1. Introduction
The history of the European Union has frequently been punctuated by spats over sovereignty between Brussels and member states. It is also apparent that these have become more serious as the union has evolved towards a quasi-federal super state and is currently reaching what is described by several of its leaders as “an existential crisis”. The decisive question, “Is the EU doomed?”[1] echoes through Europe.
This article, after analysing some major democratic qualities and weaknesses of the EU, suggests that what has become known as “the democratic deficit” is the underlying cause of increasing internal tensions as well as of the sense of diminishing legitimacy and loss of support among people in many member countries.
Without question, democratic legitimacy is the foundation of how much power the Union will have in general and of how it will maintain that power. Notwithstanding, many European citizens sense that the EU has too much power in relation to how (deficiently) democratic it is, that “some powers should be returned to national governments”[2]; that is to say, in relation to their ability and opportunity to influence the Brussels machinery of government and, more importantly, to hold it accountable. Certainly, the Union operates only in areas where member states have acceded through the founding treaties, but, if such power is to be felt legitimate by the peoples of Europe, the Union must be made more effectively democratic than at present. As long as this weakness exists, the dissatisfaction of the governed will increase.
This claim is evidenced by the loss of EU support in national elections — it appears that anti-EU parties are gaining votes as societies are becoming polarised. This could clearly be observed in the Austrian presidential elections in 2016, when there was a shift from the usual centrist parties to the extremes. Why is it happening? Many commentators would agree that a large percentage of citizens of European states, are feeling constantly “overruled” by Brussels (and Berlin), and not heard in major decisions. It is therefore critical to enhance the trust of citizens in the Union by making its institutions and processes more democratically accountable.
2. The concept of democracy
Before proceeding with the analysis, the definition of democracy requires elaboration.
Created in Ancient Greece and further developed during Roman antiquity, democracy is regarded as the ideal concept of government in the 21st century. This political theory puts at its center the “demos” – the citizens, who are the pillar of state authority; those who participate in the exercise of power. In the Enlightenment philosophy of John Locke[3] and Jean-Jacques Rousseau[4], emphasis is put on the sovereignty of the people’s decision making, or popular sovereignty.
In present times, the term “democracy” bestows an “aura of legitimacy”[5] in political life. Laws, rules, and politics, are assumed to be justified if and as long as, they are derived from a democratic process. To put it differently, sufficient participation of citizens in the formation of political will must be ensured at all times. Otherwise, state actions are considered illegitimate.
Democratic legitimacy is defined as a two-dimensional concept, referring to both inputs as well as outputs of a political system and the public assessment of institutions. While input legitimacy requires a link of political decisions with citizens’ preferences, output legitimacy places emphasis on the high level of competence mechanisms or procedures.[6]
Both of these aspects must be ensured. At the EU level, it appears that the focus lies almost solely on output-oriented legitimacy rather than input-oriented legitimacy. One might even claim that the notion of legitimacy here is somewhat constructed and designed by elites who may not possess/understand the interests of the people at hand. As Fritz Scharpf argues, the EU has established a government “for the people” (output) rather than a government “of the people” (input)[7].
However, as stated previously, the key element of democracy is always the “demos”, the citizens of a state. In the Western world today, common understanding is that a majority of people’s opinion is pivotal. A sufficient integration of nation state’s citizens in EU processes is therefore highly important.
3. Democratic qualities and weaknesses of the European Union
Proceeding from the idea that the “citizen” is central to a democracy, the following analysis will discuss the democratic concepts of the European Union. It begins with its very basis: the EU’s founding treaties.
The European treaties did not have constitutional ratifications as did constitutions in states, where the people—the demos, the true sovereigns—decided to adopt the document as the instrument by which they agree to be governed. The EU’s treaty texts were negotiated by governments, to whom the citizens of the nation states had given their mandate. National referendums on whether to join the EU were held in some states[8]. However, despite this argument, the feeling among ordinary people is that they were not the “pouvoir constituant” which created the “pouvoir constitué”[9]. To invoke a historic parallel, in supporting the move from Confederation to Federalism in post-independence America, Thomas Paine emphatically stated that “a constitution is not the act of its government”[10]. Accordingly, the preamble of the constitution that was finally adopted began: “We the people… do ordain this Constitution”. That is not a claim any institution of the EU could use on its letterhead.
As a result, a significant question to pose here is: Does the European Union even have “citizens”? Who votes? Who decides? Democracy is built on the existence of a “demos”. But is there a “demos” of Europe?
Joseph Weiler[11] explains the concept of citizenship as belonging to a country and he further states that nowadays, people can belong to different or “co-existing multiple demoi”. Accordingly, it could be possible to establish a demos of the European Union, since people can be both citizens of their nation state as well as citizens of Europe. However, if this is assumed to be possible, the demos must be given effective rights of participation in democratic processes. Several changes in the EU’s structure will need to be considered, otherwise the term will remain meaningless.
One of the main problems may be that currently, the only democratically composed body in the EU is the European Parliament[12], whose members are directly appointed by citizens of the nation states. Despite these direct elections, however, the European Parliament has anomalies. Due to the differences in member states sizes, voices of citizens are weighted differently[13]. Under the current voice-allocation, citizens in smaller states have more “power” than citizens in larger states. For example, a delegate from Germany represents more voters than a delegate from Luxembourg, meaning that a German citizen’s voice weighs less than that of a Luxembourger. Thus, to European voters, it may appear that the equal voice of universal suffrage is nullified. This contradicts centuries of a basic understanding in post-Enlightenment Western countries: the French revolution’s “Égalité”, or the United States’ Declaration of Independence’s “all men are created equal”[14].
