In 1962, Jürgen Habermas published The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, an impressive socio-historical analysis of state and society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Habermas meticulously detailed the formation of the Öffentlichkeit or the ‘public sphere’ — the space within citizens’ social lives in which they engage in critical discourses. This began with bourgeois society, in which limited participants engaged in discourses relating to the literary public sphere, discussing and critiquing contemporary literature. Yet the political, social, and economic conditions of the period also promoted the formation of a political public sphere, with newspapers and journals allowing the widespread dissemination of information. Discussion became concerned with uncovering pressing societal and political problems, potential solutions, and deeper normative questions. Its functioning was facilitated by a large degree of intersubjectivity in regards to claims to ‘truth’ and ‘rightness’ in discussion, which emerged from uniform access to information and widely accepted norms (each within the bourgeois class). The discursive process between participants would generate public opinions and ideas which would then permeate the organs of the state wherein collective action could be realised.
During the twentieth century, the political public sphere had expanded with greater enfranchisement, generating more inclusive and discursively informed political decisions. An expanded sphere created demand for greater mediation between discourse participants: the enfranchised class was no longer composed of only those with the resources to peruse relevant information and regularly deliberate, whilst the enfranchisement of heterogeneous cleavages demanded communication between networks. Highly regulated by journalistic norms such as factuality, news media could identify, process, and disseminate relevant information, issues, and interpretations across the different cleavages, producing conditions conducive to inclusive and well-reasoned deliberation and hence political outcomes.
In The Structural Transformation, Habermas prophetically suggested the failure of media as facilitator of public deliberation. He predicted that media would become colonised by the market, where economic imperatives ensure the dissemination of only the most profitable content, such as entertainment. Expensive journalistic content would be cut, and journalistic norms shunned in favour of profit maximisation, hence media would neglect its critical mediatory functions. The political public sphere would become less inclusive, with voices no longer permeating societal cleavages, and less discursive, as people become less engaged with current affairs and the quality of content decreases, thereby ‘transforming’ the political public sphere.
Today, the spirit of this concern remains, but its realisation differs. This is the topic of Habermas’ aptly named book: A New Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Deliberative Politics. Habermas directs his attention to the emergence of digitalisation which is uprooting the dynamic of contemporary media. As predicted, market imperatives have forced traditional media outlets to decrease the quality of their offerings. However, something more interesting has occurred: whilst the mass public have become commodified, they have simultaneously become the editors and publishers of media communications. A New Structural Transformation considers these implications, situating its relevance to the political public sphere and how this domain may be rescued from the perniciousness of digitalisation.
“The egalitarian and unregulated character of the relationships between participants and the equal authorization of users to make their own spontaneous contributions constitute the communicative pattern that was originally supposed to be the hallmark of the new media.”
Habermas’ initial discussion concerns this transformation of consumers into the authors and editors of mass political communications. Through digitalisation and the widespread uptake of social media, traditional media cannot execute its norm regulated gatekeeper role. He notes the vast emancipatory potential of this: marginalised voices can, in theory, be amplified into the political public sphere, increasing inclusions (i.e., everybody can contribute to public discourse). Habermas does not develop a particularly rich account of exactly what this offers — even when considering regulatory prescriptions. The porousness between societal cleavages offered by this can increase recognition, shape shared conceptions of the good, and, in a less idyllic way, improve solidarity across boundaries, ensuring that marginalised groups have voices amplified, and mobilise individuals towards worthwhile causes. Whilst this has not been fully realised, there are clear cases where social media has empowered marginalised groups.
“One effect is the self-empowerment of media users; the other is the price the latter pay for being released from the tutelage of the old media as long as they are not yet sufficiently proficient in dealing with the media. Just as printing made everyone a potential reader, today digitalization is turning everyone into a potential author. But how long did it take until everyone was able to read?”
