hard’ positions prescribed by the Government in the white paper and often voiced by the Prime Minister Theresa May during this period. The main points of the ‘hard Brexit’ strategy were: the abolition of the jurisdiction of the EU Court, parliamentary sovereignty, its own new system of migration control, exit from the single market and the EU customs union. In today’s negotiations, these points remain the same but the UK is trying to cherry-pick benefits from the EU single market, in other words, ‘softening’ this ‘hard Brexit’.
However, as we have seen, most of these points of the plan were not supported by clear and specific implementation steps, which have seriously affected plan’s effectiveness in negotiations. In response, the EU presented its own negotiation strategy, no less stringent. Brussels immediately made it clear that the four freedoms of the EU single market are indivisible, and any membership privileges for the member states that leave the EU cannot be preserved. The Europeans actually took control of the negotiations, specified all the negotiation aspects, and even then, reduced the ability of the British to manoeuvre. Nowadays, this state of affairs is still relevant: no wonder, since 2017 the EU has not yet changed its ‘victorious’ stance on dealing with the UK.
Recognizing favourable domestic political trends, the country held early elections in June 2017, which, unfortunately for Tory and PM, led to a deterioration in the political situation, not in favour of the Brexiteers. Meanwhile, during the negotiations, the lack of specific goals and objectives on the British side took place. The EU accused the UK of not being ready to conduct a dialogue, and, as a result, the ‘hard Brexit’ strategy could not be implemented at all. Even though 2019 general election showed the majority support to Johnson’s ‘hard Brexit’, similarities between 2017 and 2019 elections are more or less clear: both PMs wanted to gain support for its Brexit stance and in both elections the Brexit agenda was on top, a leading force. However, giving credits to Boris Johnson, he actually recognised the favourable political trends and won more seats for Tories to ‘get Brexit done’.
In June 2017, the general election results led to another aggravation of the political situation in the country. Including the lack of progress at the first stage of negotiations with the EU, that all made the Government think about a radical change of strategy. In the late 2017 and the beginning of 2018, we experienced the UK’s transition from hard to soft Brexit strategy, described in the Checkers Plan and the white paper that followed. Since then, we are talking about close relations with the EU after the exit, access to the single internal market of EU goods, signing of a comprehensive customs agreement, etc. But this plan was also sceptical: ‘Brexiteers’ considered it too soft, while ‘Remainers’ – not soft enough. British analysts summarised the Government’s plan by inventing a new neologism ‘Brino‘ (Brexit in a name only). This transition from one extreme to another did not suit Brussels initially, once again recalling the indivisibility of the EU internal market. Consequently, there was no considerable progress at the second stage of negotiations in 2018 either.
Eventually, pushing each other to reach at least some kind of a deal, in a hurry, both parties adopted the key negotiation documents. Indeed, these documents, being the results of the second stage of negotiations, can be considered a big victory for the European diplomacy – all the conditions set by Brussels to London back in 2017 were fulfilled in them. The Europeans have a big chance to win current negotiations too. Their never-changing no-compromise strategy is leading the discussions while British side seems to be unheard. However, the UK negotiators are nevertheless trying to push British agenda perhaps stronger than during the previous negotiations (one example of that is the UK negotiator David Frost’s letter to Michel Barnier). Even though Boris Johnson sees ‘no reason why Brexit deal cannot be sealed by the end of July’, it is always up to the EU leaders to decide.
Not to mention that the 2018 withdrawal agreement (revised later in 2019) had most of its provisions very declarative and did not change the essence of the EU-UK relationship at all. Issues of trade, the status of the Irish border and other were postponed to be dealt with today in 2020. There is quite a probability that the same destiny awaits the current negotiations as well. Indeed, nobody can guarantee that a “comprehensive” trade deal with the EU will not leave something important in tiny print on the margins, or ‘to be discussed later’. As we see now, all parties want to reach a proper deal fast but obviously without harm to their national/community interests.