It must further be noted that at present, most decisions are not made by the directly elected delegates of the European Parliament. Instead, the Commission and the Council have a leading role in the Union’s law making. It may appear to citizens that the EU decision-making process is too non-transparent and inaccessible to the public and to voters. The European Parliament has been strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty, it monitors and reviews the actions of the Council and the Commission – and can even dismiss them through votes of “no confidence”. Yet, the EP’s importance is nowhere akin to the role of national parliaments in member states; it still has no power to initiate legislation, an authority which all domestic legislatures would regard as non-negotiable. Further, it creates the impression among voters that in the real world, the EU is an institution that is failing its citizens – unable to deal with the challenges that concern their daily lives. People can vote, but they are voting for an insufficiently powerful Parliament. Consequently, perhaps, barely 40 per cent of the electorate actually vote. The turnout of the upcoming elections in May 2019 remains to be seen.
4. Conclusion
In a modern democratic society, the power lies with the citizens: it is a power of the people, a popular sovereignty. Currently however, citizens of EU member states seem to feel that this concept is not sufficiently implemented, that their interests are continuously neglected. The Union has undoubtedly sought to establish democratic concepts. EU citizens can vote directly in parliamentary elections. As shown above however, many of the Union’s institutions and procedures show deficits and must be further developed. Present weaknesses need to be eliminated, so that citizens of member states cease to consider themselves unheard by political elites. Certainly, a possible objection here may be that we find ourselves in a dilemma – we (Europeans) want greater solidarity and unity/accountability, but procedural changes of such sort require both compliance and consensus from member states. But through a strengthening of democratic processes, the Union can be brought closer to the people. And in the final analysis, the key issue is not access to the ballot box by the governed, but the accountability of those who govern.
Despite the recent criticism, one cannot fail to acknowledge that the EU was a “great success for many years” and an important “postmodernist project”[15]. It connects European countries and citizens in a union of trade, peace, and cultural exchange, and is of vital importance to European states and peoples. Therefore, Brussels in all its manifestations, must acknowledge the reasons for the dissatisfaction of citizens and work towards improvement. Only this will stabilise the EU’s power and ensure favorable public opinion; for above all, “how citizens think and talk about the EU and its institutions, that is, their identities, values and discourse, is as important for the democratic construction of legitimacy as are the democratic practices that infuse the institutions with legitimacy”[16]. An emphasis must be put on the democratic will of the people of Europe, so that the EU can accommodate the people’s will through formal or even non-formal measures, practices and laws that facilitate civil society integration. It is quite clear from observing current political movements in member states that if the European institutions fail to embrace these realities, people will never fully accept them.
[1] Jan Zielonka, Is the EU doomed? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).
[2] Pew Research Centre, “Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit” – “Disagreement on ‘ever closer’ union”, June 2016 Global Attitudes Survey http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/07/euroskepticism-beyond-brexit/ [Accessed May 2019]
[3] John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 1690 (Project Gutenberg, 2005).
[4] Jean Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique 1762 (Paris: Union Générale d’Éditions, 1963), pp. 18-20.
[5] David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 3.
[6] Mijke Boedeltje / Juul Cornips, Input and output legitimacy in interactive governance, NIG Annual Work Conference Rotterdam No. NIG2-01 (2004), p. 2; Joseph Weiler, “In the Face of Crisis: Input Legitimacy, Output Legitimacy and the Political Messianism of European Integration”, Journal of European Integration Vol. 34, Iss. 7 (2012), p. 828.
[7] Fritz Scharpf, “Regieren in Europa – effektiv und demokratisch?“, Schriften des Max-Planck-Instituts für Gesellschaftsforschung, Sonderband (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 1999), pp. 16-28.
[8] On joining the European Communities: Referenda in 1972 in France, Ireland, Denmark; Enlargement of 1995: Referenda in 1994 in Austria, Finland, Sweden; Enlargement of 2004: Referenda in 2003 in Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Latvia. Norwegian Social Science Data Services (Norsksenter for forskningsdata).
[9] Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Qu’est-cequele Tiers-État? précédé de l’Essai sur les privilèges 1788 (Paris: Classiques Sciences Sociales, 2008), p. 84.
[10] Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: Common Sense and other Political Writings 1792, ed. Mark Philp, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 238.
[11] Joseph Weiler, “To be a European citizen – Eros and civilization”, Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 4 , Iss. 4 (1997), p. 509.
[12] Catherine Barnard, The substantive Law of the EU – The four freedoms, 5th ed., Oxford University Press (2016).
[13] Alexander Thiele, Europarecht, 13th ed., (Altenberge: Niederle Media, 2016), p. 72.
[14] The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription (1776), U.S. National Archives and Records Administration https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript [Accessed May 2019].
[15] Jan Zielonka speaking at the University of Sydney, “The end of the European Dream: From Kiev to Rome” (12. June 2014), http://sydneydemocracynetwork.org/event-the-end-of-the-european-dream-from-rome-to-kiev/ [Accessed May 2019].
[16] Vivien Schmidt, “Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Output, Input and Throughput”, KFG Working Paper Series, no. 21. Berlin: FU, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe“ (2010) p. 25.