Despite the immense potential for greater inclusivity, Habermas correctly notes looming danger. Unregulated mass communication allows contributions which are not conducive to a discursive and inclusive political public sphere. Throughput can vary in relevance, quality, and even factuality. The latter of these concerns has proven demonstrably devastating. Misinformation and conspiracy theories disturb intersubjectivity in truth and normative rightness of contributions made in the public sphere. Without this, it becomes challenging for people of diverse backgrounds to engage in meaningful deliberation, leading to the fragmentation of the public sphere. Social media, claiming to offer an egalitarian platform, has sidestepped the regulatory responsibilities that traditional media forms adhere to, such as fact-checking. Habermas thus asks the question of when will the broad public become able to produce content which can meet the standards of deliberative politics; but the more pertinent question is can we produce content which meets the standards of deliberative politics?
“But with their daily stream of new information and interpretations, the media constantly confirm, correct and supplement the blurred everyday image of a presumptively objective world, which more or less all contemporaries assume is also accepted by everyone else as “normal” or valid.”
“The boundless communication networks that spontaneously take shape around certain topics or individuals can spread centrifugally while simultaneously condensing into communication circuits that dogmatically seal themselves off from each other.”
As both mediator of information and discursive forum, social media presents additional concerns regarding the fragmentation of the political public sphere. The algorithmic nature of digital media means that cleavages of society can be micro-targeted with narrow content relevant to them (i.e., personalisation), contrary to a media outlet addressing the broader public (or at least publishing in accordance with broadly accepted norms). Similarly, in its capacity as a forum, citizens are likely pushed towards groups which affirm their current positions and attitudes, thereby creating echo-chambers. Consequently, the political public sphere becomes less inclusive, as contributions do not permeate other associations. It also becomes less discursive as, firstly, fragmentation decreases willingness to engage with adversaries and, secondly, algorithms limit online discussion to homogeneous participants, with narrow perspectives, reasons, and justifications.
This being said, Habermas perhaps overstates the centrality of social media in fragmentation. In the United States, to which he makes persistent reference with respect to its immense polarisation since the 2016 election, political campaigns have effectively engaged in micro-targeting, and we have observed increasing echo-chambers around party camps. But Habermas does not acknowledge broader causes of social disintegration. A growing area of empirical work has considered the relationship between polarisation and trust in different social institutions — a pattern which has been growing prior to the effective use of micro-targeting. Whilst there is no doubt that digital media has furthered these issues, the exact dynamic of polarisation and the resultant fragmentation is perhaps less clear than A New Structural Transformation suggests.
“They, too, are responsible and should be liable for news that they neither produce nor edit; for this information also has the power to shape opinions and mentalities.”
Where does this leave us? Not in a good place, Habermas suggests. His solution is regulation: digital media must become responsible for published content — even if they neither produce nor edit it. This is sage but unsatisfactory advice, as it neither engages with its implications nor reaches far enough to prevent total fragmentation.
To regulate media throughput in this way would require deference to something universally recognisable. This would be difficult. Even intersubjective agreement in factuality seems far away. Consider the capitol riot of January 6th, for example. How would deference to truth help us to determine whether there was a full frontal assault on American democracy, a protest against perceived unfair electoral practices, or something else? In practice there are several questions, primarily: who could determine this? The state? An independent regulator? Setting aside normative issues such as the state’s duties, censorship, and impartiality, the perception of coercive state action as illegitimately regulating speech could further fragment the political public sphere.
Finally, and perhaps paradoxically, Habermas does not go far enough in prescriptions against fragmentation. Successful regulation to check content according to universally recognised norms may apply the brakes on fragmentation, but it would certainly not be sufficient for social integration. If online networks containing echo-chambers are already established, polarisation is prominent, and political elites continue to utilise micro-targeting, it seems unlikely that only the regulation of content according to norms could protect the inclusivity and discursivity of the political public sphere.
This article was originally published in OPR’s Issue 13: Language.
Richard Foster is a DPhil student in Politics at Mansfield College, Oxford and a Stipendiary Lecturer in Politics at Trinity College, Oxford.