Furthermore, it is important to see which factors have affected the transformation of the UK Brexit negotiation strategy and explore whether these factors are influencing the negotiations in 2020.
Shifting from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ Brexit in 2017-2018 happened because of the difficulties the UK decision-makers encountered in, first, understanding political trends and drawing right conclusions from them. Second, there is no doubt that UK was lost and uncertain, because of the contradictions that divide it into at least three parts: those who stand for 1) a comprehensive deal Brexit (soft); 2) take back control and possible no-deal Brexit (hard); 3) another referendum. More importantly, this division made it troublesome to come up with a proper goal and objectives towards negotiations with the EU. Indeed, the lack of exact aim made UK position in Brexit talks much weaker than EU’s one. All of the above has led to the ministerial leapfrog, and split in the ruling party, the opposition, as well as in the British society as a whole.
Thankfully, today we are not experiencing such a divide like in 2017-2018. Because of the Covid-19 pandemic, public attention is hugely shifted to dealing with the current crisis, although people should be aware that no deal with the EU (43%/51% of all UK exports/imports) can be much more economically disastrous than the pandemic. Moreover, it looks like current negotiations are the same zero-sum game as before: one party wants to get the maximum possible benefit for itself at the expense of the negotiating partner. The victory of ‘hard Brexiteers’ in 2019 general election (Johnson, Cummings, Frost, Gove and other architects of Brexit) ruled out the 2017-2018 problem of ministerial leapfrog and split in Tory party. Even though there are signs of unity and consolidation in the Labour opposition with its new leader Keir Starmer, I believe we should not exclude ‘the division of Labour’ from the agenda. The split in the British general public opinion on the relationship with the EU has also not disappeared, especially when the ratio of Eurosceptics and Eurooptimists is changing. Yes, the corona-crisis and survival during the pandemic are on top of mind but the Brexit is not yet a solved puzzle, even after the official leave on 31 January 2020.
Therefore, the country is indeed following some of the patterns of previous negotiations. Albeit it is the courage and (over)confidence of current negotiators that novel. Apparently, UK’s negotiator David Frost, ‘takes a maximalist position that sees any accommodation to EU jurisdiction as nullifying the sacred principles of Brexit.’ In comparison to the previous negotiations, the present UK strategy seems to be more developed, shaped and with some sort of framework in place – finishing Brexit, being fully independent ‘Global Britain’; concluding a minimal trade deal with the EU or trading purely according to the WTO rules. Comparing to Theresa May’s government which was always somewhere in the middle between Remainers and Leavers, soft and hard, Boris Johnson is clearly and not surprisingly a dedicated leaver. But the problem is that with such a strategy it can be too hard for Britain to avoid negative economic and political consequences: costs and losses reduction should be a main priority especially now, during the Covid-19 crisis.
As the result, there are more similarities and less differences between 2017-2018 and 2020 negotiations described above, and, in many cases, the same contradictions and factors that affect(ed) UK Brexit strategy, lead us to the conclusion that the UK-EU negotiations are in fact alike. It seems that the current UK government learns something from their mistakes in 2017-2018 talks and their approach is becoming more assertive and, perhaps, purposeful. Moreover, it seems that the current Government enjoys less pressure from public, that is busy with other crucial issues, on choosing Brexit strategy towards the EU. At the same time, Covid crisis, possible second wave in Autumn and its consequences on the UK economy, may have a considerable negative impact on the way the country will conduct negotiations with the EU.
However, similar processes do mean similar results in some cases, and we can expect the new trade deal to a certain extent reflect the 2018 Agreement with its declarative provisions and postponement (like in a form of another extension) of solutions of the most important issues like fisheries or Irish border. The repeating of the 2018 scenario will be unsatisfactory to anyone. With a stronger and more pushy Labour party, or a new division inside Tory it can even lead to a change of government and earlier general elections again, for example, in 2021, so the two-years’ term Parliament trend could remain.